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FOREWORD 
his thesis is the result of the past years’ research, consulting and discussions 
with my supervisors, my colleagues and friends, as well as travelling around 
with my laptop and papers in my backpack. This thesis would certainly not 
have been written if it were not for this combination. The idea to write a PhD came 
during my European Master in Law and Economics, while I was enjoying my time in 
Bologna in 2007 with a great group of friends. Only a few months earlier I had become 
interested in climate change policy, a topic that cuts cross so many areas of our 
everyday life, and where I felt that I contribute to improve the understanding of how 
policy works in practice. After finishing my Master thesis on the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme, I realized that the other side of the emissions trading 
“coin” is a far greater challenge: the reduction of emissions in developing countries 
through policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism. Working together with 
Delia Villagrasa, Sanjeev Kumar, and Stephan Singer at the European Policy Office of 
WWF, where I completed my master thesis, helped me to decide to focus my research 
on the Clean Development Mechanism during the European Doctorate in Law and 
Economics.  
I am grateful to Delia, Sanjeev and Stephan for their guidance and the various 
occasions we could discuss these issues. I am grateful to Professor Marco Lamandini 
and Professor Vincenzo Denicolò, who both wrote reference letters to support my 
admission to the PhD program. They are also the two scholars, great teachers and 
discussion partners, who inspired me most to continue with a doctorate after the 
master. 
As I did not have any particular knowledge of the way the Clean Development 
Mechanism works when I started my PhD, I decided to collaborate with experts in the 
field. I am grateful to my supervisors, Professor Michael Faure and Professor Marco 
Lamandini to trust in me and to support my various guest research positions at the 
University of Zurich and the German Institute for Economic Research, as well as a 
traineeship at the European Commission in the Directorate General Enterprise and 
Industry. These exchanges were in particular helpful to shape my understanding about 
the workings of the Clean Development Mechanism, its actors, as well as an 
understanding of climate policy questions from a policy-maker perspective.  
Professor Faure is a great supervisor, who patiently supported my approach to thesis 
writing. His guidance and supervision enabled me to finally put my ideas to paper. 
T 
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Thank you for your continuous support, honest feedback and encouragement at all 
times. 
Professor Lamandini has provided me with the freedom to pursue my ideas during the 
PhD as he has seen the benefit in learning from other economists and lawyers working 
on energy and climate policy. I am grateful for this invaluable support as it enabled me 
to write a thesis that is useful in practice and the application of law and economics 
concepts. The feedback that I received on early and later ideas of papers helped me 
shape the thesis into its current form. Thank you for your trust during the past years. 
Regarding my research stays, I would like to thank Axel Michaelowa, who gave me the 
opportunity to closely work with and learn from him while working at the University of 
Zurich. His continuous and invaluable feedback to early and late paper and chapter 
drafts are indispensable for the development of this book. His overview and experience 
with international climate policy as well as his research about and involvement in 
shaping the rules of the Clean Development Mechanism based on evidence were a great 
source of inspiration.  
My work at the European Commission on identifying carbon leakage sectors was an 
interesting experience that was the more rewarding as I worked under the guidance of 
and collaborated with two great, honest and open minds: Jesús Barreiro-Hurlé and 
Ingmar Jürgens. I am grateful that the friendship and collaboration extends to the 
present day. 
My collaboration with the German Institute for Economic Research and my close work 
with Karsten Neuhoff were particularly conductive for my research. Working with 
Karsten allowed me to look at climate policy from different angles, learning at the same 
time to actually write and improve paper drafts, while receiving feedback from him and 
from experts in the community. Working with Karsten meant for me constantly 
challenging economic theory, and Karsten’s rigor and enthusiasm in analysing climate 
and energy policy is encouraging. The feedback and the numerous table rounds to 
discuss and present my work, as well as numerous opportunities to collaborate with 
other researchers in the field made working with Karsten very conductive to this thesis 
and beyond.  
Several colleagues and friends contributed at various stages of the thesis writing 
process with feedback, editing of draft versions, and fruitful discussions at conferences, 
lunches and tea breaks: Aleksandra Novikova, Alexandra Quandt, Angus Johnston, 
Anja Kollmuss, Anja Rosenberg, Anne Montgomery, Anne Schopp, Charlotte Streck, 
Christian Feuerhake, Claudia Desogus, Eric Brousseau, Ferdinand Vieider, Florens 
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Flues, Hauke Hermann, Hermann Amecke, Ingrid Weyher, Jan Abrell, Jonathan Klick, 
Josephine van Zeben, Karsten Neuhoff, Kateryna Stelmakh, Luigi Franzoni, Marianne 
Breijer, Meagan Jooste, Miriam Schroeder, Moritz von Unger, Pantelis Pipergias 
Analytis, Prabhat Upadhaya, Rodney Boyd, Roland Ismer, Ruby Barcklay, Sandra 
Greiner, Sarah Lester, Stefan Weishaar, Stefano Clò, Thilo Grau, Tom Heller, Valerijus 
Ostrovskis, and Zohal Hessami. These colleagues and friends took their time to read, 
revise and comment on my work. Some of them repeatedly and patiently looked at 
various versions of chapters. Without their support and encouragement this thesis 
would look quite different. Thank you for your ideas, most of them are in embedded in 
this thesis.  
I would like to thank the participants of various conferences in Paris, Rotterdam, 
Maastricht, Bolzano, Budapest and Zurich where I could present my work. Comments 
received at these conferences were helpful in refining my working papers. Furthermore, 
I would like to extend my thanks to my “Inner PhD committee”, Louis Visscher, 
Alessandra Arcuri, and Edwin Woerdman, who carefully and thoroughly reviewed my 
thesis. Their constructive comments and encouraging suggestions were well received.  
My friends were a great source of motivation, encouragement and energy during the 
past years. Some of them do not know how much they actually helped to make this 
thesis real, through their patience, by listening and sometimes by diverting my 
attention and mind away from the thesis: Adam, Bettina, Chardy, Cristina, Dana, 
Franziska, Ken, Markus, Markus, Michael, Olia, Pantelis, Sarah, Simon, Sofia, Toba, 
Valerijus, Vanessa, and Zohal. Thank you. Cecile and Rebecca hosted me during crucial 
thesis writing times in Paris and Beijing respectively. Having a home away from home 
is invaluable in general but especially in such times.  
However, the person who supported me the most especially during the past three years 
by listening patiently and by bearing much of the weight of this thesis is Hannah. This 
thesis would not have been realized without her continuous support, and our 
conversation in Hamburg in 2006, which sparked my interest in climate change policy. 
I thank you for our friendship. 
My parents and family has been a great support. They listened carefully and I took 
great benefits from sparring ideas with them. They always trusted my decisions and I 
am grateful for the moments we shared during the past years. Although I was often 
travelling, my heart and thoughts were and are always with you. Thank you for 
supporting me and letting me go into the world. I devote this thesis to you. 
Beijing, 15 May 2012 
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AAU Assigned Amount Unit 
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CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CDM-AP Accreditation Panel 
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CER Certified Emission Reduction 
CH4 Methane   
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CO2 Carbon Dioxide  
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EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
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IET International Emissions Trading 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
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JI Joint Implementation  
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MAC Marginal Abatement Cost 
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NAP National Allocation Plan 
NPV Net Present Value 
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1. CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEED TO PAY COUNTRIES TO REDUCE 
EMISSIONS 
limate change is a threat to modern society (IPCC, 2007). According to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the cumulative impact of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has an adverse impact on the climate 
including, among others, an increase in high impact weather events such as storms, 
floods and draughts (IPCC, 2007).1 Most of these impacts are expected in developing 
countries.2 Statistics from reinsurance companies confirm and attribute this trend to 
the changing climate (Mills, 2005). Over the past decades, scientific consensus has 
grown that climate change is the result of human-induced emissions of GHGs (Weart, 
2010). Today greenhouse gas emissions occur as the result of almost all human activity 
such as combustion of fossil fuels for electricity generation, industrial production of 
steel, cement and chemicals, agricultural production, deforestation and transportation 
to name a few (IPCC, 2007 WG III). The IPCC recommends the reduction of global 
GHG emissions in the range of 80%-95% by the year 2050 relative to 1990 levels 
(Solomon et al., 2007). This requires a substantial effort by all countries to decarbonise 
their economy. 
Market forces lead to an oversupply of emissions. This is because, in the absence of any 
regulatory intervention, the cost of damages caused by emissions is not factored into 
the prices set for the production of goods or their consumption. According to economic 
theory, because the abatement of a ton of CO2-equivalent has the same effect for the 
global climate regardless of where the abatement is achieved, emissions should be 
reduced where the marginal cost of abatement is lowest. According to Coase (1960), 
where transaction costs are zero or negligible, the allocation and subsequent trade of 
property rights leads to economic efficiency independent of the initial allocation of 
rights. Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) have extended this rationale to show that an 
                                                          
1
 GHGs covered under the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous 
oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6) (UNFCCC, 1997: Annex 2). All GHGs can be restated in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2eq.) 
by multiplying their quantity in tonnes with the 100 year global warming potential (GWP) of the 
respective greenhouse gas. In 2011, during the UNFCCC conference in Durban a seventh gas, 
Nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), has been added to the list of greenhouse gases covered. 
2
 “Developing“ is an umbrella term to denote countries that have a low GDP per capita relative to 
industrialised countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). However, the economic status of many countries classified as 
“developing” when the Kyoto Protocol was signed 25 years ago, changed in the meantime. A new 
concept of newly industrialised countries is emerging for countries that have rapidly growing 
economies and are increasingly industrialised. Acknowledging these changes is important for 
current global climate policy. However, this book will use the term “developing” to denote the 
fact that when the Kyoto Protocol was signed, the difference between industrialised and 
developing countries was more pronounced. 
C 
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emissions trading system (ETS) can reduce emissions cost-effectively. In such a system, 
emitters (e.g. private companies or countries) receive emission rights, a so-called 
emission budget, while the total volume of rights is limited. Each emitter assesses 
whether it is cheaper to reduce emissions inside the company (internally) or to buy 
emission rights on the market. Emitters sell unused emission rights to the market or 
bank them for later use. In the absence of transaction costs, market forces of supply 
and demand of emission rights lead to an equalization of marginal abatement costs 
between emitters and to a minimization of total abatement costs (R. Hahn, 2000; 
Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 1985, 2006). However, difficulties arise where some 
emitters refuse to participate in the system or where no global emissions limit can be 
established, thus reducing the potential cost-effectiveness of the system. 
1.1. Kyoto Protocol - Emission reduction targets for industrialised countries 
To address the need to reduce GHGs at the global level, the Kyoto Protocol set legally 
binding emission reduction targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European 
Community (UNFCCC, 1997a). The countries, also called Annex I countries, agreed to 
reduce anthropogenic (human-made) emissions of six GHGs to 4.2% below 1990 levels 
during the Kyoto commitment period, from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC, 1997b: Art. 3).3 At 
the same time, developing countries agreed to provide GHG inventory reports, but did 
not commit to any binding emission limitations.  
In order to reduce the costs of compliance for industrialised countries, four flexible 
market mechanisms have been introduced to increase the efficiency of emission 
reduction opportunities by global trading: 
- Target Reallocation (Bubble Mechanism) (Article 4),4 
- Joint Implementation - JI (Article 6), 
- Clean Development Mechanism – CDM (Article 12), and 
- International Emissions Trading – IET (Article 17).5 
International Emissions Trading (IET) allows governments of countries with Kyoto 
commitments to sell unused shares of their emissions budgets, so-called Assigned 
                                                          
3
 The United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. According to Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, 
Peters, & Wilson (2011) the average target that industrialised countries including the United 
States would have to meet during the Kyoto commitment period is 5.2 %. 
4
 This mechanism, although often omitted in the list of flexible mechanisms, is used by the 
European Union to achieve the emission targets as a group rather than as individual countries. 
5
There is a wealth of abbreviations in the Kyoto carbon market. For convenience, the most 
frequently used terms can be found in the Annex to this chapter. 
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Amount Units (AAUs), to other countries that want to use more Assigned Amount 
Units than they have been assigned under the Kyoto Protocol. Joint Implementation 
(JI) permits the generation of emissions credits through emission reduction projects in 
an Annex-I (industrialised) country. These credits may be used by the credit-acquiring 
Annex I country to fulfil its Kyoto commitments; an equivalent amount has to be 
deducted from the emissions budget of the country hosting the projects to avoid double 
counting (Geres & Michaelowa, 2002; Metz, 1995). The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) allows projects that reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries to generate 
emission credits, so-called certified emission reductions (CERs), which can be used by 
Annex I countries to fulfil their commitments. 
Of all the Kyoto Parties, the European Union (EU) is the only one that applies the 
“bubble mechanism” of the Kyoto Protocol, which allows the EU to pursue emissions 
reduction targets as a group rather than as individual countries. The EU has agreed to 
reduce emissions by 8% from 1990 levels. Furthermore, in 2008 the EU agreed to cut 
its GHG emissions by 20% by the year 2020 relative to 1990 emissions (Council of the 
European Union, 2008). It has thus extended the EU targets specified in the Kyoto 
Protocol beyond the Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012.  
A part of the emissions reductions may be achieved outside the EU through the CDM or 
JI (Council of the European Union, 2009; Council of the European Union & European 
Parliament, 2009). This is in accordance with the CDM supplementarity criteria, which 
mandates that only part of a country’s Kyoto target may be achieved through CDM. In 
its efforts to reduce emissions, the EU distinguishes between the emissions trading 
sector and those sectors not covered by the emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). 
Approximately 12,000 installations across the EU are covered by the EU emissions 
trading scheme, as identified in Annex I of EU ETS Directive 2003/87/EC (CITL, 2010; 
Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009). These installations are 
combustion installations and engage in energy-intensive manufacturing activities. 
During the period 2008-2012, installations are allocated EU Allowances (EUAs) 
predominantly at no cost. Each EUA allows its holder to emit one ton of CO2 (as CERs 
confer the same right to their holder, CERs and EUAs can be regarded as equivalents).  
1.2. Clean Development Mechanism - Rationale and procedures 
Before the Kyoto Protocol was drafted, the IPCC concluded that “international 
transfers, in one form or another, are likely to serve as both the building blocks of 
globally optimal action and the cement of global cooperation” (IPCC 1995: 71, section 
2.4.2). Of all the Kyoto mechanisms, the CDM is the only instrument aimed at 
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incentivising abatement in developing countries. The CDM is based on the notion that 
emissions reductions can be achieved at lower costs in developing countries than in 
industrialised countries (Hoglund et al., 2009; Wetzelaer, Van Der Linden, 
Groenenberg, & de Coninck, 2007). However, in the absence of any binding emission 
targets for developing countries, an instrument is needed to encourage the 
implementation of such abatement opportunities. The rationale behind the CDM is that 
industrialised countries pay for emissions reduction projects in developing countries 
and can apply the generated certified emission reductions towards achieving their own 
Kyoto target (Hanisch, 1991; Liroff, 1980; UNFCCC, 1997a).  
Developing countries were initially strongly opposed to such an instrument (Depledge, 
2000). The concept was previously discussed under the heading of joint 
implementation, which would allow industrialised countries to reduce emissions in 
other countries. Depledge (2000: 298) emphasises that “the G-77 and China repeatedly 
expressed opposition to JI, specifically JI” between industrialised and developing 
countries.6 The main argument of developing countries and the non-governmental 
organization community against the CDM was that it would allow industrialised 
countries to buy themselves out of the responsibility to reduce emissions domestically 
and thereby allow industrialised countries to continue to emit as before (Depledge, 
2000). 
Developing countries favoured an alternative, the so-called Clean Development Fund 
(CDF), following the Brazilian Proposal (Cole, 2010; Olsen, 2007). The Brazilian 
Proposal would have established emission reduction goals for industrialised countries 
based on historical emissions, and the CDF would collect penalties from industrialised 
countries that exceed their emission limitations. The proceeds from the penalties would 
be channelled to developing countries on the basis of developing countries’ projected 
emissions between 1990 and 2010 (UNFCCC, 1997b). However, both the CDM and the 
CDF allow industrialised countries to exceed their emissions limit. According to Olsen 
(2007), this similarity was picked up by the United States negotiators and in the final 
hours of negotiation the CDF proposal was changed into the CDM in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997a; Werksman, 1998).  
Initially, the CDM also faced strong opposition by the EU (Depledge, 2000; 
Michaelowa, 2004). This initial opposition had begun to diminish when the United 
                                                          
6
 Group of 77 (G-77) is a group of developing countries within the United Nations with the aim 
to “to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint 
negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations 
system” From an initial membership of 77 countries, the G77 has 132 member countries by 
November 2011 (Group of 77, 2011). 
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States left the Kyoto Protocol and, following a stakeholder consultation in the EU on 
emissions trading, industrial emitters pushed for the CDM to be allowed for achieving 
compliance (Michaelowa, 2004: 2). Indeed, the impact of the CDM on lowering total 
abatement costs was highlighted in several model simulations at the global (Bollen, 
Gielen, & Timmer, 1999; Weyant & Hill, 1999) and at the EU level (Anger, Böhringer, & 
Moslener, 2007; Klepper & Peterson, 2005). These simulations found that the CDM 
can lower compliance costs for industrialised countries. 
Beyond the interest of industrialised countries in cost-effectiveness*, developing 
countries had stressed throughout the negotiations to the Kyoto Protocol their need for 
financial and technological assistance to achieve sustainable development* (Depledge, 
2000: p. 62, para 333).7 Sustainable development (SD) is aimed at combining the goals 
of economic development, natural resource extraction, and improvements in socio-
economic environment. While sustainable development is not defined in the Kyoto 
Protocol, its inclusion indicates the need to integrate climate and socio-economic 
objectives (Hopwood, Mellor, & O’Brien, 2005; Swart, Robinson, & Cohen, 2004). 
Although developing countries differ in their economic positions and their national 
priorities, most countries aim to improve their socio-economic status in order to 
address challenges such as poverty, health inequality and education issues.  
The CDM is aimed at both cost-effective abatement for industrialised countries and 
supporting sustainable development for developing countries (UNFCCC, 1997a). Cost-
effectiveness, as discussed above, suggests that the marginal costs of emissions 
abatement should be equalised across all emitters (Liroff, 1980; Tietenberg, 1985). This 
would ensure that the greatest amount of abatement is conducted with the least funds. 
Thus, by reducing emissions where costs are lowest, industrialised countries decrease 
their total cost of compliance with their emission targets. Sustainable development 
implies that the activities conducted to reduce emissions have socio-economic benefits 
beyond emission reductions in the country where the activities are conducted. If both of 
these goals are fulfilled, the CDM is able to raise welfare for the countries involved. 
Industrial countries benefit from reduced costs of abatement, while developing 
countries receive finances to pursue emission reductions and sustainable development. 
The CDM is thus the result of two different agendas: the sustainable development 
agenda of developing countries and the cost minimisation agenda of some 
industrialised countries (McDougall, 1999). Participation in an international treaty is 
according to Guzman (2008) and Wiener (1999) a rational choice of countries. For 
                                                          
7
 The three goals of the CDM are marked with an asterix (*). 
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instance, Wiener (1999) argues that in the absence of dictatorial rules, countries cannot 
be forced to participate in a treaty. These countries will weigh the costs and benefits to 
join the treaty and will aim at maximising their benefits from joining. Thus cooperation 
in a treaty depends on potential side-payments that induce cooperation. The CDM can 
be interpreted as such a side-payment that intends to satisfy the demands of both 
developing and industrialised countries in order to induce cooperation.  
Beyond the two objectives of cost-minimisation and sustainable development, the main 
goal of the CDM is to reduce emissions in developing countries in the same volume by 
which industrialised countries decrease their domestic efforts. Therefore, the 
reductions generated by the CDM should be “additional*” to any that would have 
happened in the absence of the CDM support. This is important for two reasons. First, 
investment in emissions reduction activities that would have occurred anyway wastes 
money that could have been used to reduce emissions or pursue other goals (i.e. 
improvements in health care or education). Second, since the emissions reductions 
generated in the CDM are applied towards achieving Kyoto targets, approving non-
additional projects does increase global emissions. Thus, for environmental integrity to 
hold, the CDM should only finance projects that would not have been implemented in 
the absence of the CDM. An institutional framework has been set up to ensure that the 
CDM does not waste money on non-additional projects and lead to global emission 
increases.  
1.2.1. Clean Development Mechanism – Procedures and actors  
The CDM framework can be understood in the three stages of demand, supply and 
compliance:  
1) Demand stage: The Kyoto Protocol sets an emissions target for industrialised 
countries. These countries demand low-cost mitigation opportunities, which 
they search for in their own country and in developing countries. 
2) Supply stage: Industrialised countries finance CDM projects in developing 
countries, which supply emissions reductions to the industrialised countries. 
3) Compliance stage: Industrialised countries use the emission reductions 
generated in the supply stage to comply with their individual emissions 
reduction targets. Any reduction of emissions achieved in the developing 
country does not have to be conducted domestically. 
In the following, these stages are described in more detail. 
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1.2.1.1. Demand stage  
The demand stage depends on the individual targets of industrialised countries and of 
the costs to reduce emissions domestically and in developing countries. First, each 
industrialised country has individual emissions reduction targets to be achieved during 
the commitment period relative to 1990 levels (the base year) (UNFCCC, 1997c).8 For 
instance, country A has a Kyoto target of reducing emissions by 5% during the Kyoto 
commitment period relative to the base year 1990. If emissions in 1990 were 100 units 
(e.g. 100 tons of CO2- equivalent), country A would need to reduce to 95 units on 
average per year during the five years from 2008 to 2012.9 The effort needed by country 
A depends on projected business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in country A, which would 
occur in the absence of any target. If BAU emissions are 120 units in each of the years 
from 2008 to 2012, the reduction effort is 25 units per year (BAU emissions – target; 
120 – 95 units).  
If country A wants to minimise the cost of reducing by these 25 units, it will consider 
the options of pursuing the reduction domestically or abroad. Country A can compare 
the different abatement options according to a marginal abatement cost curve, which 
indicates the price of emissions reductions that can be achieved at a cost per unit 
abated (usually denoted as cost/ton of CO2) (Nordhaus, 1991). Country A will choose to 
abate the cheapest units, independent of where the reductions have to be conducted. If 
country A finds that part of the reduction can be achieved at lower cost in a developing 
country (country B), then it contracts a project developer in country B to supply these 
emission reductions through a CDM project.  
1.2.1.2. Supply stage  
To supply the demanded emission reductions, referred to as CERs (see section 1.1), the 
project developer needs to conduct a project. Each CER generated from this project 
allows its holder to emit one ton of CO2- equivalent. An example of a project is as 
follows:  
                                                          
8
 The Kyoto targets are reprinted in Appendix 2 to this chapter. Bulgaria (1988), Hungary 
(average of 1985-1987), Poland (1988), Romania (1989), Slovenia (1986), have different base 
years relative to 1990. Due to economic restructuring, emissions fell rapidly in these countries in 
the 1990s, so that targets are set to the higher emissions pre-1990, which makes it easier for 
these countries to achieve their targets. This is frequently referred to as “hot air” (Grubb, Laing, 
Counsell, & Willan, 2010). 
9
 This example is only for illustrative purposes. The emissions of individual countries are 
greater, for instance emissions in the Germany were 1.2 billion tons CO2-eq in 1990 (UNFCCC, 
1997c) . 
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Assuming that a CDM wind project is conducted in a country B, where most electricity 
(the BAU baseline) is produced by CO2-intensive means such as coal. If electricity 
produced by a CDM project such as a wind park replaces that produced with coal, then 
emissions are reduced by the difference between what would have been emitted with 
coal and what is actually emitted with the wind park.  
However, since the wind park is more expensive, it requires additional funds in order to 
be financially viable. Country A, the industrialised country, finances the incremental 
cost of the wind park by buying the CERs generated by the wind project in country B, so 
as to make the project financially viable. Country A will engage in such a trade if the 
CERs are cheaper than conducting emission reductions in its own territory.  
In order to generate CERs, CDM projects need to be registered (UNFCCC, 2001). The 
CDM executive board (CDM-EB) is in charge of CDM administration, meaning that it 
ultimately decides whether projects are registered or not. In order to be registered, 
CDM projects must be additional. CDM projects can be developed by companies from 
the host country (so-called unilateral CDM) or through investments by companies from 
industrialised countries (Michaelowa, 2007).10 The registration of projects follows an 
institutionalised procedure frequently called the “project cycle”. This project cycle is 
conducted in seven steps and involves private and public actors, which are introduced 
in the following:11 
1) Companies that implement projects are called project developers. Their 
responsibility is to document how the project contributes to sustainable 
development and to provide evidence that the project would not have 
happened without CDM support (additionality determination). The project 
developer calculates the expected emissions reductions (e.g. the difference 
between coal-fired power plant and wind park emissions). These emissions 
reductions determine the potential CERs to be generated by the proposed 
project. The additionality determination is frequently done through the 
barrier or the benchmark test. If the project developer can show that the 
proposed project faces barriers that can be removed through the CDM, or 
                                                          
10
 CDM projects include, for example, energy-efficiency improvements in industry and power 
generation, flaring or use of landfill methane gas for electricity generation, the installation of 
renewable technologies such as wind, hydroelectric and solar. Appendix 1 to this chapter 
provides an overview of the registered project types, their number and share of emission 
reductions. 
11
 The representation of the project cycle here is simplified and based on the CDM procedures 
approved in the Marrakech Accords for large projects (UNFCCC, 2005a, 2005b). A detailed 
description of the CDM project cycle is provided in Chapter 2. 
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that the project is not financially viable without CDM support (compared to 
a benchmark rate of return), then the project is deemed additional.12 
2) The project developer sends this documentation to the host country, in 
which the project is to be located, for approval. A designated national 
authority (DNA) in the host country determines whether the proposed 
project fulfils the national sustainable development criteria as set by the 
DNA. The DNA of the CER buyer (industrialised) country must also approve 
the project by confirming that it is conducted voluntarily and that country A 
is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol. 
3) The project developer submits project documentation and the DNA 
approval to an auditing company, a so-called designated operational entity 
(DOE). The DOE is a private actor contracted by the project developer to 
assess the credibility of the project documentation. The DOE needs to have 
technical expertise for monitoring and quantifying greenhouse gas 
emissions from emitters (UNFCCC, 2001). In addition, the DOE needs to be 
licensed by the CDM-EB to conduct CDM auditing activities. If the DOE 
approves the documentation, in particular the determination of 
additionality, the project is submitted to the CDM-EB for registration. 
4) The CDM-EB is made up of ten experts from the ministries of developing 
and industrialised countries that have ratified Kyoto (UNFCCC, 2005). Its 
task is to register CDM projects according to the recommendation of the 
DOE, based in particular on the additionality determination for the project 
and confirmation of sustainable development by the host country DNA. 
5) If the project is registered, the project developer monitors the actual 
emissions from the implemented project and submits a monitoring report to 
an auditing company other than the one in step 3 above. 
6) The auditing company verifies the monitoring report and, if it regards the 
assumptions and calculations of emissions by the project developer as 
credible, it certifies the amount of emissions reductions specified in the 
monitoring report.  
7) Upon receipt of the certification from the auditing company, the CDM-EB 
issues CERs to the project developer. 
The project developer can then transfer the CERs to the industrialised country or a 
company in that country, which can use projects’ CERs in the compliance stage to fulfil 
part of its Kyoto targets. 
                                                          
12
 Chapter 2 describes these tests in detail. 
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1.2.1.3. Compliance stage  
The CERs purchased from a project in country B are transferred to country A. As each 
CER confers the right to emit one ton of CO2- equivalent, Country A needs to reduce 
less domestically in proportion to the number of CERs it holds. For instance, if the 
project conducted in country B generates 10 units per year for five years during the 
Kyoto commitment period, then country A only needs to reduce 15 units per year (25 
minus 10 units as discussed in section 1.2.1.1) domestically. The use of CERs for 
compliance needs to be established so that emitters in country A have legal certainty 
over which credits are allowed and which are not. 
In summary, the three stages involve six main actors whose behaviour impacts the 
delivery of the criteria of additionality, sustainable development, and cost-
effectiveness:  
1. Country A compliance buyer (cost-effectiveness) 
2. Project developer (additionality, sustainable development, cost-effectiveness) 
3. DOE (additionality) 
4. DNA of the host country (sustainable development) 
5. DNA of the buyer host country (cost-effectiveness) 
6. Executive Board (additionality) 
In the following, a brief literature review shows how CDM has performed in practice, 
and which questions arise from this performance. 
1.3. Literature 
In the past two decades, the CDM moved from theory to practice and has spurred a 
vibrant community of academics, investors, industry, NGO and government 
representatives that participate in the CDM market (Michaelowa, 2004). In May 2011, 
the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism registered the 3000th CDM 
project (UNEP Risoe, 2011). Since the first CDM project was registered in 2003, private 
investors and public institutions have transferred funds equal to €25 billion to CDM 
projects in developing countries over the period 2005-2010 (Linacre, Kossoy & 
Ambrosi, 2011). China is host to 45% of all registered projects, India to 21% and Brazil 
to 6%. CDM projects in these countries are expected to deliver emissions reductions in 
the order of over one billion tons of CO2- equivalent by the end of 2012 (Risoe, 2010). 
The CERs thus gained can be used by industrialised countries to achieve their Kyoto 
targets.  
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1.3.1. Large number of registered CDM projects 
The number of registered projects in the CDM is impressive given the recent 
establishment of the global market for emission allowances through the Kyoto 
Protocol’s ratification in 2005. This suggests that the carbon market is working, and 
that initial concerns about burdensome institutional cost hindering growth in the CDM 
have not been confirmed. Scholars were not overly optimistic about the prospect of the 
CDM in generating real emissions reductions and project impact on sustainable 
development before the CDM started. For instance, McDougall (1999) concludes that: 
“the CDM will achieve little cost reduction and little development” and will thus lead to 
disappointment. He bases his analysis on the assumption that incentives for private 
investors to participate in the CDM are weak, as the CERs can only be used during the 
commitment period 2008-2012, yet investments in projects are already allowed as of 
the year 2000 (Depledge, 2000; McDougall, 1999; UNFCCC, 1997a Art. 12.10). The 
author argues that, given this uncertainty, investors from industrialised countries are 
unlikely to engage in CDM projects, and due to the lack of engagement sustainable 
development will also not be advanced as a goal. Furthermore, he points to the 
determination of additionality as imposing costs on industrialised country investors, 
who will resent such a system. Indeed, Rentz (1998) argues that verifying whether a 
project would not be financially viable without CDM support will prove difficult and 
will only impose additional costs on investors.  
However, Michaelowa & Jotzo (2005) provide a review and estimation of transaction 
costs in the CDM, estimating it at a minimum of €150,000 per project. Of that, nearly 
half is estimated to be the cost of auditing and of registering the project. The 
profitability of a project is thus dependent on the volume of CERs and the price that a 
project can generate in order to cover its transaction costs. The authors estimate the 
CDM market to be in the range of 300 million tons of CO2-equivalent per year and CER 
prices to be around €2-3 per CER, after transaction costs. The authors conclude that 
permit prices and thus the supply market of the CDM depend on the stringency of 
targets in a potential second commitment period. 
1.3.2. Main demand market for CDM derives from the European Union 
The largest demand market for the CDM is in the European Union. While hopes for a 
second commitment period were not met, the European Union decided unilaterally to 
extend its Kyoto target to a 20% reduction goal to be achieved by the European Union 
by 2020 (Council of the EU, 2008). The establishment of the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme and the Linking Directive, which allows the use of JI and CDM credits by EU 
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ETS participants, have already led to active investor participation in the CDM 
(Michaelowa, 2004). The European Union established a quantitative limit for the use of 
project credits from JI and the CDM, and has thus provided a legal framework for EU 
emitters to use CERs for compliance. In total, the EU allows about 2.3 billion project 
credits for compliance. About 1.7 billion project credits can be used in the EU ETS, 
while the remainder can be used in sectors not covered by the EU ETS in the period 
2008-2020 (Vasa & Neuhoff, 2011). JI is expected to deliver about 300 million tons of 
CO2-equivalent up to 2012 (Risoe, 2011). Demand from other industrialized countries 
such as Japan, New Zealand, and Australia make up about 300 million tons in the 
current market, but this demand includes the sum of Assigned Amount Units, CDM 
and JI, while the demand in the EU is only regarding JI and CDM (Linacre et al., 2011). 
Before 2009, these countries were expected to contribute a larger share of demand for 
CERs, as it was expected that these countries would implement domestic emission 
trading schemes earlier (Capoor & Ambrosi, 2009). This expectation has not 
materialized in practice. As of November 2011, about 80 % of CERs find their way to 
Europe (Karsten Neuhoff, Schopp, Boyd, Stelmakh, & Vasa, 2012).  
1.3.3. Challenges for additionality of CDM projects  
Whether the CDM goals have been achieved at the project level has frequently been 
called into question. For instance, Michaelowa & Purohit (2007) and Schneider (2009) 
show that credits generated from certain CDM projects are not additional, meaning 
that the project would also have been implemented in the absence of the CDM. These 
authors base their findings on an in-depth review of CDM project project 
documentation. They argue that project developers have frequently made the claim that 
projects are not financially viable and face certain barriers that would make CDM 
support necessary. Michaelowa & Purohit (2007), for instance, show that project 
developers have omitted tax benefits from their calculation to make the project seem 
less economically viable, in order to fulifll the condition for additionality. Schneider 
(2007) has shown that companies have used company-internal profit benchmarks to 
suggest that a proposed project does not meet these, i.e. making the project additional. 
Furthermore, Haya (2007) finds that many of the large hydroelectric power plants in 
China are likely to be non-additional, and Wara & Victor (2008) show that all new 
hydroelectric installations in China have applied for CDM status.13 Arguing that most of 
large hydro plants require long lead times and government involvement, Haya & 
Parekh (2011) question the additionality of these projects. A similar conclusion is 
                                                          
13
 In addition to hydro power plants, Wara & Victor (2008) also show that all new wind and 
natural gas capacity in China applies for CDM status. 
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drawn by Hahn & Richards (forthcoming), who however conclude that there is a lack of 
insufficient empirical research on the CDM. 
1.3.4. Challenges for sustainability of CDM projects  
Where sustainability is concerned, scholars have long argued the need for the concept 
of SD to be defined and to be incorporated in the cost of abatement. For instance 
Kolshus, Vevatne, Torvanger, & Aunan (2001) create criteria for SD that incorporate 
health, poverty alleviation and employment benefits. Without monetising these 
benefits, the abatement costs of reducing emissions is positively correlated with the 
level of SD. That means that low abatement costs of an activity suggest that this 
emissions reduction activity will confer low SD benefits and vice versa. Thus, 
monetising the SD benefits in the CER price is crucial to achieve higher SD benefits. In 
the same vein, following an extensive review of the literature on SD, Olsen (2007) 
argues that if the CDM is left to market forces, it will deliver no SD benefits. Indeed, the 
literature on achievement of SD argues that sustainability criteria have not played a 
role in the decision to pursue a CDM project (Schneider 2007). To remedy this 
situation, scholars recommended taxing low-SD projects (Muller 2007), and reforming 
the CDM by applying multiple indicators (Nussbaumer, 2009) as well as a verification 
standard for SD criteria (Olsen & Fenhann, 2008) aimed at checking whether benefits 
claimed in project documentation have been realised.  
1.3.5. Challenges for cost-effectiveness of CDM projects  
Cost-effectiveness provides the main rationale for industrialised countries to 
participate in the CDM.14 It has two principle aspects: First, projects in developing 
countries should be conducted at the lowest possible costs. Second, the use of the CERs 
generated from the projects in the compliance market should be as cost-effective as 
possible. Concerning the first aspect, transaction costs played a large role in early 
discussions on the CDM, as illustrated above. However, as Woerdman (2001) has 
shown, the CDM (and JI) can have lower transaction costs than the alternative, 
international emissions trading15 between industrialised countries, if there are only a 
small number of buyers and sellers in IET, and if standardised baselines can be used in 
the CDM (and JI).16 This is the case in practice, as the CER market is much more liquid 
than the Assigned Amount Unit market (Linacre et al., 2011).  
                                                          
14
 See for instance, Ogus (2006, pp. 290–292) for the relevance of cost-effectiveness in law and 
economic analysis. 
15
 See section 1.1 above. 
16
 Indeed, there has been a lack of trading in AAUs, the currency of IET in comparison to CERs 
from the CDM (Grubb et al., 2010) See also Footnote 8. An additional reason next to the number 
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In general terms, cost-effectiveness is determined by the difference between the price 
paid for domestic emissions reductions and the price paid for a CDM project in a 
developing country. However, as an effect of the market system, the price paid for 
emissions reductions in developing countries confers a rent that is equal to the 
difference between the market price and the actual abatement costs. In practice, Wara 
(2008) has shown that a particularly strong greenhouse gas, HCF-23, could have been 
reduced at a fraction of the costs had it been regulated through traditional command 
and control regulation rather than through the CDM market system. The main reason 
is that the destruction of one ton of HFC-23 is equivalent to reducing 11,700 tons of 
CO2-equivalent, and that the destruction process is relatively cheap at below one Euro 
per ton of CO2-equivalent (Green, 2008; Wara & Victor, 2008). Wara (2008) estimates 
that direct regulation would have cost €26 million, while 10 to 30-times that amount of 
funds was transferred to these projects under the CDM. The large rents conferred to 
these projects call the cost-effectiveness of the mechanism into question, especially 
because although these projects constitute a small number (less than 1 % or 22 
projects) of the 3,000 projects registered by November 2011, they will produce one fifth 
of all CERs expected from the CDM by the end of 2012 (Risoe, 2011).  
The second aspect of cost-effectiveness lies in the compliance market. This aspect has 
been somewhat side-lined in the literature. The main driver for industrialised countries 
to adopt the CDM was cost-effectiveness (e.g. Heller, 1996). Indeed, the focus was 
primarily on the macroeconomic cost gains from the CDM which were examined in 
model simulations (Bollen et al., 1999; Weyant & Hill, 1999) and which were aimed at 
showing the inefficiency of a limit on the use of CDM (supplementarity) (Klepper & 
Peterson, 2005). Surprisingly, there has been no study on the use of the CDM in the 
compliance market so far so aimed at demonstrating inefficiency using empirical data. 
The European Union offers a particularly interesting case for such a study, as it is the 
largest market that also has set quantitative limits on the use of CDM for compliance in 
the EU ETS (Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009; Linacre et 
al., 2011).17 De Cendra de Larragán (2006) points to the allocation of rent established 
through the right to use offsets, as do Gorecki et al. (2010) for the non-ETS sector. This 
could potentially lead to large rents conferred to emitters. However, there is no 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of small buyers was the reluctance of some industrialised countries to buy the “hot air” from 
Eastern European economies that profited from a large AAU budget due to the economic 
restructuring.  
17
 Woerdman (2002) illustrates, using in-depth interviews with key EU policy-makers, that the 
EU accepted a quantitative supplementarity limit on the basis of equity for developing countries. 
Developing countries feared that industrialised countries would buy themselves out (see section 
1.2). The EU policy makers wanted to signal to developing countries that they are serious in 
their efforts to combat climate change. 
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empirical study of this issue for the EU ETS. The analysis conducted in the present 
book is an empirical assessment of how CDM limits were implemented in the EU ETS, 
and what the effects of the current rules are. 
To summarize, the brief literature review above illustrated some of the main challenges 
identified in the literature with regards to the goals of the CDM: additionality, cost-
effectiveness, and sustainable development. There seems to be a trade-off between the 
delivery of these goals, especially cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. Low-
cost abatement opportunities are often also accompanied by low sustainable 
development benefits. As SD benefits are not included in the CER price, SD seems not 
to be a decisive factor in the decision to pursue a project. Furthermore, there seems to 
be some indication of gaming by actors within the CDM system in order to gain 
financial support through the CDM, for instance by omitting positive cash-flows in the 
investment calculation. The inclusion of non-additional projects in the CDM increases 
global emissions and endangers environmental integrity. Regarding cost-effectiveness, 
the literature shows a large share of CERs (from HFC-23 projects) is bought at a much 
higher price than actual abatement costs, suggesting that the CDM has not achieved its 
cost-effectiveness objective. Furthermore, while the compliance market has been 
studied through macroeconomic model simulations, no empirical study exists of the 
use of CDM for compliance in practice. 
1.4. Research question 
In light of the literature reviewed above, this book assesses whether the CDM is an 
effective tool with which to achieve additional, cost-effective and sustainable mitigation 
in developing countries. Catching two birds with one stone is difficult, as Tinbergen 
(1952) argued when he wrote that at least one policy instrument is needed for each 
policy goal. In the case of the CDM, the main objective is to reduce emissions, but this 
should be conducted in a cost-effective manner and support sustainable development 
in developing countries. Does the CDM achieve these objectives? If the CDM is found to 
be ineffective in achieving its goals, what can be done to align the instrument with its 
objectives? From the description of the CDM procedures and the literature review, the 
question arises whether the institutional framework provides the right incentives to the 
various private and public actors to fulfil their responsibilities with regards to 
additionality, sustainable development, and cost-effectiveness.  
1.5. Method 
To answer these questions, the analysis in this book applies law and economics, i.e. 
economic theory using neoclassic environmental economics and public choice. It 
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assumes that actors involved in implementing and using the CDM are conscientiously 
calculating the costs and benefits of their actions. It is thus important to first 
understand what the costs and benefits of these actions are, and in a second step, to 
analyse whether the institutional design can alter the cost benefit calculation in favour 
of the CDM objectives. According to Korobkin & Ulen (2000) there are four notions 
that can be distinguished in rational choice theory, which is a key element in 
neoclassical economics. In order of their falsifiability, they are: definitional, expected 
utility, self-interest, and wealth-maximisation. The authors argue that wealth-
maximisation is the most testable of these, because it is possible to observe both the 
ends (e.g. financial wealth) as well as the means (e.g. decisions). In the context of this 
analysis, this definition of rational choice is applied in an attempt to understand the 
incentives of the various actors within the CDM system. According to rational choice 
theory, private actors are assumed to weigh their decisions carefully in terms of the 
costs and benefits of each decision, so as to maximise wealth. Similarly, it is assumed 
that governments act rationally so as to maximise wealth, for instance by maximising 
tax revenue available for climate and non-climate ends. 
Six actors have been distinguished within the framework of the CDM, (see section 
1.2.1.3). Three of these are private actors: the compliance CER buyer, the project 
developer, and the auditor. The other three are public actors: the government of the 
host country, the government of the buyer country, and the CDM executive board. In 
the following, the costs and benefits involved in the different decisions to be taken by 
these actors are described, in order to form hypotheses about their behaviour. These 
hypotheses guide to answer the question whether the CDM achieves its objectives in 
theory and practice and if not what can be done to improve the CDM’s performance. 
The costs and benefits for actors in the supply stage are first addressed, followed by 
those in the compliance stage (the government of the buyer country and the compliance 
buyer). 
1.5.1. Hypotheses 
In the supply stage, the main actors are on the one hand private actors, the compliance 
buyer, the project developer and the DOE. On the other hand are the host country DNA 
and the EB. 
The project developer supplies CERs to the compliance buyer. As the compliance buyer 
is interested in achieving target compliance at the lowest possible cost, it will search for 
a project developer that can deliver the emissions reductions at the least expense. The 
project developer in turn is faced with the decision of whether to conduct an emissions 
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reduction project or not. It will only do so if the benefits outweigh the costs, in other 
words, the benefits of a project under the CDM have to be greater than the cost of 
conducting the same project without the CDM. This is a standard business practice, as 
projects that do not lead to profit are generally not conducted.18 The project developer 
would normally choose the project that yields the largest profit.  
In the presence of the CDM, project developers are faced with an additional choice. 
They can either a) pursue the project that would have been selected in the absence of 
the CDM, without applying for CDM status, b) conduct another project that is more 
profitable under the CDM, but which would not have been chosen without CDM 
support, or c) apply for the CDM status with the project that is already the most 
profitable without CDM support. Assuming that these three options have increasing 
profitability (Profitability Option A < Option B < Option C), the project developer will 
choose Option C, all else equal. However, Option C means that a project that would also 
have been conducted without the CDM will generate CERs for the compliance buyer, 
thus serving to increase global emissions if used for compliance purposes. However, 
assuming that project developers want to maximise their own wealth, making a project 
that was already profitable yet more profitable is rational. 
However, independent of whether option B (additional project) or C (non-additional 
project) is selected, applying for CDM status implies transaction costs, which are 
primarily constituted in documentation and proving that the project is additional, and 
in payment of the DOE for verification of the documentation provided by the project 
developer. Assuming that there is no additional “penalty” besides the transaction costs 
lost should the project be rejected, the project developer will apply for CDM status if 
the benefits of CDM registration outweigh the transaction costs. The benefits, in turn, 
are dependent on the multiplication of the volume of CERs generated by the project, 
the CER price to be achieved, the probability that the DNA will confirm the project’s 
sustainability, the probability that the auditor validates the project positively, and the 
probability that the executive board registers the project.  
The project developer has incentives to influence all of these five variables, but will 
likely only try to influence the first four in the exclusion of an outright attempt to bribe 
the executive board. First, it wants to maximise the expected volume of CERs 
(Michaelowa, 2005). An attempt to do so in a fraudulent way, however, might be 
detected by the DOE or the CDM-EB and thus decrease the probability of final 
registration. However, the fraud does not trigger any other sanctions against the project 
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 That is to say, there are instances where businesses make losses; however, these businesses 
will exit the market unless these losses cannot be compensated by profit elsewhere. 
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developer. Fraud that has not properly been detected by the DOE however can trigger a 
sanction against the DOE. Second, the project developer increases its chances for DNA 
confirmation by claiming sustainable development benefits that fit the DNA’s demands 
(Olsen & Fenhann, 2008). Third, it can contract with the compliance buyer for a high 
CER price, however, the compliance buyer will make the price dependent on the 
probability of registration and on the availability of other options to buy CERs in the 
market. If the compliance buyer can find cheaper CERs elsewhere, the project 
developer has to accept a lower CER price. Fourth, the project developer can offer the 
DOE a performance fee that is only payable if the project achieves registration, in order 
to increase the chances of a positive DOE opinion. These extra efforts must be 
outweighed by the increased probability of registration. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I: The project developer maximises the profit from 
project registration by optimising the volume of Certified Emission 
Reductions, their price, and the probabilities of approval by the 
designated operational entity, the Designated National Authority, 
and the Executive Board. 
The DOE is paid by the project developer and licensed for operation by the Executive 
Board. The Executive Board can withdraw this license at any time if the auditor is 
found not to be performing its auditing tasks. The DOE is dependent on commission 
fees from project developers to finance its auditing business. Assuming that the more 
auditing contracts it has with project developers the better it is for the DOE, the DOE 
will attempt to maximize the number of projects it audits. A project developer aiming at 
CDM registration will chose the DOE with the best track-record for auditing projects 
positively. If a particular DOE has declined a large number of projects, project 
developers will look for another, more lenient DOE. Thus, DOEs compete for business 
and have an incentive to exercise lenience in determining additionality and calculating 
CER volumes (Betzenbichler, 2004; Schneider, 2007; Schneider & Mohr, 2010). 
However, in doing so, the DOE runs the risk of losing its license by the EB. The 
probability of this happening is dependent on the extent to which malperformance on 
behalf of the DOE can be observed or, more precisely, the cost for the EB, and the 
financial capacity of the CDM-EB to detect DOE mal-performance. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis II: The Designated Operational Entity will maximize 
project business while minimising the risk of losing its operating 
license. 
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The host country DNA aims at maximising a combination of project inflow and 
sustainable development benefits. The number of projects conducted in the host 
country increases financial inflow to the country and can lead to increased economic 
activity if directed towards additional projects. Furthermore, SD benefits can 
potentially alleviate poverty, health and employment concerns. According to economic 
theory a host country DNA maximises the combination of large financial transfers and 
SD benefits. There is, however, competition for projects among different host countries, 
as well as within the host country. As long as SD benefits have no value in the 
compliance market and countries offer similar abatement opportunities, DNAs will 
lower their SD criteria so as to maximise project inflow. The value of SD benefits is a 
function of international requirements of a certain level of sustainability to be achieved 
by each project, and the unilateral sustainable development requirements by 
industrialised countries to use CERs (Haya & Parekh, 2011; Olsen & Fenhann, 2008). 
Thus, the DNA aims to satisfy the demand market, which is driven by the compliance 
buyers’ demand for low-cost CERs. The DNAs of countries with a large volume of low-
cost abatement opportunities have a monopoly/oligopoly position in the CER market 
and can impose higher requirements (e.g. higher SD standards, taxes or even prices) 
without sacrificing project inflow (Muller, 2007). The DNAs would do that if higher SD 
standards do not reduce the financial inflow from projects. This is the case if the 
additional cost due to higher SD standards still allows the country to sell CERs at lower 
costs than other CDM host countries, and still at a CER price below domestic 
abatement costs in industrialised countries. Furthermore, the DNA is subject to interest 
groups within the respective host country, which want to influence the definition of 
sustainable development so as to include their technology in the definition. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis III: Designated National Authorities compete for project 
inflow and will thus engage in regulatory competition that leads to a 
“race to the bottom” of sustainability criteria, unless the DNA’s 
country holds a monopoly/oligopoly position in the low-cost 
abatement market. 
The Executive Board is interested in maximizing the number of registered additional 
projects and safeguarding the environmental integrity of the CDM. At the same time, 
the members of the Executive Board are interested in maximizing their own wealth, 
which could be achieved by seeking promotions within the regulatory system or 
attaining other higher government positions (Flues, Michaelowa, & Michaelowa, 2009). 
CDM-EB members benefit from scrutinizing CDM projects in that they demonstrate 
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their ability to fulfil their mandate. Thus, the cost of scrutinizing CDM projects is 
expressed in the effort and expertise needed to conduct the work. Additional costs arise 
for CDM-EB members where their mandate as board members interferes with the 
interests of host country DNAs to maximize project inflow. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis IV: Executive Board members maximise the volume of 
additional projects to be registered subject to their expertise and in 
avoidance of any costs imposed by a conflict of interest with their 
country of origin. 
At the compliance stage, the compliance buyers of CERs are interested in minimizing 
their total private compliance costs (Weyant & Hill, 1999). Assuming an emissions 
trading scheme such as the EU ETS, compliance buyers aim at minimizing their total 
abatement costs by using the cheapest mitigation options first and selling or banking 
the more expensive options for later (e.g. Anger, Böhringer, & Moslener, 2007; Klepper 
& Peterson, 2005). If compliance buyers have been allocated any emissions rights for 
free, these rights can be exchanged for CERs if that trade yields a profit. The costs of 
doing so are determined by the transaction costs for procuring CERs in the supply 
market and the costs associated with trading in the ETS market. This leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis V: Compliance buyers aim at minimizing the target 
compliance costs. This can be achieved through arbitrage of 
emission rights against Certified Emission Reductions. 
The buyer country wants to minimize the costs of achieving the emission reduction 
target at the (country) society-level (Böhringer, Löschel, Moslener, & Rutherford, 
2009; EU Commission, 2008). At the same time, the government wants to keep the use 
of government budgets for emissions reductions to a minimum, where these 
expenditures are in competition with other expenditures for infrastructure, health care 
or education, just to name a few. If the budget available for these other purposes is 
eroded by government spending on the climate, it can carry a cost for the government 
in terms of declining constituent support, i.e. voters. However, if emissions reduction 
costs are directly internalised by companies, these companies can pass the costs of 
climate regulation on to consumers (or taxpayers). While this loose interpretation of 
indirect spending of consumer tax money is more difficult for consumers to detect, 
governments will want to minimize adverse impact as a result of distributional policies. 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis VI: Governments aim to minimize the costs imposed on 
society by emissions reduction targets by pursuing the lowest cost 
policy and maximizing the revenue available for climate and non-
climate issues, so as to be able to compensate potentially adverse 
effects from the emissions policy. 
As discussed above, the main research question of this book is whether the CDM 
achieves its objectives of cost-effectiveness, the promotion of sustainable development, 
and additionality? If the CDM is found to be ineffective in promoting its goals, what can 
be done to align the instrument with its objectives? The six hypotheses in this section 
guide the analysis in the following chapters. After a survey of the institutional 
procedures for conducting a CDM project in Chapter 2, the following questions will be 
addressed in the respective chapters: 
1) Chapter 3: How has the CDM performed in practice? Can potential 
inefficiencies be addressed by an alternative approach?  
2) Chapter 4: What incentives exist to set the appropriate benchmark for the CDM 
additionality test? A case study of renewables projects in India and China.  
3) Chapter 5: Has the EU implemented the CDM efficiently? 
Chapter 3 answers the research question whether the CDM has been effective in 
achieving its goals in practice. The chapter focuses on the question, whether the 
institutional framework at the supply stage generate cost-effective, sustainable and 
additional projects. Chapter 4 analyses renewable energy projects and their 
additionality. The chapter analyses data on a subset of the projects examined in 
Chapter 3. Chapter 5 analyses whether the European Union, the prime demand market, 
has established an institutional framework that maximises the benefits of the CDM. 
Chapter 5 thus fills a gap in the existing literature on the CDM which mainly focuses on 
how CDM projects and credits are generated, rather than how credits are used. 
1.6. Scope  
This dissertation applies economic theory and uses neoclassic environmental 
economics and public choice in order to draw general lessons for the institutional 
design of climate policy instruments. The CDM exemplifies the interaction between the 
administrative and institutional design of market instruments, the presence of 
information and transaction costs, and the divergence of public versus private interest. 
These challenges are also present in other contexts such as health care, the insurance 
sector, and the financial market in general. Effectively dealing with these issues and 
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their interaction with other policies enables policy-makers and academics to make 
better public policy choices in the future. 
The boundaries of the research are set by the international legal framework of Article 12 
of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords, which determined procedures for the 
CDM. Furthermore, frequent use will be made of guidance by the CDM Executive 
Board, which has established and changed at times the rules for registering a project 
within the project cycle (UNFCCC, 1997a, 2001, 2005a, 2005b). Furthermore, this 
dissertation examines EU legislation governing the EU Emissions Trading Scheme with 
respect of CDM project credit use (Council of the European Union & European 
Parliament, 2009).  
This study does not address cost-benefit analysis and the scientific debate on target-
setting. The adequacy of Kyoto targets and the 2020 targets of the European Union is 
not disputed and these targets are taken as given. The study also does not address the 
literature on new market mechanisms and nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs). The discussion on nationally appropriate mitigation actions on the 
terminology, typology as well as a common understanding is currently evolving 
(Upadhyaya, 2012). Sectoral trading and crediting systems, brought forward to address 
emissions in developing countries and competitiveness and leakage concerns, also fall 
outside of the scope of this dissertation. All of these mechanisms are not operational at 
the time of writing of this dissertation and an empirical assessment is therefore not 
possible.19 In addition, sectoral approaches, while theoretically able to address 
competitiveness concerns, are practically difficult to implement. Sectoral approaches 
comprise in essence three options (Baron, Buchner, & Ellis, 2009; Meckling & Chung, 
2009):  
a) Sectoral crediting: intensity targets operationalized through pre-set 
CO2/output benchmarks, where the sector receives credits when the benchmark 
is surpassed,  
b) Sectoral trading: fixed targets with ex-ante allocation of allowances and 
subsequent trading, and  
c) Technology approaches: a sectoral technology-based cooperation in research 
and development and technology transfer 
                                                          
19
 However, experience with the CDM can and has been used to inform discussions on the design 
of these instruments. For a good overview of the discussion of sectoral approaches and their 
strength and weaknesses see Chapter 6 in Karsten Neuhoff (2011). 
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According to Meckling & Chung (2009, pp. 19–23) the discussion around sectoral 
approaches is based on the competitiveness agenda of industrialised countries and the 
technology transfer agenda of developing countries. Industrialised countries and their 
industries prefer a fixed or intensity targets approach so as to create a level playing field 
for industry. Fixed targets were consistently rejected by developing countries at both 
the national and the sectoral level and thus it became apparent that sectoral trading is 
not a politically feasible option in the medium term. Intensity targets bear the challenge 
on how to distribute credits after a sector has achieved a particular benchmark. Good 
performance by companies in a sector can be offset by bad performance by other 
companies (Baron et al., 2009, p. 23). Thus, intensity targets run the risk of not 
providing direct incentives for good performance. Furthermore, data gathering and 
benchmark-setting is less controversial for sectors with homogeneous products such as 
cement and steel, than it is for instance for chemical products with a large variety of 
production processes. In addition, Baron et al. (2009, p. 15)caution that the potential 
credit supply from intensity targets would potentially surpass demand from 
industrialised countries in the presence of CDM credit supply. This would require a 
careful assessment of industrialised country targets, and of the interaction with CDM 
(Baron et al., 2009; Meckling & Chung, 2009). At the same time, sectoral technology 
cooperation and transfer approaches preferred by developing countries, do not address 
the industrialised countries’ criteria of cost-minimisation and competitiveness. 
Summarising, the proposed sectoral approaches do not fulfil simultaneously the 
interests of both industrialised and developing countries, as the CDM does (Heller, 
1996; Wiener, 1999). A further discussion and analysis of sectoral approaches is beyond 
the scope of this book. 
The CDM is only one element in the mix of national and international policies. It is not 
in the scope of this work to illustrate the interaction of the CDM with other energy-
relevant policies, such as fossil fuel subsidies still in existence in several countries (see 
e.g. Cust & Neuhoff, 2010). Examples will be provided, however, where the interaction 
with national policies leads to positive or negative effects with regards to the goals of 
the CDM. The latest developments in the design of the CDM and the EU ETS up to 
November 1, 2011 are taken into account.20 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Political, legal and economic developments that occurred after this date cannot be taken 
properly into account in this thesis. Thus, the relevant CDM decisions taken at the UNFCCC 
conference in Durban in December 2011 have not been addressed here. 
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1.7. Synopsis 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the institutional procedures of the CDM. It serves as 
a basis for the analysis in chapters three to five. At the same time, each chapter is to 
some extent self-standing, and includes a brief introduction to the CDM and its 
relevant concepts where necessary. Thus, readers familiar with the concept of the CDM 
can skip these parts in chapters three to five.  
Chapter 3 approaches the CDM from the supply side.21 Guided by Hypotheses I through 
IV, the analysis aims to show the effects of different actors’ actions on the CDM market 
with the use of the marginal abatement cost concept. The hypotheses are mainly 
approached via a review of the literature addressing how the CDM achieved its three 
objectives of cost-effectiveness, sustainable development and additionality. 
Furthermore, publicly available data from the CDM Pipeline (Risoe, 2007, 2011) will be 
used to assess the rents conferred to CDM host countries and how the EB, DOEs and 
project developers took decisions with regards to projects up to November 2011. 
Previous analysis has been primarily based upon in-depth case studies of samples of 
registered projects. This analysis aims to apply a high-level categorization to 
sustainable development and abatement costs found in the CDM literature. Lastly, the 
chapter assesses whether an alternative funding approach would be better suited to 
align the incentives of actors in the CDM to achieve the three objectives.  
Chapter 4 examines how the benchmark rates used in the determination of 
additionality have been selected over time in India and China. The chapter implicitly 
relates to Hypotheses I and III and aims to show that both the project developer and 
the host country want to maximize project inflow and will thus set the benchmark rate 
strategically so as to achieve this goal. The chapter analyses how benchmark rates have 
changed over time by focusing on the two main renewable technologies, wind and 
hydro, in the two principal CDM host countries India and China. These countries differ 
within the benchmark test mainly because one uses a fixed rate (China) and the other a 
flexible rate to be chosen by the project developer (India). This chapter intends to show 
that, faced with the flexibility to choose, Indian project developers will select 
benchmark rates that maximise their expected wealth (Hypothesis I) and, when fixing 
the benchmark rates, governments will aim to maximize project inflow (Hypothesis 
III). The analysis is conducted using publicly available benchmark rates and project 
information from Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES, 2010). 
                                                          
21
 The literature review in this chapter is a reworked version of a Climate Strategies report 
written with Karsten Neuhoff (Vasa & Neuhoff, 2011). 
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Chapter 5 analyses the CDM from the compliance dimensions on how the CDM has 
been used by emitters in industrialised countries emitters.22It thus completes the 
picture on the life-cycle of a CDM credit from generation to actual usage. Such an 
assessment has to the author’s knowledge not been conducted previously and is an 
important link between previous macroeconomic model simulations aimed at showing 
the inefficiency of limits to the use of CDM in emissions trading markets and the actual 
implemention of such limits. This chapter is aimed at showing how the European 
Union has implemented the CER limits, using the example of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. The right to use CERs in the EU ETS entails a value for emitters, the 
impacts that such a rent has will be assessed. Hypotheses V and VI guide the analysis 
and aim to show that by conferring the right to use CERs for free, the EU is creating 
windfall profits for emitters. Options to capture this rent and apply it towards 
increasing abatement are discussed. The chapter applies comparative statistics and 
uses publicly available empirical data from the EU ETS Community Independent 
Transaction Log on verified emissions, allocation of EUAs and surrendered CERs in the 
EU ETS for the year 2008 (CITL, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 This chapter is a slightly reworked version of an article recently published in Climate Policy 
(Vasa, 2011). 
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Appendix 1: Overview of CDM project types 
Table A 1.1 Registered CDM project types November 2011 
Type  Number of 
registered 
projects 
Share of CERs 
expected 2012 
Afforestation 5 0,03% 
Biomass energy 391 5,36% 
Cement 19 1,02% 
CO2 usage 2 0,01% 
Coal bed/mine 
methane 
51 3,99% 
EE households 26 0,13% 
EE industry 64 0,47% 
EE own generation 196 6,12% 
EE service 5 0,02% 
EE supply side 28 0,59% 
Energy distribution 5 0,22% 
Fossil fuel switch 67 5,98% 
Fugitive  21 2,40% 
Geothermal 12 0,61% 
HFCs 22 22,50% 
Hydro 1064 15,09% 
Landfill gas 210 7,83% 
Methane avoidance 411 3,37% 
N2O 66 11,72% 
PFCs and SF6 14 0,55% 
Reforestation 27 0,61% 
Solar 46 0,10% 
Tidal 1 0,05% 
Transport 10 0,18% 
Wind 793 11,08% 
Total 3556 100,00% 
Source: Risoe (2011) 
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Appendix 2: Kyoto Protocol targets 
Table A 1.2 Kyoto Protocol targets for commitment period 2008-2012  
Country GHG emissions (2008-
2012) relative base year 
Base year 
Australia  8% 1990 
Austria  -8% 1990 
Belgium  -8% 1990 
Bulgaria -8% 1988 
Canada  -6% 1990 
Croatia -5% 1990 
Czech Republic -8% 1990 
Denmark -8% 1990 
Estonia -8% 1990 
European Community -8% 1990 
Finland  -8% 1990 
France  -8% 1990 
Germany  -8% 1990 
Greece  -8% 1990 
Hungary -6% average 1985-1987 
Iceland  10% 1990 
Ireland  -8% 1990 
Italy  -8% 1990 
Japan  -6% 1990 
Latvia -8% 1990 
Liechtenstein  -8% 1990 
Lithuania -8% 1990 
Luxembourg  -8% 1990 
Monaco  -8% 1990 
Netherlands  -8% 1990 
New Zealand  0% 1990 
Norway  1% 1990 
Poland -6% 1988 
Portugal  -8% 1990 
Romania -8% 1989 
Russian Federation 0% 1990 
Slovakia -8% 1990 
Slovenia -8% 1986 
Spain  -8% 1990 
Sweden  -8% 1990 
Switzerland  -8% 1990 
Ukraine 0% 1990 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland  -8% 1990 
United States of America* -7% 1990 
*Not Party to the Kyoto Protocol -                                                Source: (UNFCCC, 1997a) 
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2. PROCEDURES AND ACTORS WITHIN THE CDM AND THE EU EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 
he Kyoto Protocol is based on the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC), 
which was established in 1992 and ratified in 1994.1 The Kyoto Protocol set legally 
binding emission reduction targets for 37 industrialised countries.2 These countries 
agreed to reduce anthropogenic emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) to 4.2% below 1990 
levels during the Kyoto commitment period, 2008-2012 (UNFCCC, 1997, Article 3).3 These 
targets have set a cap on the emissions of the countries involved.4 To achieve their emission 
reduction targets, industrialised countries distribute the responsibility to reduce emissions 
among national emitters, usually private entities. Developing countries did not agree to any 
emission caps and thus their emissions are not limited.  
Reducing emissions in developing countries is possible at lower costs than in industrialised 
countries (Hoglund et al., 2009; Wetzelaer et al., 2007). One example is that many 
industrialised countries already achieved a certain degree of energy-efficiency which translates 
in a lower carbon intensity of industrial and power production. Conversely, in developing 
countries, the available power generation and industrial infrastructure is more carbon intensive 
and much of the infrastructure still has to be built. It is thus assumed that installing energy-
efficient low-carbon technology in developing countries is cheaper than retrofitting existing 
infrastructure in industrialised countries.5 Therefore, both industrialised and developing 
countries can benefit from finding an instrument that encourages emission reductions where 
they can be conducted at lowest cost. 
The Clean Development Mechanism allows emitters from industrialised countries to achieve 
part of their emission reduction target with emission reductions accomplished through distinct 
projects in developing countries.6 To achieve their emission reduction target, industrialised 
                                                          
1
 Readers familiar with Chapter 1 can skip the introduction to section 2.1. Readers familiar with the CDM 
procedures, its actor and the EU ETS can skip this chapter and continue with Chapter 3. 
2
 Each country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol is a Party to the treaty. The European Union has also 
joined the Kyoto Protocol as a Party. Parties to the Protocol are differentiated between “Annex I”, i.e. 
industrialized countries and “Non-Annex I”, i.e. developing countries.  
3
 With United States ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the average target would be 5.2% below 1990 
levels (see also Chapter 1 Footnote 3). 
4
 To track their progress towards this goal, industrialised countries agreed to monitor, report and verify 
(MRV) their GHG emissions on an annual basis. 
5
 High-carbon technologies are defined in terms of the volume of GHG emitted per unit of product output. 
This includes production of output such as steel and cement, and electricity. Low-carbon technologies are 
technologies that emit less GHG emission in the production process. In the power sector low-carbon 
technologies relate to renewable energy technologies such as wind, hydroelectric power plants, solar and 
geothermal. 
6
 The CDM is one of four flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, and the only one that motivates 
emission reductions in developing countries. The other mechanisms are emissions trading between 
industrialised countries, the bubble mechanism used by the European Union to achieve its goal jointly, 
and joint implementation between industrialised countries. JI is a project-based mechanism similar to 
T 
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countries usually distribute responsibilities to reduce emissions to emitters within their 
territory. By paying for emission reductions in developing countries using the CDM, an 
industrialised country can lessen the domestic reductions needed to achieve its own target. 
CDM projects in developing countries generate CERs.7 Each CER allows an industrialised 
country emitter to lower its domestic reduction effort by one ton of CO2. Besides generating 
cost-efficient emission credits, the CDM is to further sustainable development in the countries 
hosting projects. 
In order to generate CERs, CDM projects need to be registered with the CDM EB (UNFCCC, 
2001). 8 The CDM-EB is in charge of CDM administration, meaning they ultimately decide 
whether projects are registered or not. To do so, they should be sustainable, cost-effective and 
additional to any that would have happened anyway (UNFCCC, 1997). The registration of 
projects follows an institutionalised procedure frequently called the “project cycle”.  
CDM projects can be developed by companies from the host country (so-called unilateral CDM) 
or through investments by companies from industrialised countries; the latter is however rare 
(Michaelowa, 2007).9 The emission reductions from a CDM project are calculated against the 
baseline emission scenario, i.e. the emissions scenario of what would have happened without 
the project’s implementation. The difference between this baseline emissions scenario without 
the project and the emissions of the project are the emission reductions generated by the 
project, which are then issued as CERs. Emitters from industrialised countries or their 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the CDM, which generate emission reduction units. The main difference is that JI is conducted in 
industrialised countries, and that any emission reduction units generated are deducted from the emission 
cap. While JI is also challenged by setting a baseline (see following paragraph) emission reduction units 
cannot inflate global emission emissions beyond the cap from industrialised countries (Hoogzaad, 2009). 
7
 Developing countries were initially strongly opposed to such an instrument (see also Section 1.2 in 
Chapter 1). They favoured a compliance fund, called the clean development fund (CDF) for industrialised 
countries (Cole, 2010; Olsen, 2007). The CDF, proposed by the Brazilian delegation in 1997, would collect 
penalties from industrialized countries which exceed their emission limitations and channel the proceeds 
to developing countries (UNFCCC, 1997; Cole, 2010). Industrialized countries opposed the penalty nature 
of the CDF, and in the last hours of the Kyoto negotiations, the concept of the CDF was changed to the 
CDM (UNFCCC, 1997a; Werksman, 1998). Chapter 3 of this book compares the two instruments using 
static analysis. 
8
 The CDM-EB is made up of ten experts from ministries of Kyoto ratifying developing and industrialised 
countries. To ensure the independence of CDM-EB decisions, board members must act in their own 
personal capacity (UNFCCC, 2005: para 8c) and notify conflicts of interests when they arise (UNFCCC, 
2005: Rule 10 (2)). A violation of this principle can lead to suspension of the respective board member 
(UNFCCC, 2005: para 10-11 and 4/CMP.1 Rule 7-8). CDM-EB fulfils both a rule-making and rule-
enforcing role. Decisions by the CDM-EB are legal documents denoted by the respective meeting when 
the decision was taken (e.g. EB2 denotes the second meeting of the executive board). Decisions of the 
CDM-EB can be divided into three main classes (Netto & Barani Schmidt, 2009): 1) Regulatory decisions 
relating to the supervision of the CDM in implementing its modalities and procedures throughout the 
project activity cycle, 2) Rulings relating to compliance with the CDM modalities and procedures by the 
project participants, accredited entities and/or DOEs, such as, accrediting and provisionally designating 
operational entities, approving methodologies, registering CDM project activities, and issuing certified 
emissions reduction units, and 3) operational decisions relating to the functioning of the EB. 
9
 CDM projects include for example energy-efficiency improvements in industry and power generation, 
flaring or use of landfill methane gas for electricity generation, the installation of renewable technologies 
such as wind, hydroelectric and solar. 
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governments buy the CERs that are generated by the project. The first CDM project was 
registered in 2003, with the first credits issued in 2005, the year the Kyoto Protocol was ratified 
(Risoe, 2011). By the end of November 2011, the CDM-EB had registered over 3,000 CDM 
projects. 
The cap on emissions in industrialised countries creates the demand for CERs. Compliance with 
the Kyoto targets by industrialised country emitters is conducted in three stages: 
1) Demand stage: Industrialised countries demand CERs to lower the cost of achieving 
their individual emission reduction responsibilities 
2) Supply stage: CDM projects in developing countries supply CERs to industrialised 
countries 
3) Compliance stage: Industrialised countries use CERs to achieve part of the Kyoto target 
In principle, all industrialised countries want to reduce their total compliance costs, and thus 
there is theoretical demand for CERs from each of these countries. However, industrialised 
countries need to specify legal procedures that regulate how CERs can be used at the 
compliance stage, especially when individual emitters have distributed reduction 
responsibilities. Few countries specified the legal procedures for private entities to use CERs for 
compliance. An exception is the European Union, which has established an EU-wide emissions 
trading scheme (EU COM, 2003). In the EU ETS, emitters receive EU allowances that allow its 
holder to emit one ton of CO2- equivalent (see section 1.1). The European Union has also 
specified compliance rules for CERs, which confer to its holder the same right as an EUA, and 
has thereby created the biggest demand market for CERs (Council of the European Union & 
European Parliament, 2004; Linacre et al., 2011; Michaelowa, 2004; Karsten Neuhoff et al., 
2012).  
The aim of this chapter is to provide the necessary background to understand and analyse the 
demand-, supply- and compliance-stage in the following chapters. Firstly, this chapter defines 
the supply-side. It defines the necessary criteria each CDM project is required to fulfil and the 
private and public actors involved in the process, the so-called project cycle. The CDM criteria 
addressed in the project cycle are discussed, in particular: additionality, sustainable 
development and cost-effectiveness. Particular attention is devoted to the requirements to 
demonstrate additionality of projects and emission reductions. Secondly, this chapter 
introduces the compliance market and in particular the rules that govern compliance with CERs 
in the EU ETS.  
2.1 Criteria for successful CDM projects 
The CDM specifies three criteria that each project needs to fulfil to receive registration. The 
CDM should 1) promote cost-effective abatement for industrialised countries, 2) support 
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sustainable development for developing countries (UNFCCC, 1997a), and 3) ensure 
environmental integrity, i.e. that the CDM does not increase global emissions, the CDM should 
lead to real, measurable and additional emission reductions. A condition for the use of the CDM 
by industrialised countries is that the CDM should only be used to achieve part of the targets of 
these countries. This limitation is called supplementarity criterion.10  
2.1.1 Additionality safeguards the environmental integrity of the CDM 
The CDM requires that only additional emission reductions are certified. Additionality is a key 
aspect to ensure the environmental integrity of the CDM. By using CERs generated from CDM 
projects in developing countries, emitters in industrialised countries can increase their 
emissions beyond their individual country emission caps. The emission reductions in 
developing countries are thus offset by an increase in emissions from industrialised countries.11 
Additionality therefore requires that only emission reductions are credited that would not have 
occurred anyway. Otherwise, if industrialised country emitters use non-additional CERs for 
compliance, the CDM contributes to an increase in global emissions (Greiner & Michaelowa, 
2003; L. Schneider, 2007).  
Environmental additionality is a measure of how many emissions are reduced by a certain 
project activity relative to the emission baseline scenario (Baumert, 1999).12 The emission 
baseline scenario assumes the emissions that would occur in the absence of the project 
(UNFCCC, 2001: para 43). The baseline is thus a hypothetical, counter-factual scenario. The 
estimation of the baseline is described in a baseline methodology. To quantify emission 
reductions, once the project is implemented, the project’s actual emissions need to be 
monitored through procedures specified in a monitoring methodology. The difference between 
baseline emissions and monitored emissions from the project is the volume of emission 
reductions of the project. This is the volume of CERs that should be awarded to the project. The 
baseline and monitoring methodologies, which are inextricably linked, have to be approved by 
the CDM-EB for a project to apply them.13 
                                                          
10
 The interpretation of “partly” has an effect on the restriction on the use of the CDM for compliance in 
industrialised countries. The Protocol uses a different wording for Joint Implementation and 
International Emissions Trading on one side and the CDM on the other. This difference points towards a 
difference in intent. Instead of “partly”, Article 6 (1d) and 17 of the Protocol state that the use of these 
mechanisms should be “supplemental” to domestic efforts. One possible interpretation of the difference 
in wording is that the CDM should be used to a lesser extent than JI and IET (Michaelowa, 2004). Zhang 
(2001) argues that such a differentiation would lead to replacing the use of one mechanism with the 
other, thereby rendering the differentiated limits of IET, JI and CDM use inefficient. For the remainder of 
this book we assume that the use of all flexibility mechanisms shall be “supplemental” to domestic action. 
11
 The offset concept was first applied in the US Environmental Protection Agency Clean Air Act (Liroff, 
1980). For a comprehensive overview of offset applications, see Hahn and Richards (forthcoming). 
12
 Additionality is frequently assessed through the investment analysis test, i.e. whether the project would 
be implemented in the absence of the revenue from the CDM. Section 2.3 illustrates the different 
additionality tests to demonstrate project additionality. 
13
 To illustrate the information challenges to estimate baseline emissions, one can imagine that all factors 
that impact emissions directly and indirectly have to be accounted for. These factors include for instance 
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O F  C D M  | 49 
This section introduced the concept of additionality. The next section introduces the concept of 
sustainable development. 
2.1.2 Sustainable development addresses developing countries priorities 
CDM projects should assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development 
(UNFCCC, 1997). The UNFCCC makes frequent reference to the concept (UNFCCC, 1992).14 For 
example, Article 3 of the UNFCCC states that “[…] Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development.” However, the UNFCCC does not define sustainable development. At 
the global level, sustainable development can be defined as “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(Brundtland, 1987).15 Chichilnisky (2009) argues that when extinction matters, sustainable 
development is the level of consumption that avoids extinction. These findings argue in favour 
of a standard definition that maximises sustainable development at the global level. However, 
these definitions are difficult to operationalize in practice due to differences in understanding 
among between different countries what that level of consumption should be and how it should 
be distributed.  
The aim of the CDM is thus to maximise the sustainable development benefits as understood by 
the different countries involved. Within the CDM, the criteria for sustainable development are 
subject to CDM host country interpretation (UNFCCC, 2001: para 40a). To establish sustainable 
development criteria, the host country empowers an institution to act as the DNA.16 Each CDM 
project conducted needs to fulfil the sustainable development criteria setup by the respective 
host country DNA. Thus, CDM projects conducted in different countries are subject to different 
sustainability criteria. 
One argument in favour of country-specific criteria for sustainable development derives from 
differences in economic conditions in developing countries. In her review of the literature on 
sustainable development criteria in the CDM, Olsen (2007) distinguishes between three 
dimensions of sustainable development: social, environmental and economic. The importance 
of these individual dimensions is different in each country, and varies among others with 
regional economic conditions. For instance, Markandya & Wilkinson (2007) show that 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
energy and non-energy taxes and subsidies that have an effect on emissions. The baseline scenario has to 
reasonably estimate the effect of these factors to approximate baseline emissions. Appendix 1 to this 
chapter provides a graphical overview of estimating baseline emissions. 
14
 For instance in the Preamble, and Articles. 2, 3 and 4. 
15
 Balancing the needs of future generations against present needs involves normative judgments. A 
standard cost-benefit analysis of discounted utility is ill-equipped to account for the risk of extinction that 
is inherent in climate change and the absence of sustainable development. 
16
 The DNA can be located in an existing government department or ministry (the choice for most host 
countries), be established as an inter-ministerial committee (e.g. in Brazil) or as a new and independent 
office (e.g. Indonesia) (Curnow and Hodes, 2009 p. 21). 
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electricity access is a prerequisite for human wellbeing.17 The authors argue that providing 
electricity with renewable energies does decrease the adverse local health effects from fossil-
fuel, especially coal-fired, electricity generation.  
At the same time, Markandya & Wilkinson (2007) argue that the largest health benefits from 
electricity generation increase with income up US$7,500 per capita and only slowly beyond that 
level.18 As the incremental benefits of health vary with the per capita income level, and this level 
varies between countries, there is a rationale to differentiate sustainable development criteria 
between countries. This suggests that multiple interpretations of sustainable development are 
the result of different national development priorities and economic conditions. 
The inclusion of sustainable development as a criterion for the design of a climate mitigation 
instrument can be understood in the context of international cooperation. Wiener (1999) argues 
that in the absence of dictatorial decision making, countries need to be made better off to induce 
them to join an international agreement. Sustainable development is a key term to gather 
support from different developing countries, despite their diverging priorities, and to induce 
cooperation when local benefits matter. However, sustainable development goes beyond the 
side-payment nature for cooperation. 
In short, the definition and interpretation of sustainable development depends on the country 
context. It includes in general also non-climate related aspects. In the context of climate change 
mitigation, sustainable development can provide a long-term guide for a transformation to a 
low-carbon economy, which entails higher costs of abatement in the short-term, but lower costs 
in the long-term. The next section introduces the concept of cost-effective abatement. 
2.1.3 Cost-effectiveness minimises global abatement costs  
Cost-effectiveness means that an emission reduction goal is achieved by using the least 
resources necessary (Kolshus et al., 2001). The UNFCCC addresses the importance of cost-
effectiveness by stating: “policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.”(UNFCCC, 1992 Article 3 
para. 3) 19 Abatement costs vary within and between countries. The differential abatement cost 
between countries can generate cost-effectiveness gains, when abatement is conducted by 
emitters which face the least cost (Montgomery, 1972). This approach aims an equalization of 
                                                          
17
 As electricity generation from fossil fuels, such as coal, produces additional pollutants such as SO2, NOx 
gases and particulate matters, electricity generation can also impact population health adversely through 
respiratory diseases. 
18
 In detail see Deaton (2004) and Woods (2000). 
19
 The second part of Article 3.3 states “To achieve this, such policies and measures should take into 
account different socio-economic contexts […].” Thus, while cost-effectiveness is a driving force, socio-
economic contexts also determine abatement actions (UNFCCC, 1992). This is an important reason to 
look beyond cost. This is reflected in the addition of sustainable development to the goals of the 
Convention.  
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marginal abatement costs across countries. The gains of this approach are economic surpluses, 
and the size, potential distribution, and use of these rents are important factors to judge the 
viability of an instrument. CDM projects should allow industrialised countries to achieve their 
emission reductions (abatement) cost-effectively irrespective of the location of emissions.20  
The differential costs to reduce emissions can be illustrated with the comparison of marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) curves.21 The MAC curve illustrates the cost of abating one additional 
unit of emissions, and increases with the quantity abated (see Figure 2.1 for representation of 
MAC curves in two countries).22 The slope of the MAC curve determines the cost of abatement: a 
steeper MAC curve leads to higher cost for abating the same amount of emissions, all else 
equal.23 Thus an industrialised country with a steep sloping MAC curve reduces total abatement 
costs of reaching a pre-defined emission reduction goal, if it can reduce emissions in a country 
with a flatter sloping MAC curve.24 The CDM allows emitters in industrialised countries to 
identify and use cost-effective opportunities in developing countries with flatter MAC curves.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates that two countries with different MAC curves have different total costs to 
achieve the same emission reduction. MACA denotes the marginal abatement cost curve of 
country A (schedule A). MACB denotes the marginal abatement cost curve of country B 
(schedule B). Imagine that emitters in country A and emitters in country B have to reduce 
emissions by R units each. If country A emitters have to reduce R emissions domestically, their 
total costs will be equal to the area TA. The price at which supply meets demand (equal to R) of 
emission reductions is PA. If country B emitters have to reduce R emissions domestically, total 
costs will be equal to the area TB. At price PB supply meets demand in schedule B. Schedule A 
and B show that TA is greater than TB. That is because emission reductions in country B cost less 
                                                          
20
 The wording of the Article 12 in the Kyoto allows for partial achievement of compliance through the 
CDM. (UNFCCC, 1997a: Art. 12). Emission reductions in developing countries shall be supplemental to 
domestic abatement in developed countries. Section 2.1.4 discusses briefly the implications of this rule, 
and chapter 5 analyses the implementation of this rule in the European Union. 
21
 The MAC curves in this section are illustrated at the country level. The logic can equally be applied at 
the company and project level. Each unit abated (x-axis) could then be a particular CDM project. 
22
 There is viable criticism to the use of marginal abatement cost curves including the non-consideration 
of ancillary benefits such as health improvements from reduced air pollution (Gohlke et al., 2011; Smith 
&Haigler, 2008), the static representation of abatement costs for only a single year which does not 
address path dependency, and the inability of MAC curves to capture wider social implications of climate 
change mitigation (Ekins, Kesicki, & Smith, 2011). As stated above in the section about sustainable 
development, cost-effectiveness alone does not account for the wider social implications, including 
transformational and health benefits from choosing higher cost abatement options. Nevertheless, 
marginal abatement costs curves despite these shortcomings are a useful tool to illustrate implications on 
costs. In the further analysis, we will point out where challenges arise and where they cannot be 
addressed by a view on the marginal abatement cost curve alone.  
23
 Thus, when a country can negotiate its own reduction target, instead of it being fully externally 
imposed, a steeper abatement MAC curve would impose higher costs and thus incentivise the country to 
negotiate a lower reduction target, all else equal. 
24
 For cost-effectiveness opportunities to exist, the MAC curve in the developing country can be steeper 
relative to the industrialised country curve. The gains from trade would just be smaller. However, it is 
commonly assumed that MAC curves in developing countries exhibit a smoother slope (den Elzen and de 
Moor, 2002; Castro 2012). 
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per unit relative to country A, and because costs are increasing at a lower pace as the slope of 
MACB is flatter than that of MACB. Thus, the same target R imposes higher costs on country A 
relative to country B emitters. 
Figure 2.1 Total abatement costs to reduce R units in different countries 
Combining the emission reduction opportunities in country A and B would lead to even lower 
total abatement costs than reducing R units in country B. Combining the two MAC curves, 
MACA and MACB yields a new MAC curve MACAB. If country A is an industrialised country with 
a reduction target of R units and country B is a developing country without a target, the lowest 
costs of achieving the reduction R is for country A emitters to i) achieve part of the reduction in 
country A domestically, and ii) achieve part of the reduction in country B by paying firms in 
country B to conduct emission reduction projects.  
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2.2 shows that if R is equal to four units to be reduced, country 
A decrease its total abatement costs to TAB by reducing two units in each country A and B.  
Country A pays a price PAB for each unit reduced. As two units are reduced in country B, the 
difference between the price PAB and the cost of these abated units is a rent to country B. The 
rent for firms in country B that have implemented the CDM project is equal to the area above 
the dark grey bars and below PAB. This rent is important as it means that actual emission 
reduction costs have been lower than the price paid for them.25 Total costs for country A thus 
reduce from TA in schedule A of Figure 2.1 by the hatched area WAB. WAB is welfare 
improvements for country A. If country A emitters are given the opportunity to abate in country 
B, this option leads to welfare improvements.  
 
 
                                                          
25
 This rent can be used to leverage investments in additional emission reductions (Hepburn, 2009). 
Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3 quantifies the rent conferred by the CDM to host countries, and to China, India 
and Brazil in particular. 
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Figure 2.2 Combining MAC curves from different countries 
The marginal abatement cost view has an important draw-back. It is static and does not 
incorporate the potential for technological change. For instance abatement from some 
renewables technologies with a large abatement potential is currently only available at a higher 
marginal abatement cost. These technologies would be implemented last according to the 
marginal abatement cost curve perspective. However, with targeted support for these 
technologies, the technology becomes cheaper due to the learning curve effect and thus shifts 
leftward along the MAC curve over time (Vogt-Schilb & Hallegatte, 2011). In the long-term, this 
can reduce the total cost of abating a given volume of emissions and is essential if deep emission 
reduction targets (e.g. 80% by 2050) are concerned. Natural candidates for these technologies 
are renewables due to their low-carbon intensity and underlying high abatement potential. 
Without targeted support the market will need much more time to make renewables cost-
competitive with other technologies in the presence of imperfect competition and absence of 
electricity grid infrastructure suitable for renewables. 
2.1.4 Supplementarity increases the slope of the combined MAC curve 
Figure 2.2 has shown that part of the abatement necessary for country A to reduce R emission 
units would occur in country B, the developing country. However, the CDM allows 
industrialised countries to achieve only part of their emission reduction targets in developing 
countries.26 This rule is called supplementarity principle, which aims at ensuring that 
                                                          
26
 This rule was the source of much controversy before and after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol 
(Depledge, 2000). Some industrialised countries argued that this would increase compliance costs 
significantly. These claims were supported by marco-economic modeling of trading of CERs between 
countries (Weyant & Hill, 1999).  
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industrialised countries reduce emissions primarily domestically.27 Quantitatively limiting the 
volume of emission reductions allowed to be achieved in B-type (developing) countries in Figure 
2.2 leads to a contraction of the MACAB curve. The contracted MAC curve is steeper, but still less 
steep than both MACA and MACB. The total abatement costs increase with a contracted MAC 
curve under the supplementarity rule.  
However, in practice, the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent guidance through the Marrakech 
Accords does not specify any quantitative limit of abatement in developing countries (UNFCCC, 
1997, 2001). The European Union has defined supplementarity unilaterally to mean that at least 
50% of the EU’s emission reduction target should be achieved domestically (EU Com, 2004). 
The EU thus limits the inflow and use of credits from the CDM for EU target compliance. 
Chapter 5 analyses the implementation and effects of this rule in the European Union. For the 
purposes of this chapter it is sufficient to note that according to the CDM rules, the CDM should 
not be the primary emission reduction strategy of industrialised countries, but that only the 
European Union has defined the supplementarity limit quantitatively to address equity 
concerns by developing countries that the EU does “buy itself out” of its responsibility 
(Woerdman, 2004).  
The sub-sections above have introduced and defined the concepts of additionality, sustainable 
development and cost-effectiveness and supplementarity. Additionality is important so as to 
only reward projects that actually reduce emissions beyond any that would have happened 
anyway to avoid an increase in global emissions. Sustainable development is important to 
address the different sustainable development priorities of developing countries and to 
maximise benefits beyond emission reductions. Cost-effectiveness is important to achieve the 
goal at lowest cost. The next section introduces the institutional framework that was established 
to ensure the above criteria are met.28 
2.2 Process steps of supply-side of CDM 
Each proposed CDM project needs to pass through the institutional framework of the CDM. The 
steps that this involves are commonly called project cycle. It involves legal responsibilities for 
public and private actors. The project cycle aims at identifying and registering the projects that 
fulfil the criteria of additionality, sustainable development and cost-effectiveness and reject 
those that do not.  
                                                          
27
 Developing countries felt that industrialised countries “buy themselves out” of their responsibility to 
reduce emissions domestically if they were allowed to reduce a large part or their whole target in 
developing countries. Furthermore some developing countries felt that industrialised countries would use 
all low-cost abatement options leaving developing countries only with high-cost abatement options 
(Akita, 2003; Narain and van ’t Veld, 2008; Castro, 2012). Chapter 3 shows how the argumentation of 
developing countries that industrialised countries buy themselves out lead to the adoption of the CDM. 
28
 Netto and Barani Schmidt (2009) provide a detailed account of the different roles of actors in the CDM 
project cycle.  
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The regulator of the project cycle is the CDM Executive Board. The role of the CDM-EB is to 
register projects that meet the criteria of additionality, and to reject projects that do not. The 
Registration and Issuance Team (RIT) supports the CDM-EB in this work (UNFCCC, 2007). The 
host country DNA is responsible to ensure that the project contributes to sustainable 
development. Project developers are responsible to demonstrate additionality to the EB, 
sustainable development to the host country DNA, and cost-effectiveness to potential CER 
buyers from industrialised countries. The CDM-EB supervises the project cycle and ensures that 
each project follows the modalities and procedures of the CDM (UNFCCC, 2001). 
As mentioned above, CDM projects supply CERs for emitters in industrialised countries. 
Emitters will demand CERs if these are cheaper than reducing the same amount of GHG 
emissions domestically. To receive CERs, the emitter contracts a project developer to identify 
and conduct a suitable CDM project. Both the project developer and the buyer of the CERs 
become project participants in the project. The project developer can be from any country, but is 
generally from a developing country and thus well-informed about project opportunities in the 
respective country. The buyer is usually from an industrialised country and buys CERs for 
compliance.29 The following paragraphs explain the procedures and the involved actors in 
chronological order of the seven steps a project needs to go through to become registered. The 
project cycle introduces the complete supply-stage. The CDM project cycle is conducted as 
follows (UNFCCC, 2011)30:  
1) Project Design 
2) National Approval 
3) Validation 
4) Registration 
5) Monitoring 
6) Verification 
7) CER issuance 
These are described in the following three sub-sections. 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 Buyer can also act as intermediaries between project developers and ultimate compliance buyers. For 
the purpose of this book, buyers are compliance buyers.  
30
 In the following, the procedures and modalities for large-scale projects are described. Small-scale 
projects have simplified rules to decrease transaction costs (UNFCCC, 2005b Annex II, para. 9, 2005c 
Annex, para 55). However, the actors involved and their responsibilities are the same independent of the 
project size (exemption is Step 6, where small scale projects can use the same auditing firm as in Step 3). 
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2.2.1 Project design and approval by host country  
Step 1 (Project design): The project developer identifies a project31 and documents the 
information about the proposed activity in the project design document (PDD). The main aim of 
this step is for an external observer to understand all details necessary to determine whether the 
project is additional, i.e. would not have happened without the CDM. The PDD also quantifies 
how many CERs and which sustainable development benefits are expected from the project. To 
estimate CERs, the PDD provides information on the baseline and monitoring methodology.32 
Project developers try to identify projects with the lowest abatement costs per ton of CO2- 
equivalent, as these can be sold in the market with a high profit (a higher rent between PAB and 
MACAB in Figure 2.2).
33 Project developers can choose between the barrier test and the 
investment analysis to demonstrate additionality. These test will be introduced at the end of the 
project cycle.  
Step 2 National Approval: The project developer submits the PDD to the host country and to the 
buyer country for approval. Each country that participates in a CDM project (either directly, or 
through a private actor (e.g. buyer or project developer)) needs to a DNA (see section on 
sustainable development).34 The task of the DNA is to issue of Letter of Approval (LoA) that: 
 The respective country is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol,  
 The proposed CDM project is conducted voluntarily. 
Furthermore, the DNA of the host country needs to confirm that the:  
 The proposed CDM project contributes to sustainable development according to the 
host country national criteria.  
Each project participant listed in the DD needs a LoA from its country DNA.  
                                                          
31
 The identification of a project is mostly done in a Project Idea Note (PIN), which just describes the 
location, size and project type of the project proposed. The project design document builds on the PIN 
and is a more detailed description that includes all the requirements to be validated (Step 3) and 
registered (Step 4). We assume for the remainder of this book that projects developers start by drafting a 
PDD. This does not alter any of the conclusions in the following chapters. 
32
 In this example, it is assumed that the baseline and monitoring methodologies used already exist. If the 
project is the first of its kind, the project developer first needs to register the methodology with the 
executive board. The process is described in Netto & Barani Schmidt (2009: 223).  
33
 In bilateral projects, the buyer of CERs and seller of CERs, usually the project developer, contract 
beforehand the volume and price of CERs. A project can also be conducted unilaterally. That means that 
the project developer sells CERs generated by the project in the open market and does not contract 
beforehand with a buyer from an industrialised country. Unilateral CDM has become a widely used 
method for conducting CDM projects (Michaelowa, 2007). See also Footnote 35.  
34
 The project developer can ask for the host country confirmation at any time during the project cycle, 
but latest before the project is submitted for registration to the EB. 
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Usually, LoAs need to be issued before Step 4 (Registration) starts. However, in unilateral 
projects where the project developer does not specify any buyer of CERs, the LoA of the CER 
buyer need only to be issued before Step 7 (CER issuance).35 
2.2.2 Validation by auditing firms and executive board assessment for registration  
Step 3 Validation: The project developer submits the PDD to an auditing firm. This private 
auditing firm is called DOE. The DOE has to have technical expertise for monitoring and 
quantifying greenhouse gas emissions from emitters (UNFCCC, 2001). The DOE can be from 
any country but needs to be approved by the EB. The CDM Accreditation Panel (CDM-AP) 
recommends the accreditation or withdrawal of accreditation of DOEs to the CDM-EB 
(UNFCCC, 2007a). The DOE is contracted and paid by the project developer. The tasks of the 
DOE are to:  
 audit the information in the PDD regarding the additionality determination and the 
choice of baseline and monitoring methodologies,  
 assess whether the information provided in the PDD is complete, and 
 make the PDD public for stakeholder comments.  
If the documentation is complete and the DOE has assessed that the right baseline and 
monitoring methodology are used in the PDD, the DOE makes the PDD publicly available 
(online).36 Parties, stakeholders and non-governmental organisations accredited by the 
UNFCCC can comment on the project within a 30-day period (para 40 b-c).37 These comments 
have to be made publicly available.38 After the 30-day commenting period, the DOE determines 
how the project should be validated. 
On the basis of the information provided in the PDD and the stakeholder comments received, 
the DOE drafts a validation report. The aim of the validation report is for the DOE to identify 
the projects where either a) the additionality demonstration is credible, or b) the demonstration 
is not credible and the project should thus receive a negative validation report. If the 
additionality demonstration is credible, the DOE issues a positive validation report, which is 
forwarded to the CDM-EB for registration and made public simultaneously. If the additionality 
demonstration is not credible, the DOE issues a negative validation report, the project will not 
be further submitted for registration, and the decision has to be made public as well. The DOE 
                                                          
35
 See for instance, Jahn, Michaelowa, Raubenheimer, & Liptow (2004); Krey (2005); Michaelowa 
(2007).
36
 The official CDM registry website is http://cdm.unfccc.int.  
37
 Parties are defined as countries, or supra-national organization (e.g. European Union), that ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
38
 Registered non-government organsiations, research institutes and private parties can comment on the 
DOE validation report. These comments can identify questions of additionality, the calculation of 
emission reductions, and the sustainable development benefits of the project (McCully, 2008 or 
2010).These comments have to be addressed by the DOE. 
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submits a request for registration to the EB, by enclosing the validation report, the LoAs (Step 
2), and the PDD. All documents are uploaded online for public access.39 
Step 4 Registration: Based on the information submitted by the DOE the CDM-EB decides 
whether the project should be registered. Only projects which have received a positive validation 
report are analysed. During a four-week period following the submission of these documents by 
the DOE, the Registration and Issuance Team supports the CDM-EB in assessing the project.40  
The task of the Registration and Issuance Team is to analyse, using the information provided by 
the DOE validation report and the underlying PDD, whether the project is truly additional and 
submit recommendations to the CDM-EB on the project.41 The final decision is taken by the EB. 
The Registration and Issuance Team can recommend one of three decisions to the EB: 1) to 
reject the project, 2) to issue a request for review, or 3) to register the project. Unless at least 
three members of the CDM-EB follow the RIT’s recommendation to issue a request for review or 
to reject the project, the project is registered automatically after the four-week period.42  
2.2.3 Monitoring and verification of emissions and issuance of credits  
Step 5 Monitoring: If the project is registered, the project developer monitors actual GHG 
emissions from the project, for the duration chosen by the project developer, according to the 
monitoring methodology listed in the PDD. The results of the monitoring are detailed in a 
monitoring report, to be able to calculate actual emission reductions from the project.43 The 
actual emission reductions are calculated as the difference between monitored emissions and 
baseline emissions as specified in the baseline methodology. This amount of CERs should be 
awarded to the project.  
Step 6 Verification: The project developer submits the monitoring report to a DOE. To avoid a 
conflict of interest, the project developer is required to contract a different DOE from the one 
                                                          
39
 The DOE can also choose to terminate the validation pf a project.  
40
 The rules regarding the CDM-EB procedures have changed frequently as it became apparent that the 
CDM-EB needs additional technical support and expertise to identify suitable CDM projects. Following a 
series of criticism of long delay, the Registration and Issuance Team was established in 2006 to support 
the CDM-EB in its task to identify additional and non-additional projects (UNFCCC, 2007; Michaelowa, 
2009).  
41
 The Registration and Issuance Team is former from the UN’s roster of technical experts. 
42
 Data on registration, rejections and withdrawals per project type is publicly available. The United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) RISOE centre provides a public database in spreadsheet 
format (UNEP Risoe, 2011). The database, called CDM Pipeline, is updated monthly and contains every 
CDM project that has been proposed. It contains information about the project type, the location of the 
project in the host country, the DOE that validates the project, the estimated amount of emission 
reductions mentioned in the PDD, and important dates such as the submission of the PDD for public 
comments, and the date of registration of the project. The CDM Pipeline further documents all decisions 
that have been taken with regard to the project. Chapter 4 uses the CDM Pipeline to assess the 
effectiveness of benchmark test of the CDM.  
43
 The usual length of the monitoring period is one year. 
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that has validated the project.44 The task of the DOE is to make the monitoring report public on 
the CDM website and to compile a verification report. In this report, the DOE verifies that the 
emissions monitored by the project developer are authentic (UNFCCC, 2005, Annex, para 62).  
This includes a confirmation whether the project developer has monitored the emissions from 
the project accurately, and whether emission reductions from the CDM project activity are 
calculated accurately. Where the DOE discovers that project developers have not monitored 
emissions in accordance with the registered PDD, the DOEs are required to make the most 
conservative assumptions theoretically possible about the parameters monitored by the project 
developer.45 Based on the verification report, the DOE certifies in writing the volume of 
emission reductions achieved by the project, announces in writing the CDM-EB and the project 
developer of its decision, and uploads the decision publicly.  
Step 7 CER issuance: This last step is the actual process of CER creation. Based on the 
verification report and the certification by the DOE, the CDM-EB issues CERs at the request of 
the DOE. The CDM-EB issues the amount of CERs specified in the verification report. These 
CERs are directly forwarded to the participants specified in the PDD. The CDM-EB keeps 2% of 
all issued CERs as the so-called adaptation fee to finance climate adaptation in developing 
countries, which are “particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 
2001). The remainder of CERs can be used subsequently for compliance in industrialised 
countries (compliance-stage), provided these have specified rules to do so.  
Summarising, this section introduced all main private and public actors that participate in the 
project cycle, and the responsibilities of actors to ensure the criteria of additionality, sustainable 
development and cost-effectiveness. The CDM-EB and DOEs are thus responsible for ensuring 
additionality of projects and emission reductions, while the project developer is responsible for 
cost-effectiveness and the host country DNA is responsible for sustainable development. In Step 
1, the project developer chooses the project cost-effectively, documents expected sustainable 
development benefits and demonstrates that the project and the resulting emission reductions 
are additional. In Step 2, the DNA of the host country confirms that the project contributes to 
sustainable development. In Steps 3 and 4, the DOE and the CDM-EB are responsible to ensure 
the additionality of the project. In Steps 5 and 6, the CDM-EB and another DOE monitor and 
verify that the emission reductions claimed in the PDD actually materialised to ensure only 
additional emission reductions are issued in Step 7.  
                                                          
44
 To reduce transaction costs small-scale projects can use the same DOE which has validated the project. 
45
 To verify the data from the monitoring report, the DOE can conduct on-site visits of the project, 
interviews with project participants (technical staff) and local stakeholders. Moreover, it can gather 
additional data, if necessary. 
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As discussed in Step 1, the project developer uses additionality test to demonstrate that the 
project and the resulting emission reductions are additional. These tests are explained in the 
following section. 
2.3 Additionality tests 
Project developers can chose between two additionality tests, the barrier test and investment 
analysis. 46 To conduct any of these tests the project developer carries out and documents the 
different steps of additionality determination:  
 the identification of alternatives to the proposed project47,  
 barrier test, or 
 investment analysis test, and 
 for all projects as a credibility check, the common practice analysis.48  
The identification of alternatives involves a comprehensive illustration of all realistic and 
credible alternative projects that provide outputs or services comparable with the proposed 
CDM project activity. These alternatives should include (UNFCCC, 2008): 
I. The proposed project activity not undertaken as a CDM project; 
II. Other realistic and credible alternative scenario(s) to the proposed CDM project activity 
scenario that deliver the same quality of outputs (e.g., cement) or services (e.g. 
electricity, heat); or 
III. The alternative of continuing the current situation (i.e. no project activity). 
These alternatives and the proposed CDM project have to be assessed with the barrier or the 
investment analysis tests. 
The barrier test requires that the project developer shows that the proposed project faces 
barriers, which can be removed if the project receives CDM support. These barriers can be of 
financial and technological nature. For instance, if the proposed project has difficulties to 
acquire funding or only receives funding at unfavourable rates, the project developer can show 
how the CDM revenue helps overcome this financial barrier (UNFCCC, 2008a Annex 3, para. 
114). For technology barriers, the project developer can show that the necessary infrastructure 
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 The procedures to demonstrate additionality are described in the ‘Tool for the demonstration and 
assessment of additionality’ (henceforth: additionality tool) and the ‘Combined tool to identify the 
baseline scenario and demonstrate additionality (henceforth combined tool)’ (UNFCCC, 2008). Their use 
is voluntary, but it has de facto become the standard for project developers (Michaelowa, 2009). The rules 
discussed in this book relate to the additionality tool. The combined tool requires that project developers 
conduct both the barrier test and the investment analysis. The combined tool refers to the case where 
project developers can implement all alternatives themselves. Michaelowa (2009) argues that this is 
rarely the case, because for instance a wind project developer does not have the financial strength to 
implement a coal-fired power plant as an alternative. The combined tool is rarely used in practice. 
47
 This includes the alternative of doing anything, i.e. not implementing any action. 
48
  EB 44, Annex 3, paragraph 119. 
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to operationalize the project or that skilled labour to operate and maintain the technology is not 
available in the relevant country/region. If the project developer can demonstrate that the 
proposed project overcomes the financial and technological barriers with CDM support, the 
project is deemed additional according to the barrier test. 
As an alternative to the barrier test, the project developer can conduct the investment analysis 
test.49 The investment analysis allows project developers to choose between two approaches, a) 
the investment comparison analysis, and b) the benchmark approach.  
a) For the investment comparison analysis, the profitability of the proposed project and 
any identified alternatives are compared against each other. If one of the identified 
alternatives is more profitable than the proposed project, the project is deemed 
additional. The alternative could be a more profitable project including the alternative of 
not taking any action. For instance, if the project developers can show that another more 
emission intensive project (e.g. coal-fired power plant) would be more profitable than 
the proposed CDM project (e.g. renewable energy from wind turbines), the proposed 
project is additional.  
If one of the identified alternatives is “not taking any action”, project developers can 
show that this alternative is more profitable because reducing emissions under the 
proposed project only carries costs but no revenues without the CDM.50  
b) Project developers which use the benchmark approach demonstrate additionality by 
showing that the financial returns of the proposed CDM project activity are insufficient 
to justify the required investment. That means that the proposed project is not 
financially attractive when compared to a benchmark return on investment (ROI). This 
benchmark rate of return is usually a national or sectoral profitability rate usually 
achieved by similar projects.51 The benchmark test does not require that the project 
reaches the benchmark rate with the extra CDM revenue, the project’s profitability 
should only be below the benchmark rate without CDM support. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the functioning of the benchmark test. The figure shows several projects A 
to L and their profitability in terms of return on investment (ROI) without and with the extra 
revenue (in grey) from CERs. For a firm to conduct a project, the ROI of a project needs to be 
above a minimum threshold ROImin. ROImin is the benchmark rate. In Figure 2.3, the ROI of 
projects A to D is already equal or above ROImin. These projects are financially viable without 
CDM support and will not be registered under the CDM. The CDM revenue provided to projects 
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 Renewable energy projects are allowed since 2008 to apply exclusively the investment analysis 
(UNFCCC, 2011). 
50
 This variant within the investment analysis is called simple cost analysis and has been mainly applied to 
industrial gas projects. These will be introduced in the literature review in Chapter 3. 
51
 Until the year 2008, project developers also used company internal profitability rates as benchmark 
rates (Schneider, 2007). The potential effect of this rule is further examined in Chapter 4. 
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E to H pushes these projects beyond the ROImin threshold. These projects would not happen 
without the CDM because they do not reach the benchmark ROI. These projects are thus 
additional. Projects I to L are not financially viable even with CDM support. The incremental 
ROI from the CDM is still not enough to reach the ROImin. While these projects would in theory 
not be implemented, in practice the benchmark test does not require that the project reaches 
the ROImin benchmark threshold. Thus, the benchmark test would render all projects from D to 
L additional.52  
Figure 2.3 Illustration of the benchmark approach to determine additionality  
 
Source: Rentz(1998) 
The common practice analysis is a credibility check after the project has passed the barrier test 
or the investment analysis. It aims at identifying whether the proposed project (e.g. technology 
or practice) is already commonly applied in the relevant sector and region of the respective host 
country. If similar activities to the CDM project are observed essential distinctions between the 
two must be reasonably explained (UNFCCC, 2011a: Annex 7). If similar activities are widely 
observed and commonly carried out, it calls into question the claim that the proposed project 
activity is financially unattractive or faces barriers. 
Summarising, each project has to pass through an additionality test. This comprises three steps: 
the identification of alternatives, the application of the barrier or the investment analysis test to 
these alternatives, and the common-practice analysis. The barrier test requires that the project 
developer shows that barriers exist that can be overcome with the proposed activity registered 
as a CDM project. The investment analysis requires that the proposed CDM project is not the 
most profitable alternative. The common-practice analysis checks whether the proposed project 
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 There is thus an incentive for both project developers and host countries to choose a high benchmark 
rate so as to render more projects additional. Chapter 4 assesses the importance of benchmark 
parameters applied for registered Chinese and Indian CDM projects that have supported wind parks and 
hydroelectric power plants. 
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is already commonly applied. If the project passes all these tests, the project can be registered as 
described above in the seven project cycle steps. 
2.4 Challenges of additionality determination and responsibilities of actors in the project cycle 
In theory, there are at least three challenges for the CDM to achieve cost-effectiveness, 
additionality and sustainable development: 
- Moral hazard to set high baselines, to misrepresent the financial profitability of project,  
- A principal-agent conflict between the CDM-EB and DOEs, as DOEs want to maximise 
commissions paid by project developers for project validation,  
- Regulatory competition between developing countries to set low sustainable 
development criteria so as to maximise project inflow.  
The next chapter explores these challenges in detail.  
This section has introduced the goals and project cycle of the CDM, its actors and the 
additionality test required from project developer. After issuance of credits by the executive 
board, the CERs can be used by companies in industrialised countries for compliance. The next 
section describes the compliance market and introduces the European Union as the biggest CER 
compliance market. 
2.5 The compliance market in industrialised countries 
In principle, all industrialised countries can use CERs to achieve part of their target. The use of 
CERs is dependent on the difference in marginal abatement cost curves, as shown in Figure 2.2, 
and on the presence of legal procedures that govern the use of CERs for compliance. Some 
countries have only specified rules to use CERs at the country level, but have not specified the 
rules for individual emitters. In the absence of these rules, there is no demand for CERs from 
emitters in industrialised countries. The European Union was the first Party which distributed 
legally binding emission reduction responsibilities to private actors in its territory through the 
EU emissions trading scheme (EU Commission, 2003). Subsequently, the European Union 
established legal rules for the use of project credits from CDM and JI (EU Commission, 2004).53 
In the following, the book focuses on the European Union, which is currently the biggest 
demand market for CERs, with about 80% of CERs in the CDM project pipeline being 
demanded by European buyers (Point Carbon, 2012; Neuhoff, Schopp, Boyd, Stelmakh and 
Vasa, 2012).  
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 JI was only allowed to generate credits from 2008 onwards. While the system is operational, the JI 
market is much smaller in terms of projects and projected emission reductions relative to the CDM. 
Hoogzaad (2009) provides an overview on how to scale-up joint implementation. 
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The EU has agreed to cut its GHG emissions by 20% by the year 2020 relative to 1990 emissions 
(Council of the EU, 2008). It thus has extended the EU targets specified in the Kyoto Protocol 
beyond the Kyoto commitment period 2008-2012. Part of the emissions reductions can be 
achieved outside the EU through the CDM or JI. In its efforts to reduce emissions, the EU 
distinguishes between the emissions trading sector and those sectors not covered by the 
emissions trading scheme.  
The EU limits the use of CERs both quantitatively and qualitatively. The absolute amount of 
project credits (CDM and JI) allowed for compliance in the EU is slightly above 2.4 billion tons 
(Vasa and Neuhoff, 2010). Of these, the majority, about 1.67 billion tons are allowed in the EU 
ETS to be covered by project credits. The EU ETS does not accept projects from large 
hydroelectric power plants (above 20 megawatts), which do not comply with the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) Guidance. Chapter 5 provides a detailed assessment on the rules, 
and their origin on how project credits can be used in the EU ETS, and analyses empirically how 
the EU has implemented the quantitative rule in practice.54  
2.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter provided the background for understanding the different actors involved in the 
CDM project cycle on the supply side, and has introduced the European Union as the main 
demand market for CERs, due to the presence of procedures to use CERs. There is considerable 
delegation of responsibilities to private entities such as project developers and auditing firms. 
The information provided by these firms on the proposed CDM project is scrutinised by the 
executive board and national authorities in the CDM host and buyer country. This aims at safe-
guarding the environmental integrity and sustainability of the CDM. The information in this 
chapter should serve as a basis for the analysis in the following chapters and will be referred to 
frequently throughout the next chapters.  
The next chapters analyse how the CDM worked in practice. Chapter 3 provides an overall 
assessment of the challenges of the CDM to fulfil the criteria of cost-effectiveness, 
environmental integrity and sustainable development. Chapter 4 focuses on the workability of 
the benchmark approach. Chapter 5 analyses the efficiency of the rules to use the CDM within 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.  
Appendix 1: The concept of baseline emissions at the country level 
A country’s baseline emissions are dependent on supply and demand factors of emission 
relevant production and policies that impact these variables. Baseline emissions are frequently 
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 To the author‘s knowledge, no assessment of CERs from large hydroelectric power plants has been 
conducted. Such an analysis would shed light on the effectiveness of the qualitative limits of CERs in the 
EU ETS. This is beyond the scope of this book and is left for future research. 
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called business-as-usual emissions. The supply side for energy is influenced, for instance, by the 
mix of power generation through the conversion of conventional (oil, gas, coal) and renewable 
(wind, solar, biomass) fuels to electricity as well as the use of energy sources as feedstock in 
industrial processes (e.g. steel).55 The demand side is influenced, for instance, by the population, 
energy efficiency of production processes and buildings, climatic conditions, and demand for 
road, air and marine transport just to name a few. Additional GHG emissions come from 
agricultural production, for example through the use of fertilizers, and land-use change and 
forestry (IPCC, 1996). Agriculture can both be demanding energy and supplying by providing 
biofuels for energetic use. 
All of these supply and demand factors are influenced by the domestic policy in the respective 
country. For instance, the country can implement energy taxes to tax the energy content of fuels 
and thus ration the use of energy. Or it could regulate emissions directly by making mandatory 
the requirement to install emission filters in industrial production. Or the country might 
subsidize the costs of energy aimed at increasing electricity access for low-income households or 
supporting domestic industry, thus resulting in increased energy demand. The interaction 
between demand and supply factors on one side and the link to domestic government policies 
on the other (taxes, subsidies, direct regulation) is illustrated in Figure A 1. 
Figure A 1 The effect of taxes or subsidies on energy and emissions 
 
Figure A 1 illustrates in Schedule A the effect of the supply and demand curves on energy use. 
The figure assumes that one unit of energy used translates to one unit of emissions emitted. 
Furthermore, Schedule A assumes that the government has not implemented any energy policy 
at all. The supply (S) and demand (D) curve of energy meet at the price P0 and lead to the use of 
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 Nuclear fuels are somewhere between these two.  
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E0 energy units. The no-policy scenario generates baseline emissions equal to BAU0. This is the 
level of emissions that prevails when no policy intervention occurs.  
Schedule B introduces two types of mutually exclusive policies. We consider the introduction of 
policy L, an energy tax, or policy H, an energy subsidy to the scenario in Schedule A.56 In 
general, the subsidy on energy shifts the supply curve down by the amount of the subsidy and 
increases energy use and underlying emissions. The tax on energy shifts the supply curve up by 
the amount of the tax and decreases energy use and underlying emissions. It is assumed that 
these policies are introduced individually and are not present at the same time. The tax reduces 
energy use to EL and emissions to BAUL. The subsidy increases energy use to EH and emissions 
to BAUH.
57 
These policies are taken for illustrative purposes. However, it is important to note that 
quantifying the effects of a tax or a subsidy in practice is a complex endeavor as the “no-policy” 
case, as well as the effects of a tax and subsidy, are not readily observable and quantifiable in 
reality. A quantification of these effects requires perfect information. However, in the presence 
of imperfect information, establishing baseline emissions is at best challenging and at worst 
impossible.  
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 These policies are taken for illustrative purposes; their effect in practice depends largely on factors 
including the price elasticity of demand and supply of the underlying goods. 
57
 These policies are taken for illustrative purposes; their effect in practice depends largely on factors 
including the price elasticity of demand and supply of the underlying goods. In general, the subsidy (tax) 
on energy shifts the supply curve up (down) by the amount of the subsidy (tax) and increases (decreases) 
energy use and underlying emissions. 
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3. THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: THEORY, PRACTICE AND 
THE ALTERNATIVE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND1 
he Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol allows countries with an 
emission reduction target, so-called Annex I countries, to achieve part of their 
emission reductions in countries without emission reduction targets. Developing 
countries (Non-Annex I) were initially strongly opposed to such an instrument. They 
favoured a compliance fund, called the clean Development Fund (CDF) for Annex I 
countries, according to the Brazilian Proposal (Cole, 2010; Olsen, 2007). The Brazilian 
Proposal would establish emission reduction goals based on historical emissions and the 
CDF would collect penalties from Annex I (industrialised) countries which exceed their 
emission limitations. The proceeds from the penalties would be channelled to Non-Annex I 
countries according to Non-Annex I countries’ projected emissions between 1990 and 2010 
(UNFCCC, 1997b). Annex I countries opposed the penalty nature of the CDF and, in the last 
hours of the Kyoto negotiations, the concept of the CDF was changed into the CDM in Article 
12 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997a; Werksman, 1998).  
The CDM, as defined by the Kyoto Protocol, should lead to environmental integrity through 
real and measurable emission reductions, promote cost-effective abatement for Annex I 
countries, and support sustainable development for Non-Annex I countries (UNFCCC, 
1997a). Achieving these three goals would further the achievement of the ultimate objective 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, to avert dangerous climate 
change (UNFCCC, 1992, Art. 2). Cost-effective abatement means that emissions reductions 
are obtained at the least cost. The criterion of sustainable development ensures that 
abatement incorporates co-benefits such as health improvements, employment and other 
factors. Environmental integrity aims to ensure that any project implemented under the 
CDM does not increase global emissions, i.e. projects supported through the CDM shall be 
additional to any that would have happened anyway.  
Chapter 2 has introduced the procedures to conduct a CDM project and responsibilities of 
the main public and private actors to ensure the criteria of additionality, sustainable 
development and cost-effectiveness are met. The CDM regulator (the Executive Board - EB) 
and auditing firms (Designated Operation Entities – DOEs) are responsible for ensuring 
additionality of projects and emission reductions, while the project developer is responsible 
for cost-effectiveness and the host country DNA is responsible for sustainable development.  
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 The literature review in this chapter is a reworked version of a Climate Strategies report written with 
Karsten Neuhoff (Vasa & Neuhoff, 2011). 
T 
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This chapter analyses whether the CDM incentivises these actors to achieve the three criteria 
of environmental integrity, cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. The aim of this 
chapter is thus to analyse whether the CDM is an effective tool to encourage emission 
reductions in developing countries and to achieve global emission reduction goals. An 
alternative instrument, the Clean Development Fund, is analysed with regards to its 
potential performance of cost-effectiveness, environmental integrity and sustainable 
development.  
To answer the question (whether the CDM is an effective instrument or not), the analysis in 
this chapter is split in three parts. The first part analyses the incentives of actors in the CDM 
from a theoretical perspective. The second part assesses whether the theoretical predictions 
were met in practice. This is done through a review of the literature, and by conducting an 
analysis of projects with regards to sustainable development and cost-effectiveness. The 
third part assesses whether the CDF, if it had been implemented, would have fulfilled the 
three CDM criteria. For this purpose, the CDM and CDF are compared. The analysis also 
assumes that all actors, including at the country level, behave rationally (see also section 1.5 
in Chapter 1). 
While several authors have analysed the different individual criteria of the CDM in practice, 
as the literature review will show, the contribution of this chapter is an extension of the 
analysis to the projects that have been registered since the beginning of the Kyoto 
commitment period in 2008 and an analysis of the CDF. There is scarce literature on the 
CDF. The literature focused more on the establishment of historical responsibilities for 
industrialised countries, rather than the CDF itself (Elzen et al., 1999; La Rovere, de Macedo, 
& Baumert, 2002; Rosa, Ribeiro, Muylaert, & Pires de Campos, 2004). An exception is Cole 
(2010) who analyses the initial intent of the architects of the CDF idea with regards to 
sustainable development, arguing that the initial intentions of the CDF were met in practice 
by the CDM. In general, however, there is to the author’s knowledge no such analysis on how 
the CDF would have been operationalized. This chapter aims to fill this gap.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. After a brief review of the CDM and CDF rationale,2 and 
governance structure, the next section provides an overview of the incentives the CDM 
provides in theory to achieve the three criteria. This section is followed by a review of the 
literature and two analyses of cost-effectiveness and sustainable development of projects in 
the CDM pipeline by November 2011. This section aims to identify whether any inefficiencies 
found in practice, are predicted by the theoretical overview in the previous section. The last 
section analyses whether the CDF is able to reduce the inefficiencies of the CDM and thereby 
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 Readers familiar with Chapter 1 and 2 of this book can skip reading section 3.1.1. 
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better achieve the goals of sustainable development, cost-effectiveness and environmental 
integrity.  
3.1 The clean development mechanism and the clean development fund – Background and 
rationale 
3.1.1 Clean Development Mechanism 
Since GHG are universally mixed pollutants, the location of abatement does not matter for 
climate change impacts. Based on this notion, GHG emission abatement should be 
conducted where it is cheapest so as to reduce the overall cost of abatement or conversely 
maximize abatement opportunities with a given budget. To reduce total abatement costs, 
countries can reduce emissions in another country and count these reductions against their 
own emission limits target. This is called an offset system, as emission decreases in one 
country are offset by increases in another.3 
As developing countries do not have emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol, 
emission reduction opportunities could be used to reduce abatement costs and avoid or slow 
down a lock-in of carbon-intensive infrastructure in developing countries (Heller, 1996). 
Emission increases in countries with an emission reduction obligation are counted against 
emission reductions in countries without emission reduction obligations. If the increases are 
completely offset by reductions, global emissions do not increase. The currency used in this 
transaction is CERs. Each CER is equivalent to one tonne of CO2- equivalent reduced and 
can be used to increase emissions elsewhere by the same amount. 
3.1.2 Clean Development Fund 
The CDF was part of a proposal put forward by Brazil in May 1997 (UNFCCC, 1997b). This 
submission had two parts. The first part suggested a mechanism to establish emission 
reduction targets for countries based on historical responsibility. Countries, which have 
emitted (historically) the most GHG emissions, should also bear the greatest reduction effort 
under this proposal. Cumulative emissions were counted as of 1850 in the proposal. Using 
available data at the time, Brazil’s submission projected that developing countries’ absolute 
emissions will take over those of industrialised countries approximately by 2037. In terms of 
historical cumulative emissions, developing countries would only over take industrialised 
countries emissions by 2162 (UNFCCC, 1997b). This justified, according to the proposal that 
only developed countries should be subject to an emission limitation, a so-called cap on 
emissions.  
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 See for pioneering work on offsets Liroff (1980) and for a review of the literature on offsets in general 
(R. W. Hahn & Richards, 2010). 
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The second part suggested a compliance regime for achieving the emission targets 
established in the first part of the proposal. This proposal outlined the CDF. The proposal 
works as follows: According to the formula proposed in the first part of the Brazilian 
submission, industrialised countries would receive individual emission reduction limits, an 
individual cap. Developing countries would not have a cap on emissions. If a country emits 
more than its emission reduction limit allows, then it has to pay a penalty fee (F) for each 
tonne of GHG emitted in excess of the emission limitation. These penalty fees would be 
collected by a so-called Clean Development Fund (UNFCCC, 1997b, p. 5). The proposed 
penalty fee per tonne of CO2- equivalent in Brazil’s submission was US$ 10.  
3.1.3 Similarities between the two instruments breaks initial opposition to CDM 
The CDM explicitly allows achieving compliance with a reduction target through abatement 
in countries without a cap. The CDF in turn implicitly allows a country with a cap to emit 
more than the cap, if the country pays a penalty fee. Thus, both instruments allow a country 
with an emission limit to exceed this limit. Developing countries were at first strongly 
opposed to the idea that industrialised nations could exceed their cap and argued that rich 
countries could buy themselves out of the responsibility to reduce emissions domestically 
(Depledge, 2000).4 The CDF however allows exactly that: according to Olsen (2007) this 
similarity was picked up by the US negotiators and the proposal of the CDF changed into the 
CDM.  
3.1.4 Institutional framework of the CDM  
Chapter 2 introduced the goals and procedures of the CDM. These are in short: CDM 
projects should be cost-effective, contribute to sustainable development, and should be 
additional to any that would have occurred anyway. The project host country is responsible 
for ensuring that proposed projects meet the sustainability criteria of the respective country 
they are located in. Buyers and sellers of CERs generated by CDM projects aim to reduce 
emissions at lowest cost, i.e. cost-effectively. However, as host countries and CER buyers in 
the CDM market both have an incentive to overstate emission reductions, an institutional 
procedure (described in Chapter 2) has been established to avoid the registration of projects 
that would have happened anyway, i.e. also without CDM support. Projects and emission 
reductions that would have happened also without the CDM support are called non-
additional.  
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 This view is supported by Najam (2002), who argues that by using the low-cost abatement 
opportunities, low-hanging fruits in developing countries, future generations are only left with more 
costly options. See Castro (2010) for an empirical analysis refuting the claim that the low-hanging 
fruit issue hinders advanced developing economies to engage in mitigation. 
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3.1.5 Institutional framework of the Clean Development Fund 
In contrast to the CDM, the CDF has no market for emission reductions. The price for 
exceeding the emission cap in industrialised countries is set by the level of a penalty fee (F). 
The proceeds from the penalty are transferred to developing countries, which then conduct 
abatement of emissions in their territory. Assuming the host country is interested in 
maximising emissions abatement, it would set up a national system similar to the one 
described in Chapter 2 for the CDM. The main difference is that the funds received by the 
developing country are dependent on the penalty fee and not the actual price to reduce 
emissions in the developing country. 
3.2 Clean Development Mechanism – Theoretical predictions 
The following section analysed the incentives of actors to pursue projects and emission 
reducing activities that fulfil environmental integrity, cost-effective abatement, and 
sustainable development criteria. Each of these criteria is analysed separately. In general, it 
is assumed that projects are conducted through the government. In practice, however, 
private actors conduct emission reduction projects in the CDM. Regardless, the conclusions 
about incentives do not change. 
3.2.1 Environmental integrity Clean Development Mechanism 
The rationale of the CDM is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.1 Schedule A illustrates the 
emissions of country A (with an emission reduction limit cap) and country B, without a cap. 
Absent any emissions limit, country A emits business-as-usual (BAU) emissions equal to 
BAUA.
5 The reduction necessary for country A to meet its target is equal to R (reduction) 
units. If country A achieves its emission limit domestically, it will emit C (the cap) units of 
emissions. Thus, it reduces emissions from its current business-as-usual (BAUA) emissions 
by the necessary reduction R. Country B will continue to emit a volume equal to BAUB 
emission units as it does not have any emission cap. 
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 For a simplified introduction to the concept of business as usual, see Appendix 1 of Chapter 2. 
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Figure 3.1 Global emissions are equal under domestic abatement only and domestic 
abatement with the transfer of country B emission reductions 
 
The CDM is illustrated in Schedule B. The mechanism allows the counting of emission 
reductions achieved in Country B against the emission reduction target of Country A. If 
country A pays to reduce emissions in Country B, for instance emission reductions equal to a 
volume S, then country A finances S emission reductions (hatched area in schedule B) 
compared to the business-as-usual emissions, BAUB. Thus, after abatement country B emits 
BAUCDM units of emissions. The S units reduced in country B are “transferred” to country A. 
These emission reductions count fully against the target of reducing R emission units in 
country A. Thus, the reduction target of country A becomes R2, equal to the initial target R 
minus the S units already abated in country B. Thus, country A’s new emissions cap becomes 
C + S. As emissions are reduced in country B by S units and increased in the Country A by 
the same amount, global emissions do not increase. 
With the transfer of S emission reductions, country A’s emissions will be higher by S units. 
Country A can emit C+S emissions by reducing emissions abroad instead of domestically. 
Country A would, however, only use emission reductions from country B when it is cheaper 
to abate abroad (i.e. in country B) relative to domestic abatement.  
To illustrate the moral hazard challenges of this approach two cases are analysed regarding 
the information a country possesses about its own business-as-usual emissions. In the first 
case, the country is able to calculate its business-as-usual emissions under any scenario and 
knows the impact of policies on emissions. In the second case, the country knows its BAU 
emissions under the no-policy case, but is unable to estimate the effect of policies or a 
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specific project on emissions because of a lack of capacity.6 This creates a challenge for 
environmental integrity. For instance, if projected BAU emissions are above the actual BAU 
emissions, the reductions S are calculated from the higher baseline. This creates SF emission 
reductions, which would not have occurred in practice. They are simply the result of an 
“accounting” error, the absence of knowledge of the actual BAU emissions. These are non-
additional emission reductions. 
Case 1 Assumption: Complete Information - The country can perfectly calculate its BAU 
emissions and the impact of policies on BAU. 
Case 2 Assumption: Incomplete Information - The country can calculate its BAU emissions 
for the no-policy case but cannot calculate the impact of policies on BAU. 
Thus, the emission reductions counted against the (false) BAU scenario BAU* are equal to S* 
which is the sum of SF and SB (see Figure 3.2). In reality only SB units have been reduced. If 
country A increases its emissions by S*, global emissions increase by SF. This is how 
imperfect information of the BAU emissions in one country creates global emission 
increases, and is a fundamental challenge as the transfer of emission reductions to countries 
with a cap actually increases emissions rather than reduces emissions.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates this: schedule A shows the real BAU emissions of country B as BAUB 
and the overestimated BAU emissions in schedule B as BAU*. The higher emission 
reductions of S* are transferred to Country A. Only SB, however, are truly additional 
emission reductions. 
                                                          
6
 Note that the absence of knowledge about BAU emissions is a problem of ex-ante projection capacity 
rather than the exactness of ex-post reporting and verifying emissions. Estimating the effect of a 
policy is inherently difficult. Currently various research projects are aimed at addressing this question. 
The EU monitoring decision requires each EU member state to project the impact of its policies on 
emissions (Council of the European Union, 2004). For an example of such a report and its projections 
in Germany see for instance the policy scenarios (Matthes et al., 2009) that feed in into the projection 
report. 
74 | T H E O R Y ,  P R A C T I C E  A N D  T H E  F U N D - A P P R O A C H  
Figure 3.2 The impact of overestimated BAU emissions in country B 
 
We have defined emission reductions to be additional only if they occur in addition to 
emission reductions that would have happened anyway (the real BAU scenario). SF are non-
additional emissions reduction units. Global emissions thus increase by SF emission units. 
Non-additional emissions can thus be the result of imperfect knowledge. The country 
certifies the reduction of more emissions because it believes its country’s emissions would 
have been higher than is the case in reality. However, even if the country has complete 
information about its BAU scenario, it has incentives to overstate the actual BAU scenario to 
a higher level BAU* (Figure 3.2 schedule B). Country B, the country without an emission 
limit, overstates BAU emissions in order to sell more emission reductions to Country A. 
Instead of SB emission reductions, country B now sells S* emission reductions. The 
“production” cost of the difference, SF, emission reduction, however, is zero; they are only 
reductions on paper.  
Country A has incentives to buy non-additional emission reductions as these decrease 
compliance costs. Figure 3.3 illustrates how the SF non-additional emission reductions shift 
the combined MACAB curve (Schedule A)
7 to the right and results in the new MACAB* curve. 
The non-additional emission reduction lowers the compliance cost of abating R emissions 
for country A. Country A’s domestic abatement in Schedule B is zero. It achieves compliance 
with its reduction target R via SF non-additional units and one unit, SB’, abated in Country B. 
The SF emission reductions cost nothing to produce and replace real emission reductions. 
Global emissions increase thus by SF, the volume of non-additional credits.
8 Figure 3.3 
                                                          
7
 Compare with Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2. 
8
 Global emissions are equal to BAUB-SB’ + BAUA – D + SF, where D is domestic abatement. This is 
higher than BAUB+ BAUA-R, if R ≤ D+ SB’ -SF. Domestic abatement D is zero and additional emission 
reductions in country B SB’< R 
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emphasizes that with non-additional emissions (SF) the amount of emission reductions 
conducted both domestically, in country A, and abroad, in country B, is reduced. The price 
paid by country A for abatement in country B drops to PAB* relative to the price PAB (Schedule 
A). This affects the rent that country B receives. The non-additional credits change the rents 
transferred to country B from RentB (Schedule A) to RentB* (Schedule B). Depending on the 
volume of SF and the slope of the MACAB curve, the rent transferred to country B can actually 
decrease (Michaelowa, 2005). Thus, even with complete information country B has 
incentives to overstate its BAU emissions.9 
Figure 3.3 The effect of non-additional emission reductions on abatement costs and location 
Above, we have illustrated that even with complete information, country A and B have an 
incentive that country B’s BAU emissions are overstated as non-additional emission 
reductions lower the compliance costs for country A and lead to economic surpluses for 
country B. Non-additional emission reductions, when counted for compliance in country A, 
raise global emissions. Note that the situation does not change if the target in the country A 
is increased beyond R. With a more stringent reduction target (R*>R) the incentive for 
country A to use non-additional emission reductions actually increases as overall costs 
decrease with more non-additional emission reductions from country B. 
                                                          
9
 A dynamic scenario can be constructed, where country A possesses a low-carbon technology that 
enables country B to reduce emissions more cost-efficiently by lowering marginal abatement costs. 
Country A would be interested in selling as much as possible of this technology to country B and thus 
would be interested that country A abates as many emissions as possible. The overstatement of 
country B’s BAU emissions would reduce demand by country B for the technology. In this case, 
country A would have an incentive to avoid non-additionality. Another scenario is that industries in 
country A and B compete. A payment for non-additional emission reductions from industry in country 
A to industry in country B would be equivalent of a direct transfer of wealth without any effort for 
country B’s industry. Competitiveness could be undermined, and industry in country A has thus, an 
interest in avoiding non-additional emission reductions. This is however beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
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3.2.2 Cost-effectiveness 
Country B receives rents from the CDM equal to the difference between actual marginal 
abatement costs and the market price paid for emission reductions: these rents were labelled 
RentB in Figure 3.3. To increase the transfer of these rents, country B has an incentive to 
lower its marginal abatement cost curve so as to increase the difference in marginal 
abatement cost curve slopes between countries. Such a “lowering “of the abatement cost 
curve can occur in two ways. The first type could be generated by removing non-monetary 
barriers or increasing the financial profitability of abatement options, for instance through 
domestic policy. The second is by increasing emissions to claim reductions later. 
However, the nature of the CDM, where abatement needs to be additional to what would 
have happened anyway relative to BAU emissions, precludes somewhat the incentives to 
improve the domestic framework in country B. Country B needs to balance the 
implementation of domestic policy to reduce abatement costs with the risk of losing part of 
the transfers because abatement units become ineligible if domestic policy addresses them 
already. Thus, there is an incentive for country B only to engage in a degree of domestic GHG 
regulation that does not preclude CDM transfers (Tirole, 2008, p. 34).10  
To avoid such perverse incentives, an E+/E- rule has been defined for the CDM. The E+/E- 
rule stipulates that regulatory changes to the baseline at the national level should not be 
incorporated into baseline calculations if the regulation favours a less or a more emissions-
intensive technology over the other (UNFCCC, 2005d, para. 5). Regulations that give 
comparative advantage to more emission-intensive (E+) and less emission-intensive (E-) 
activities should be disregarded in the baseline calculation as of the end of 2001 and 1997, 
respectively. Projects are evaluated against policies that have historically been in place. This 
can allow governments in ‘country B’-type countries to improve supporting policies for less 
emission intensive projects while retaining financial inflows from the CDM. The result is, 
however, equally challenging, as project developers can qualify for CDM projects even if the 
projects are already commercially viable under the current policy framework. 
The second kind, directly generating low-cost abatement opportunities is due to the subsidy 
nature of the CDM (Tirole, 2008, p. 33). In the presence of a subsidy such as the CDM, 
projects are conducted that would not have occurred without the subsidy. For instance, if a 
                                                          
10
 We have focused here on the incentives for country B to lower marginal abatement cost curves. 
However, country A has also incentives to lower its cost burden by reducing its own non-monetary 
barriers and for providing a stable investment environment for low-carbon technologies. However, the 
incentives for such steps are lower in the presence of “outside” options such as abatement abroad. 
Thus, while cost-effectiveness ensures the short-term optimization of resources spent on abatement, it 
does not necessarily optimize resource use in the long-term. 
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project produces simultaneously a product X with profit Y and emissions of 0, a lump-sum 
transfer for abatement could induce inefficient behaviour of the project owner so as to emit 
emissions only to receive the subsidy. The project owner would do that if the cost of changing 
the technology to an emitting alternative increases overall profit, including profit from 
receiving the subsidy. This effect is likely to appear with low cost products, where the 
monetary value of the subsidy can change the economics of the project’s profit function. The 
generated abatement cost opportunities endanger the environmental integrity of the 
instrument. 
This section has illustrated how the CDM achieves cost-effectiveness. Country B receives 
economic rents and receives transfers for abatement in their country. Abatement in country 
B would in general not have occurred due to financial or other barriers, and is thus 
additional. A moral hazard problem exists where countries can increase emission reduction 
estimations, to increase revenues associated with these reductions. Furthermore, the 
potential economic surpluses from such a strategy can incentivise country B to craft 
domestic regulation so as to produce “additional” abatement opportunities and thereby CDM 
eligibility. The subsidy effect can also generate market entry opportunities for polluting 
technologies profiting from the subsidy to halt pollution. The literature review in section 3.3 
will examine whether these effects can be observed in practice. In the next section the effect 
of the CDM on sustainable development will be assessed. 
3.2.3 Sustainable development 
As discussed in the definition of sustainable development in chapter 2 (section 2.1.2), there 
are good reasons for the interpretation of sustainable development to depend on the 
development context of the respective developing country. Depending on the development 
status, each developing country has a different interpretation of sustainable development. To 
analyse the impact of the CDM on sustainable development we thus assume that a country 
chooses its own interpretation. This creates several challenges for the attainment of 
sustainable development benefits due to a conflict with cost-effectiveness goals. 
Kolshus, Vevatne, Torvanger, & Aunan (2001) argue that some projects with SD benefits 
might not be the preferred option under cost-effective perspective. This is only the case if the 
benefits from sustainable development are not priced in to the marginal abatement costs. 
Aunan et al. (2004) show, using emission abatement options from coal power generation11 in 
                                                          
11
 The ranking of the abatement options by costs only would be 1) cogeneration, 2) modifying the 
boiler design, 3) boiler replacement, 4) improved boiler management and 5) coal washing have been 
implemented (Aunan et al, 2004: Table 7). 
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the Shanxi province in China, that briquetting12 would be the most expensive abatement 
option, and thus the last to be implemented according to the marginal abatement cost 
approach. However, when central estimates of health benefits are included to the cost of 
abatement, briquetting becomes substantially cheaper from a social welfare perspective and 
would be preferred to all other abatement options. The sustainable development benefits, in 
the form of health benefits, would outweigh the higher abatement costs. The positive health 
impact of briquetting is due to the elimination of coal dust which is responsible for 
respiratory diseases.  
By choosing the sustainability criteria, the CDM host country can in theory change the order 
of abatement options that are implemented in its territory. The simplest way to imagine this 
is by assuming that abatement opportunities with low sustainable development benefits are 
just excluded from the abatement cost curve.13 If a relatively cheap abatement opportunity 
induces negative health effects, country B will prefer not to undertake it, while country A, if 
focused on cost-effectiveness, will not oppose conducting this measure. By setting the 
standard such that this abatement opportunity is not eligible for the CDM, country B 
“erases” this option and the marginal abatement cost curve becomes steeper. Country A 
needs to comply with the rules set by country B and will conduct abatement using the 
remaining options, based on cost-effectiveness criteria.14 
However, if a second (developing) country C without a cap enters the CDM supply market, 
country A can chose between abating in country B or C. For simplicity, we assume that 
country C is equal in all regards to country B, except that it has more lax sustainability 
criteria. Thus, with stricter sustainability criteria in country B relative to country C, country 
A prefers to conduct abatement in country C as, all else equal, it has to pay less for 
abatement. Country B would lose the economic transfers. This can lead to regulatory 
competition between country B and C and a “race to the bottom” in sustainability criteria 
between country B and C. Countries without a cap lower their sustainability criteria such that 
they create a large abatement market for country A and transfers for themselves (Kelly & 
                                                          
12
 ‘Briquetting’ is a way to bind coal together. The effects are more efficient operation and the 
elimination of coal dust. The reduction in SO2 emissions depends on the addition of lime to the 
briquettes. This is also the costly component that if left out lowers the positive reduction of SO2 
emissions (Aunan et al., 2004). 
13
 The decision to “erase” abatement costs options can also be based on other grounds such as security 
grounds. For instance, the exclusion of nuclear abatement opportunities from the CDM might be 
based, in addition to sustainability criteria, on national security concerns. Detailed information about 
domestic nuclear power plants is sensitive and unlikely to be shared publicly with other nations, as 
would be required by the CDM procedures described in Chapter 2. 
14
 In the following, especially in chapters 4 and 5, we will introduce a deviation to this assumption. In 
the EU Emissions trading demand market for CDM, the EU Linking Directive has set sustainability 
criteria for hydroelectric power plants that go beyond the criteria defined in the institutional 
framework of the CDM.  
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Helme, 2000). This can substantially reduce the ancillary benefits from climate mitigation 
benefits as cost-effectiveness becomes the only driving force behind abatement.  
Regulatory competition is particularly concerning given the need to switch away from fossil 
fuels to significantly reduce GHG emissions. Renewables can provide these benefits and also 
have in general higher sustainability benefits than other project types (Olsen & Fenhann, 
2008). Renewables deployment is strongly regionally dependent, which warrants regionally 
differentiated support policies (M. Schneider, Schmidt, & Hoffmann, 2010). Abatement 
options through renewables deployment and grid expansion are in general more expensive 
than incremental efficiency projects that maintain fossil fuel based power generation and 
industrial production. Despite the importance of these investments, countries B and C will 
prefer transfers for incremental efficiency improvements with lower sustainable 
development benefits if they are concerned that transfers go to other countries otherwise. 
Thus, even though sustainability criteria between countries differ, CDM host countries will 
lower these criteria to maximize the transfer to be received. Regulatory competition, 
however, is less a concern for developing countries that have a monopoly position in 
providing low-cost emission reductions. These countries can maintain a higher level of 
sustainability criteria because they do not need to be concerned of losing transfers. The 
literature review in the following sections aims to understand whether this has been the case. 
3.3 Literature Review - Clean Development Mechanism 
The following section reviews the literature on the performance of the CDM with regards to 
environmental integrity (additionality), cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. It 
aims at verifying whether the theoretical predictions analysed in section 3.2 hold. 
3.3.1 Environmental Integrity  
3.3.1.1 Non-additional projects achieved registration 
Various studies agree that a large share of registered CDM projects is non-additional 
(Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007; Schneider, 2007, 2009a; Wara & Victor, 2008).15 Based on a 
random sample of 93 of the 803 CDM projects registered by October-2007, Schneider (2007, 
2009a) finds that a large share of projects (up to 40%) would have happened without 
support from the CDM. In many cases, project developers' additionality demonstrations 
through benchmark analysis, common practice analysis, and barrier analysis, have not been 
credible. For the barrier and investment analyses, for example, project developers chose 
                                                          
15
 The procedures to register a project and to demonstrate additionality are described in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 4 examines the use of the benchmark approach within the investment analysis test do 
demonstrate additionality. 
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subjective, company-specific barriers or used company-specific investment hurdle rates, 
rather than a sectoral or national market rate, as suggested by CDM-EB guidelines. When 
using the common practice analysis as a credibility check, project developers frequently 
chose the technology narrowly and the comparison group broadly (e.g. all national power 
producers) in order to demonstrate a low technology penetration rate for the technology in 
question and to gain CDM status.  
Furthermore, the DOEs charged with validating projects’ additionality have been ineffective 
in filtering non-additional projects. According to Schneider (2009), this results partly from a 
lack of guidance and partly from the misinterpretation of available guidance by both project 
developers and DOEs. With many projects, DOEs have not checked the credibility of the 
information provided by project developers in Project Design Documents, or they have 
simply restated the information given in the Project Design Document in the validation 
report. These findings are supported by various other scholars, who find a share of non-
additional projects of between 20% (Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007) and two-thirds (Wara & 
Victor, 2008) in their analysis.  
3.3.1.2 Moral Hazard - Strategic behaviour to achieve CDM registration 
Other studies find evidence that the CDM is often the “icing on the cake”; making already 
economically feasible projects more profitable (Ellis & Kamel, 2007; Haya, 2007). These 
authors find that projects have to be economically feasible without the CDM in order to 
attract investment capital in the first place, for instance investment by banks. In addition, 
Purohit & Michaelowa (2007, p. 11) find that most wind energy projects in India pass the 
investment additionality test only if they omit tax benefits, which at least one project has 
done. 
According to Michaelowa (2005), project participants react directly on Executive Board 
decisions. The scholar cites an example where after a biomass project with doubtful 
additionality had been registered in India, submissions of this project type increased by 56% 
suddenly thereafter. Michaelowa (2005) further cautioned that if the barrier test captures 
decision-making processes in companies developing CDM projects it might be better suited 
than the investment analysis test. However, he cites that past experience with the CDM 
validation process has shown that misrepresenting (i.e. gaming) “of barriers [was] relatively 
simple and not always detected by the validators” (Michaelowa, 2005, p. 17). This is 
confirmed by the analysis conducted by Schneider (2007), who recommends that clear 
guidance is given to validators especially with regards to the barrier test and the investment 
analysis. McCully (2010) goes even further and suggests banning the barrier test altogether.  
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Furthermore, Schneider (2007) recommends that projects that have started already and only 
apply for CDM status more than a year after project start, should not be registered. These so-
called ‘prior consideration projects’, the author argues, claim that they have counted on CER 
revenue when they started the project. This claim however is hardly credible, because if the 
project needs to prove that it cannot start operation without the CDM, its actual project start 
is evidence against the need for CDM. These projects are arguably non-additional. Requiring 
the project to substantiate and document the claim and proving that knowledge existed 
about the CDM support and that it was considered is one way, the CDM-EB and DOEs have 
dealt with the issue. As Michaelowa (2005) states, however, project documentation has 
frequently been backdated to conform to the prior consideration claim. 
The theoretical concern of a subsidy-effect voiced by Tirole (2008) in section 3.2.2 has 
materialized in practice. While credits from HFC-23 projects are clearly additional in the 
absence of regulation, Schneider (2011) has shown that producers of HCFC-22, the 
refrigerant gas that produces as waste gas HFC-23, have increased the production of HCFC-
22 to profit from the sale of HFC-23 CERs. The sale of HFC-23 credits is more profitable 
than the actual sale of the main product HCFC-22.16 The large price difference in market 
price and actual abatement costs conferred a large rent to sellers of CERs from these projects 
(see section 3.3.3.1 for an estimate of the rent). 
3.3.1.3 Renewable energy projects and interaction with domestic policy 
Renewable energy projects are the most numerous in the CDM (UNEP Risoe, 2011). They 
made up 17% of issued CERs by the November 2011 and are expected to command a share of 
35% of all CERs up to 2012, according to project documentation.17 However, renewable 
energy projects have had a more difficult start than industrial gas projects (Ellis & Kamel, 
2007; Ellis, Winkler, Corfee-Morlot, & Gagnon-Lebrun, 2007; Pearson, 2007). When 
evaluating CDM projects, banks discount expected CDM revenues because of the 
uncertainties around registration and issuance, future carbon prices, and potential import 
constraints. This reduces the contribution that CDM revenue can make to capital-intensive 
investment. Hence, CER cash flow is frequently only seen as an add-on to domestic support 
schemes.  
                                                          
16
 With regards to HFC projects the CDM-EB had early discussed banning the registration of newly 
established HCFC-22 facilities, however no final decision has been taken on this issue (UNFCCC, 
2005e, 2007b para 86, 2011b). 
17
 In the following, “expected” means always the volume of CERs that are documented in the project 
design document. Project documentation has often overestimated the amount of emission reductions, 
such that actually issued CERs are lower than projected. Only for solar projects the actually achieved 
issuance success was higher than documented before the project started- Renewables have an 
issuance success of 85% relative to project documentation (Risoe, 2011).  
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In its 51st session, the CDM-EB decided to reject ten Chinese wind farms because they could 
have been implemented without the CDM as a result of the feed-in tariff (He & Morse, 2010). 
The Chinese feed-in tariff had previously been decreased by the National Development and 
Reform Commission, and the CDM-EB feared that the CDM was replacing the feed-in 
support. However, the rejection based on this new tariff policy could be interpreted as a 
violation of the E+/E- rule. Even if the decision of the CDM-EB was correct in this case—in 
theory it would have prevented the approval of non-additional projects—it is not consistent 
with previous decisions, which deliberately ignored regulatory changes. This emphasizes the 
dilemma of the CDM-EB in deciding which projects to register. It also illustrates that credits 
are created from potentially non-additional projects, which are commercially feasible with 
available national support.  
3.3.1.4 Executive Board reforms CDM guidelines to strengthen environmental integrity 
To address the adverse development on the CDM market the executive board has reacted to 
these criticisms. First, in 2006, the Registration and Issuance Team has been established at 
the 29th meeting of the executive board (EB29) to “assist the Executive Board to consider 
requests for registration of project activities and requests for issuance of CERs submitted to 
the Executive Board by DOEs” (UNFCCC, 2007, Annex 14, para 1). On the basis of advice 
from the RIT, the CDM-EB registers or rejects CDM projects. Since the establishment of the 
RIT, rejection rates have gone up. By October 2007, the CDM-EB had registered 803 and 
rejected 36 projects (4.4%). By November 2011, the CDM-EB had approved 3,556 projects 
and rejected 204 (5.7%) (Risoe, 2007, 2011). The CDM-EB furthermore agreed to publish the 
reasons for rejections (UNFCCC, 2006, para 82). According to Schneider & Mohr (2010), 
failure to demonstrate additionality is the main reason for the rejection of projects.  
Furthermore, the CDM-EB developed, together with DOEs, the validation and verification 
manual (VVM) in November 2008 (UNFCCC, 2008a). The VVM is especially relevant for 
projects that receive other revenues than CDM and thus use the investment analysis, for 
instance renewable energy projects (as will be discussed in Chapter 4).  
According to the VVM (UNFCCC, 2008a, sec. Annex I para 98 & 109): 
- For all new projects submitted after August 2nd, 2008 project developers need to 
substantiate to the DOE that the respective project was considered for CDM status 
prior to the start of the Kyoto commitment period (2008-2012). 
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- The main responsibilities of validators in terms of the evaluation of the benchmark 
test are to check all the parameters and assumptions behind the financial indicator 
(UNFCCC, 2010a).18  
Furthermore, as suggested by (L. Schneider, 2007; Stehr, 2008), the CDM-EB further 
developed in the VVM the DOE accreditation standard and a policy framework to address 
non-compliance by DOEs in terms of issues arising from the registration and issuance 
process (Schneider and Mohr, 2010). This policy framework monitors the performance of 
DOEs and has applied sanction mechanisms. Schneider and Mohr (2010), in their rating of 
DOE performance, find that the three main reasons for deficiencies in DOE performance are 
a) lack of competence of the personnel in validation and verification teams, b) lack of 
evidence that the DOE actually undertook an independent technical review of the case; and 
c) DOEs did not follow internal review or audit procedures to ensure sufficient quality.  
With the adoption of the VVM at EB44, the CDM-EB applied its first sanction of Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) by temporarily suspending one of the largest CDM validator from operation 
(UNFCCC, 2008a, Annex 2). At the time DNV covered one third of all projects and 40% in 
terms of expected annual CER generation as documented in the Project Design Documents. 
The suspension was based on several non-conformities found by the CDM Accreditation 
Panel charged with accrediting validators (UNFCCC, 2007a, 2008a, Annex 2).19 The DNV 
suspension was a strong signal to the validation market. Before the suspension, the CDM 
Pipeline database did not indicate any project that had received negative validation reports 
or whose validation was terminated by DOEs by October 2007, this situation changed 
significantly in November 2011.20 By that latter date, the validation of over one thousand 
projects has been terminated by the validator, and 196 projects received a negative validation 
report (UNEP Risoe, 2007, 2011). Thus, the adoption of the VVM, issuance of the guidance of 
investment analysis and the suspension of the biggest validator can be taken as evidence that 
the CDM-EB took the findings and recommendations of the literature. 
 
                                                          
18
 Chapter 4 examines the choice of the benchmark rate over time and describes the responsibilities 
for validators regarding the benchmark test in section 4.2.4. 
19
 The review of five samples project activities revealed that for these projects: 1) the sector expert’s 
input and involvement with validation work was not documented, 2) a review of the contract was not 
available in three surveyed cases, 3) the constellation of the validation team was not documented in 
three surveyed cases (UNFCCC, 2007a, 2008a, Annex 2). 
20
 Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) and Tüv-Süd, two other major DOEs, were suspended from 
operations in 2009 and 2010, respectively (UNFCCC, 2009, 2010b). For instance, in the Tüv-Süd 
case, the CDM-AP found that personnel was not sufficiently trained in a competence area after three 
months experience, and that concerns about additionality by the DOE still resulted in positive 
validation. 
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3.3.2 Sustainable development 
The theory in section 3.2.3 predicted regulatory competition as the result of a conflict of cost-
effectiveness and sustainable development. This section examines: whether these predictions 
held in practice; how sustainability of projects developed over time, and; options to increase 
the benefits actually obtained from projects. 
3.3.2.1 Regulatory competition and the absence of a price for sustainability in the CDM 
The sustainable development criteria vary between CDM host countries. For example, 
Ghana, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Tunisia each use different combinations of 
environmental, social, and economic aspects, including poverty alleviation and technology 
transfer, through different weightings, numerical scoring systems, and a minimum average 
score thresholds that must be reached for approval (L. Schneider & Grashof, 2006). The 
choice of these parameters is by their nature subjective, and some country DNAs have 
approved a range of projects that comply with only one of the criteria. This is potentially the 
result of a “race to the bottom” as several authors suggested (Gupta et al., 2008; Kelly & 
Helme, 2000; Nussbaumer, 2009; L. Schneider, 2007; Sutter & Parreño, 2007).  
Countries that have more stringent sustainable development criteria compete with other 
CDM hosts that hold investors to less strict criteria, enabling the implementation of low-cost 
projects with larger rents and potentially lower risks (Schneider, 2007, p. 47). Furthermore, 
the differing sustainable development criteria make a pricing of the benefits into the carbon 
price difficult. Thus, investors will prefer cheap projects rather than sustainable projects 
priced at a premium.  
3.3.2.2 Conflict between additionality and sustainability  
Alexeew et al. (2010) demonstrate an inherent conflict between additionality and expected 
sustainable development benefits. They derive their conclusion from an extensive review of 
40 (31 of which are large-scale) Indian CDM projects, using multi-criteria analysis of 
sustainable development claimed in the PDDs and the impact of the CER income stream on 
the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project.21 The probability of additionality was 
measured by analysing the increase in profitability due to revenue from the CDM. The 
                                                          
21
 The sample used was chosen from the pool of 379 Indian projects registered in January 2009 and 
represents 90% of the main project types (number of projects): biomass (15), wind (12), hydro (7), 
energy efficiency (4) and HFC-23 (2). Sustainability benefits taken from Project Design Documents 
were assessed in economic development, environmental and social dimensions, following the criteria 
in Olsen & Fenhann (2008). Economic criteria include sustainable and innovative technology, 
employment generation, financial benefits of the project, and cost-efficiency of GHG abatement. 
Social criteria analysed include stakeholder participation, social benefits for poorer parts of society, 
development support for poorer regions and impact on quality of life. Environmental criteria included 
project impact on air, soil and water. 
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assumption is that, the more the cash flow from CER sales increases profitability, measured 
by the internal rate of return, the greater the probability that the project is additional.22  
In line with the findings of other authors on the additionality of a share of renewable 
projects, Alexeew et al. (2010) find that for hydro and wind projects the IRR without the 
CDM is already relatively high and that the CDM does not increase it significantly. 
Furthermore, in line with their hypothesis, they find that projects with an above-average 
sustainability performance were more likely to be non-additional, and vice versa. The 
authors conclude that any reform or minor change to address one of the goals of the CDM – 
additionality or sustainable development – must be taken with due regard to the impact of 
the other mechanism.23 
3.3.2.3 Actual versus claimed sustainability benefits of CDM projects 
Scholars and CDM experts analysing the sustainable development impact of the CDM come 
to the conclusion that out of a sample of 200 (Olsen, 2007) and in-depth review of 16 CDM 
project documentation (Sutter & Parreño, 2007) the CDM contributes only marginally to 
sustainable development. Olsen & Fenhann (2008) analyse the sustainable development 
benefits of a sample of 296 PDDs out of a total of 744 projects submitted to the CDM project 
cycle till May 2006. They count the various benefits each PDD mentions per project type. 
This method allowed projects to be ranked by their total number of potential sustainability 
benefits.24 However, the benefits documented in the PDD are expected, rather than realized 
benefits. Thus, according to Olsen & Fenhann (2008) to ensure that benefits materialise in 
practice, an institution is needed that compare the estimated benefits in the PDD and 
actually realised benefits. Since international carbon markets do not attribute a price 
premium to the total number of sustainable development benefits per project (Nussbaumer, 
2009; Olsen, 2007; Sutter & Parreño, 2007), Olsen & Fenhann (2008) propose an 
international sustainable development standard in addition to national criteria.  
                                                          
22
 Thus, the authors only analyse projects that claim investment additionality. 
23
 Chapter 4 analyses the benchmark rates used to prove additionality for hydro and wind projects in 
China. 
24
 See Appendix 1 for a ranking and categorization in three sustainability levels. The largest number of 
sustainable development benefits per project is provided by renewable energy projects, energy 
distribution and clinker replacement in cement production. The authors explain the latter with high 
environmental (air, water, land and conservation of natural resources) benefits linked to clinker 
replacement in comparison to socio-economic benefits such as employment, welfare, health and 
learning that are the strength of renewable energy projects. Coal bed methane, fugitive emission 
projects and industrial gas projects receive the lowest sustainability ranking. 
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Currently, CDM host countries' Letters of Approval comply with the national definitions of 
sustainable development.25 Thus, establishing additional international criteria for 
sustainable development, especially the verification of the achievement of sustainable 
development benefits claimed, could help to prevent a regulatory “race to the bottom” and 
could increase the share of long-term benefits achieved through projects (Olsen & Fenhann, 
2008). The imposition of sustainable development criteria through buyer (e.g. European 
Union) Letters of Approval might be viewed critically by some CDM host countries if vested 
interests are suspected. Thus, common criteria and verification methodologies to examine 
actual achievement of sustainability criteria could be developed by both parties together. 
This is subject to high demand for negotiation resources and information needs, which the 
CDM must deliver. The high informational costs, combined with weak incentives for project 
developers to provide information, have been pointed out by Wara & Victor (2008).  
3.3.2.4 Sustainability development of project over time 
Based on the sustainability ranking by Olsen and Fennhan (2008) it is possible to show the 
evolution of sustainable development for registered and declined projects over time.26 This is 
done by distinguishing project sustainability in three categories: high, middle and low 
sustainability (SDC, SDB and SDA, respectively). All CDM projects are labelled according to 
these criteria using the CDM Pipeline (Risoe, 2011). The project sustainability is assessed 
over time, as well as all decisions on CDM projects between October 2007 and November 
2011. This time frame is chosen because few projects were declined and no project had 
received a negative validation from auditing firms before that date.  
The analysis suggests that the share of projects with a high number of sustainable benefits 
has increased over time. Figure 3.4 depicts that 58% of all project in November 2011 are 
high-SD type projects (denoted by SDC). Figure 3.4 shows that the share of high SD-projects 
has grown over time. In terms of the annual CER volume, high SD-type projects cover 39% of 
all expected annual CERs, almost the same share, however 41%, is commanded by low-SD-
type projects. This is mainly due to the large size of industrial gas projects (HFC and N2O) 
which are small in project number but generate large amounts of CERs (Wara, 2007). 
                                                          
25
 Letters of Approval are issued by the host and the buyer country (Step 2 of the CDM project cycle in 
Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1). 
26
 See Appendix 1: Overview of sustainability criteria. 
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O F  C D M  | 87 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Number and expected CERs of projects by impact sustainable development 
benefits and date of registration 
 
Source: Risoe (2007, 2011); author calculations 
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the sustainability of projects that have been declined by actors in 
the CDM project cycle between October 2007 and November 2011. The decisions are 
distinguished between decisions taken by the CDM-EB (rejection of the project), DOEs (the 
sum of termination of and negative validation) and project participants (voluntary 
withdrawal). Figure 3.5 shows the number of decisions taken between October 2007 and 
November 2011. 
Figure 3.5 Declining decisions by sustainability of projects by CDM actors between October 
2007 and November 2011  
 
Source: Risoe (2007, 2011); author calculations 
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Table 3.1 Decisions on projects between October 2007 and November 2011. 
  
October 2007 - November 2011 
Registered 
projects 
Rejected Validation 
terminated 
or negated 
Withdrawn Total 
Decisions 
Oct. 2007-
Nov. 2011 
Low SD benefits 
(SDA) 320 (45%) 48 (7%) 330 (46%) 16 (2%) 714 (100%) 
Medium SD benefits 
(SDB) 549 (54%) 37 (4%) 415 (41%) 15 (1%) 1016 (100%) 
High SD benefits 
(SDC) 1653 (77%) 81 (4%) 390 (18%) 15 (1%) 2139 (100%) 
Total        2522            166          1135             46               3869   
Source: Risoe (2007, 2011); author calculations 
Figure 3.5 and Table 3.illustrate that the CDM-EB is responsible for rejecting 166 projects, 
with the largest share, 81 projects, covered by high SD-type projects. However, high-SD type 
projects have also exhibited the largest registration success rate during that time (77%). 
Compared with all projects with decisions in the four years assessed, the share of high SD-
type projects rejected by the CDM-EB is low (4%). Low-SD projects have been rejected at a 
higher rate of 7% compared to all projects with decisions.  
The largest number of declining decisions (1,135) has been issued by DOEs. The decisions 
aggregated both the negation and termination of projects.27 Most of these projects were for 
more than three years in the CDM pipeline and were unlikely to be registered. High SD-type 
projects make up a significantly lower share, 18%, compared to the other SD categories for 
all DOE decisions. These range between 41% for medium and 46% for low SD projects. That 
suggests that DOEs were reluctant to terminate or negate the validation of high SD projects. 
This can be explained by the fact that the largest share of high SD type projects are 
renewables and thus also use the benchmark analysis. Given the experience with the 
benchmark analysis in the literature above, DOEs are rational in keeping these projects in 
the project cycle if they expect the registration of these projects and commission fees linked 
to the success of project registration. 
In summary, the analysis above suggests that the number of registered high sustainability 
projects has grown over time. These projects have been preferred in the registration 
decisions of the EB. Auditors also rejected proportionally more projects with low-sustainable 
development benefits, somewhat shielding high-sustainability projects. Given that most of 
the projects in the high sustainability category are renewables, this is rational. Proving 
additionality for these projects is difficult, however, but the majority of renewables projects 
                                                          
27
 No such decision was made by DOEs prior to December 2008 (Risoe, 2008). 
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were registered in the past.28 Thus, these projects have a high probability to get registered 
and thus are protected by rational auditors, who want to maximise commission fees. Still, for 
a considerable number of high-SD projects auditors have terminated validation. These 
projects however, were mainly old projects with a low probability of getting registered.  
3.3.2.5 Increasing sustainability through fees and taxes 
To increase the number of high-sustainability projects, Michaelowa (2005) had proposed to 
levy a higher adaptation fee for non-CO2 projects (HFC, N2O and methane) relative to the 
usual 2% adaptation fee charged on each CDM project.29 This proposal is similar in effect to 
the Chinese sustainability tax differentiated by project type. China taxes the proceeds of 
projects differentiated by the sustainability of projects. HFC projects for instance get taxed at 
a rate of 65%, N2Os at 30% while renewable energy projects need to forgo 2% of their 
revenue (Olsen and Fenhann, 2007). The difference is the recipient of the revenue, the 
government in the Chinese example and the UNFCCC adaptation fund as suggested by 
Michaelowa (2005). The establishment of the Chinese CDM fund started in October 2005, 
and indicates that the Chinese government acted rationally by starting the collection of 
revenues on projects pursued in China, rather than be subject to the collection and 
disbursement system of the UNFCCC. 
3.3.3 Cost-effectiveness – the difference between abetment costs and the market price  
In the CDM, there is no institutional body that ensures cost-effectiveness. A high market 
price for CDM credits leads to large rents and potential market entry as discussed in section 
3.2.2.30 The theoretical prediction is that the rent creates interest groups that will oppose 
regulation as long as a subsidy such as the CDM is in place, and meanwhile the rent cannot 
be used to pursue higher cost-projects. However, if the rent is reinvested in mitigation 
projects, the overall system can achieve a high cost-effectiveness. 
3.3.3.1 Industrial gas projects – low cost and large rents  
                                                          
28
 See Figure 4.2 and   
Figure 4.3 4.3 in Chapter 4. 
29
 See Project cycle Step 7 (Issuance) in Chapter 2 Section 2.2.3. 
30
 The price paid for project credits is either set by demand and supply or set by host countries as is 
the case of China, which set an floor price between 8 Euro per CER to be paid for credit generated 
from Chinese projects (Schroeder, 2009). In January 2012, China has lowered the CDM floor price to 
7 Euro per CER due to a CER and EUA price crash (Point Carbon, 2012). In the following calculations 
this move by the Chinese government is not taken into account and the lowest price is kept at 8 Euro 
per CER. 
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The CDM has been successful in terms of finding least-cost abatement opportunities. A small 
number of industrial gas (HFC-23 and N2O) projects (93 projects total registered) make up 
38% of total expected CERs by 2012. Industrial GHGs have high global warming potentials, 
acting as a multiplier to each tonne of the respective GHG destroyed, so such projects can 
provide a large number of certifiable emissions reductions at a low price, for HFCs below €1 
per CER (Wara, 2007). These projects are clearly additional, as the implementation of the 
project entails costs but no revenue (these projects use the simple cost approach explained in 
section 2.3 of Chapter 2) (Schneider, 2007). However, the market price paid for credits is 
between €8 and €12 per CER and thus these projects create a large rent.31  
If the destruction of industrial gases had been implemented differently – for instance by 
national regulation – a large part of the cost of these projects could have been saved and 
reinvested in other mitigation projects. Wara (2008) has calculated that the yearly costs for 
abating all developing country HFC-23 would be about €26 million, while through the CDM, 
Annex I buyers paid between €250 and €750 million in total. The Chinese government has 
recognized the large windfall profit from this project type and taxes CER revenues at 65% to 
create a sustainable development investment fund from the revenues (Liu, 2010).  
However, as Muller (2007) observes, the Chinese government has not taken steps to 
implement national legislation addressing HFC projects. In the meantime, the Chinese CDM 
fund that collects the tax revenue has started discussions on how to use the funds for 
mitigation purposes (China CDM Fund, 2011).  
3.3.3.2 Case studies of abatement costs per project type 
The cost-effectiveness of different CDM project types has been analysed by Green (2008) 
and by Castro (2010). Green examines 912 projects registered by January 2008 according to 
the costs needed to reduce one tonne of CO2- equivalent. The lowest median costs, below €1 
per tonne of CO2e, are HFC, N2O, and fugitive projects (the latter of which recover methane 
(CH4) from oil wells, gas pipeline leaks and charcoal production). The highest emission 
reduction costs, between €10-13 per tonne of CO2e, are commanded by wind and hydro 
projects; geothermal projects are about 50% more costly than these project types. The 
“middle ground”, €3-6 per tonne of CO2e, is taken by methane avoidance and biomass 
energy projects.  
                                                          
31
 A distinction has to be made between primary and secondary CER prices. For the rent calculation in 
this chapter primary CER prices are used. Primary CER prices reflect the price of CER for credits that 
are not issued yet and thus still carry risks of non-issuance (see Step 7 (Issuance) in Chapter 2). 
Secondary CER prices refer to CERs which have already been issued, and thus can already be used for 
compliance. These generally have a higher price. See Chapter 4 for a development of the CER price 
over time. 
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Castro examined 252 registered projects from the main CDM host countries except India and 
Brazil, according to their costs of generating emission reductions. Castro finds that solar 
CDM projects are most expensive, well above €300 per CER. Cement plants, have “medium” 
abatement costs close to biomass energy projects in Green (2008). Green concludes on the 
basis of his analysis that the examined projects were cost-ineffective and suggests that the 
price paid for emission reductions shall be pegged to the actual costs of reducing emissions. 
These cost-ineffective projects confer rents that could be used to leverage mitigation. 
3.3.3.3 Estimation of the annual rent transfer for project registered November 2011  
To assess the rent conferred to host country actors, abatement cost estimates are used by 
Green (2008) and (Castro, 2012). The rent is calculated as the difference between these 
abatement costs and CER prices of €8 to €13. Figure 3.6  shows that projects that need the 
least CER revenue to become operational are renewables, these are cost-effective from a 
global perspective, as they convey the smallest rent. At low CER prices of below 10 Euro 
many of these are not even financially feasible. This suggests that the CER price was not the 
sole determinant for project implementation. Biomass energy, cement and flaring projects 
create “medium” rents, and cost-ineffective projects from the global perspective include 
industrial gas projects and landfill gas and methane avoidance projects with a power 
component. The latter projects also receive revenue from the sale of power and are thus 
cheaper and less cost effective than their flaring (landfill and methane) counterparts.  
Figure 3.6 further illustrates that at an assumed carbon price between €8 and €9 per CER, 
the CDM leads to rents between €1.1 and €1.6 billion per year transferred to developing 
countries. This figure increases by about €500 million for each €1 increase in the assumed 
CER price. If these rents are used for mitigation purposes, they can significantly support the 
reduction of emissions beyond those offset by increases in industrialised countries (Cameron 
Hepburn, 2009). In many cases, this rent is captured by businesses and intermediaries. 
While it can be assumed that renewables project developers reinvest the rents in renewables, 
the same cannot be expected from owners of coal bed methane projects for instance. These 
latter project developers will use the rent to increase fossil-fuel based activities where these 
are profitable. The rent created for China, India and Brazil is illustrated in Table 3.2. The 
three countries, China, India and Brazil make up about 70% of the rent created by the CDM.  
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Figure 3.6 Abatement quantity in CO2-equivalent for registered projects by November 2011, 
project-type specific abatement costs, and potential rent generated 
 
Source: Castro (2012); Green (2008); Risoe (2011); author calculations 
Table 3.2 Overview of rent at different CER prices 
Rent in million 
Euro 
All 
projects China India Brazil 
Rent Rent 
Tax 
revenue Rent Rent 
€8 per CER 1,672 551 370 461 126 
€9 per CER 2,716 1,116 420 661 169 
€10 per CER 3,760 1,682 469 862 213 
€11 per CER 4,804 2,248 519 1,063 256 
€12 per CER 5,848 2,813 568 1,263 300 
€13 per CER 6,892 3,379 618 1,464 343 
Source: Author calculations based on abatement costs from Castro (2012) and Green (2008) 
To the author’s knowledge only China imposes tax on the proceeds of projects. The tax is 
based on the sustainability of the projects and taxes low-sustainable projects at a higher rate 
(see section 3.3.2.5). The revenue is channelled into the China CDM fund from which it 
should be distributed for mitigation purposes. With the tax, China makes sure that part of 
the rents of the CDM remains in the host country (Liu, 2010; Muller, 2007). The largest 
revenue share comes from industrial gas projects, HFCs and N2Os, and is between €366 and 
€415 million per year at carbon prices of €8 and €9 per CER, respectively. Liu (2010) arrives 
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at similar rent estimations and argues that the CDM tax revenue is small (about 0.1%) 
relative to annual national tax revenues of €520 billion.32  
The effectiveness of mitigation using these funds depends on whether the fund can leverage 
mitigation projects better than the market can. The fund would need a similar approval 
system to disburse funds as the CDM-EB to ensure cost-effectiveness. While the taxation is a 
rational choice for China, it creates strong incentives against domestic regulation of 
industrial gases and even blocking attempts to increase the speed to phase-out HCFC-22 for 
developing countries in the Montreal Protocol (Schapiro, 2010). The HCFC-22 gas (which 
generates HFC-23 as a waste gas) is governed under the Montreal Protocol and has a phase-
out schedule that is binding for developed countries. The presence of HFC-23 credits and tax 
revenue disincentivises domestic regulation of these gases. In the meantime, the European 
Union has taken action on this issue and has banned the use of credits from industrial gas 
credits, HCFs and N2Os, in the EU ETS from 2013 onwards.33 
The estimates in Figure 3.6 and Table 3.2 have to be taken with caution as they are based on 
median rates of examined projects by Green (2008) and Castro (2012) and exclude 
transaction costs (see limitations in Appendix 2). The actual abatement costs including 
transaction costs could be higher. However, even with higher actual abatement costs due 
transaction costs, the annual rent created by the CDM remains substantial. Furthermore, 
also a higher market price incentivises more submissions of CDM projects. However, the 
supply of industrial gas projects is fixed as no new plants can apply for CDM registration. 
Summarising, the cost-effectiveness of projects has increased as low-cost projects have 
decreased in number. The impact in terms of CER volume is however not as pronounced due 
to the weight of projects with high global warming potentials (see also Chapter 1 footnote 1). 
The rent created by these latter projects is in the order of €1 billion per year. Only China 
captures a large share of the rent created through the Chinese CDM projects. China is thus in 
the position to expand its mitigation activities with this revenue. 
The literature review above has shown that the CDM faced considerable difficulties in 
practice to achieve cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. Furthermore, the 
literature has detected that several projects did not require the CDM to become operational 
and would have happened anyway. These projects actually lead to global emission increases. 
The next section analyses whether an alternative to the CDM, a fund-approach that collects 
                                                          
32
 The US$ 690 billion cited in Liu (2010: page 1875) are converted into Euro at a Euro exchange rate 
of 1.3 US dollar. 
33
 The implications of the use of CERs in the EU ETS are the subject of the Chapter 5. 
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penalties from industrialised countries, would perform better on the dimensions of cost-
effectiveness, sustainable development and environmental integrity. 
3.4 Clean Development Fund 
The CDF allows countries with a cap to emit more than their emission reduction limit 
allows.34 The country has to pay a penalty fee (F) for each tonne of CO2e emitted in excess of 
the emission limitation (e.g. the Kyoto target). These penalty fees are collected by a so-called 
Clean Development Fund.35  
This system thus follows three steps: 
Step 1: (Industrialised) Country A emits more than its emission limit  
Step 2: Fee is distributed to country B 
Step 3: (Developing) Country B conducts emission reduction activities on its territory 
In the following, this section will assess each step. However, the order of the presentation is 
altered. First, step 1, then step 3, and then step 2 will be explained. This order allows the 
analysis of step 1 and 3 if only two countries A and B exist, while Step 2 describes the 
additional challenges that arise if more than one (developing) country B exists. 
3.4.1 How does country A decide how many emissions to reduce? 
3.4.1.1 Interaction of marginal abatement cost curve with penalty fee 
Country A bases its decision how much to emit domestically on its marginal abatement cost 
curve (MACA) combined with the penalty level. This new MAC curve is called MACA-CDF in 
Figure 3.7. Thus, faced with the target to reduce emission by R units, country A would abate 
domestically D1 units and pay the penalty for T1 emission units. The sum of D1 and T1 units 
equals country A’s original emission reduction target R. Country A abates only D1 units, 
because abating more than D1 is more expensive than paying the fine F per additional 
emission unit. The cost to country A is the sum of the areas A1, A2 and PR1. The areas A1 and 
A2 are paid for by domestic abatement and PR1 are the aggregate penalties, which is equal to 
the fine F multiplied by T1. Country A emits T1+C emissions and thus more than its cap. The 
                                                          
34
 In the following it is assumed that the Clean Development Fund actually becomes operational and 
examines the effects of its implementation. 
35
The proposed penalty fee per tonne of CO2.equivalent in Brazil’s submission was US$ 10. (UNFCCC, 
1997b, p. 24). Average CER prices observed in practice were above €10 or US$13 (see section 5.1.1 of 
Chapter 5 for a development of CER prices over time). 
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funds PR1 from the compliance fund are channelled to country B.
36 A higher penalty fee, all 
else equal, will lead to higher domestic abatement and higher total abatement costs to be 
paid by country A (this is illustrated in Figure 3.8). 
Figure 3.7 Penalty payments and domestic abatement – the combined MACA-CDF curve 
 
In the CDF approach, the funds generated through the penalty and transferred from country 
A to country B, are independent of the marginal abatement cost curve in country B. The 
penalties paid into the fund solely depend on the size of the fine F and the shape of the 
marginal abatement costs curve in country A (MACA). Figure 3.8 illustrates this for two 
different fines F1 (Schedule A) and F2 (Schedule B) holding the MAC curve of country A 
constant in schedules A and B, respectively. The level of the fine has a direct consequence on 
domestic abatement (D), the number of emission units that remain unabated and for which 
the penalty is paid for (T) and the proceeds from the fund (PR) channelled to country B.  
                                                          
36
For simplicity we assume here that there is only one developing country, country B. We will relax 
this assumption below. 
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Figure 3.8 Interaction between the level of the fine and MAC curves in country A 
 
A higher fine F does as Schedule A and B in Figure 3.8 illustrates, all else equal, increase 
domestic abatement (D1<D2) and decrease correspondingly the units the penalty is paid for 
(T1>T2). The size of the absolute penalty (PR) paid, depends on the level of F, the marginal 
abatement costs curve and the overall reduction target R. Depending on who sets F, 
assuming that R and the marginal abatement costs curve are fixed, has incentives to 
maximize (country B) or to minimize (country A) the total penalty to be paid (PR). For 
instance, country A would, all else equal, prefer to minimize F. Because it can thus lower its 
total abatement costs and increase welfare gains (the sum areas denoted by W in Figure 3.8). 
Country B would prefer to maximize the proceeds (PR) to use them for mitigation or other 
purposes.37 A marginal abatement cost curve, with a steeper slope than MACA (e.g. MACC) 
does decrease domestic abatement (D1>D3) and increases the number of units (T1<T3) 
country A pays the penalty for (Schedule C) The proceeds flowing to country B increase in 
Schedule C compared to Schedule A. Thus, in short, domestic abatement and the proceeds 
channelled to the fund depend on the marginal abatement costs curve in country A, the 
emissions limit R and the level of the fine F. 
                                                          
37
 Section 3.4.3.2 describes incentives to bargain over the level of the fee. 
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The costs of compliance for country A are the sum of domestic abatement and the penalties 
paid for the fund. For instance in schedule A, country A’s compliance cost are the sum of A1, 
A2 and PR1. Compared to the domestic abatement case with abatement costs A, country A 
benefits from welfare gains equal to the sum of W4 and W5. A higher penalty, such as in 
schedule B, increases total abatement costs for country A to the sum of A1, A2, A3 and PR2 
because the additional abatement from D1 to D2 induced through a higher fine (A3 + PR2> 
PR1 for F2>F1). This is because a higher fine approaches domestic abatement costs. The effect 
of a steeper marginal abatement cost curve keeping all other variables, R and F, constant 
increases total compliance costs with increasing penalties going to the fund. Thus, a country 
with a steeper marginal abatement cost curve has, all else equal, larger cost savings in 
penalty-regime but also larger total abatement costs.  
3.4.1.2 Timing 
In the CDF approach, Country A pays the penalty after it breached its obligation to reduce R 
emissions units. The payment leads to emission reductions in country B after the excess 
emission units occurred in country A. For country A the payment of the penalty relieves it, 
unless otherwise specified, from further obligations to ensure environmental integrity.38 In 
contrast, in the CDM, country A can only increase its emissions beyond the cap after 
emission reductions were generated and issued from implemented projects in country B.39 
Thus, in the CDM, emission reductions in country B have to have occurred first and only 
then can country A buy credits and reduce the effort to reduce R units. In the CDM, country 
A needs to pay to implement emission reduction projects in country B first, before it can 
increase emissions in its territory. This difference between the CDF and CDM can 
significantly weaken environmental integrity within the CDF (as defined by Figure 3.1). 
Despite the timing issue, country A can have incentives that country B actually engages in 
abatement or spending the funds on products if country A is an exporter of technology.40 
Country A wants to sell this technology to country B. These technologies can either be GHG 
relevant (high-, or low-carbon intensity) or GHG neutral. Environmental integrity is 
dependent on the relative carbon-intensity, price and availability of the technology between 
country A and B. Exports of technology from country A to country B can thus change the 
impact regarding environmental integrity either positively (reduce global emissions) or 
                                                          
38
 In the CDF system it has to be determined who pays the penalty fee. In the CDM it is country A or 
country emitters. Similarly in the CDF country A needs first to distribute emission reduction 
responsibilities to individual emitters to collect potential penalties for non-achievement of the 
individual reduction goals. 
39
 See Step 7 (Issuance) in Chapter 2 for details. 
40
 The focus here is on technology but the analysis holds for any other exported good. 
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negatively (increase global emissions). Thus, incentives of country A to export technology 
could improve environmental integrity.41  
Summarising, this section illustrated the actions taken by country A to determine optimal 
abatement strategies. First, country A decides on the basis of its domestic MAC curve how 
much to abate at home. Where the MAC curve crosses the fee, country A starts paying fee up 
to R to fulfil its emission reduction target. The decision in country A is similar to the one 
taken under the CDM. However, under the penalty approach country A does not need to 
know marginal abatement costs in country B, it just needs the level of the fee to decide 
domestic abatement. This substantially lowers the information costs imposed upon country 
A but also means that country A forgoes the benefits of lower abatement costs in country B. 
Furthermore, this section raised the timing issue, which differentiates the CDF from the 
CDM. In the CDF, emission increases in country A happen before any emissions are reduced 
in country B. The next section continues with the use of the penalty proceeds by country B 
(Step 3). 
3.4.2 How does country B decide on emission reductions in its territory? 
Country A pays the penalty PR1 to country B.
42 Assuming no transaction costs, country B 
receives funds equal to PR1.
43 If country B uses the funds to reduce T1 units, the amount of 
unabated emissions in country A, global emission decrease in total by R and thus achieve the 
emission reduction target imposed on country A. For this to occur, the funds collected 
through the penalty have to be equal to the aggregate costs for abating T1 emission units in 
country B.  
There are three dimensions that distinguish the CDM from the CDF presented in the 
following section.  
 
 
                                                          
41
 The prospect of gaining from the export of technologies could be a reason for countries to agree to 
both the CDM or a penalty fund system. If country A type parties know that their technology will be 
purchases with the funds, they will support such a scheme. Sunstein (2007, p. 14) shows that this was 
the case in the Montreal Protocol and the phase out of ozone depleting substances chlorofluorocarbon 
CFCs. The author shows that while American CFC producers such as DuPont, lobbied against 
domestic controls on CFCs, these companies supported an international freeze on CFCs once safe 
substitutes were discovered. DuPont and other producers would benefit in the future from the sale of 
these substitutes.  
42
 Step two the distribution of the fund is discussed below.  
43
 Potential transaction costs could be administration fees of the fund. These generally increase with 
the complexity of the distribution formula and the information required to calculate the outputs of the 
formula. Inputs could be for instance historical gross domestic product or emissions. Projected 
emissions were suggested as an indicator in the Brazilian Proposal (Cole, 2010). 
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These are: 
- Sufficiency of funds 
- Abatement in country B 
- Country B choices on sustainable development 
3.4.2.1 Sufficiency of funds 
The level of environmental integrity of the CDF depends on how much abatement the 
proceeds from the fund can “buy” in country B. Abatement in country B, absent of 
transaction costs, thus depends on country B’s marginal costs and the proceeds from the 
fund. For instance, the steeper the marginal abatement cost curve in country B44, the more 
difficult it will be to cover the same amount of excess emissions (T) for which the penalty was 
paid for by emission reductions in country B.  
In Figure 3.9 we illustrate three cases, using the variables PR1, PR2 and PR3 from Figure 3.8 
to assess the level of environmental integrity these funds enable. In schedule A and B of 
Figure 3.9 the funds are enough to more than offset the emissions increase in country A. The 
excess emissions in country A, T1 and T2, are more than offset by reductions TX1 and TX2 in 
country B as T1< TX1 and T2< TX2, respectively. However, schedule C shows that the penalty 
revenue PR3 is insufficient to abate T3 emission units. Only TX3 units are abated in country B, 
while emission increases in country A were equal to T3 units such that TX3<T3. Thus, the level 
of environmental integrity is negative by the difference between T3 and TX3. For illustration 
we have used a steep marginal abatement cost curve MACD (schedule C) in country B, but it 
is essential to note that the main reason for a lack of environmental integrity is the absence 
of a direct connection between abatement in country A and country B and thus a disconnect 
between both countries marginal abatement costs curves.45 
                                                          
44
 For consistency, we assume that the slope of MACB is lower than the slope of MACA and MACC., but 
this is not necessarily true in practice, there are countries which are classified as developing and thus 
do not have caps, but whose MAC curve slopes can be above those of developed countries (reference). 
This would just strengthen the argument in this section. 
45
 However, for consistency, the slope of MACD is (slightly) lower than that of both MACA and MACC in 
country A.  
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Figure 3.9 Penalty proceeds and abatement in country B (proceeds from penalty in grey) 
 
Figure 3.9 shows that the proceeds PR1 and PR2 are sufficient to establish positive 
environmental integrity. The funds actually create surpluses of S1 (schedule A) and the sum 
of S2 and S3 (schedule B), for country B respectively depending on the level of the fine. These 
surpluses suggest that a lower penalty would have sufficed to ensure both environmental 
integrity and achieve cost-effectiveness. If these surpluses are invested in mitigation, as 
suggested in Figure 3.9,  they can increase emission reductions beyond the level necessary to 
establish environmental integrity (i.e. Ti unabated emission units in Country A). Schedule C 
paints the opposite picture. There are not sufficient funds for environmental integrity; funds 
equal to M1 are missing to establish neutral environmental integrity. Environmental integrity 
cannot be restored unless either country A transfers the missing funds M1 to abate the 
difference between T3 and TX, or country B pays this from its own budget. 
3.4.2.2 Abatement in country B 
The CDF raises a public choice problem of choosing in which sector to abate within country 
B. If the government is composed of different ministries or more general interest groups, 
these groups will compete for the use of these funds. The result could be that the ranking of 
abatement could be decided on another basis other than environmental integrity and cost-
effectiveness. For instance, the government in country B could employ sustainability criteria 
to decide where to invest the funds. Depending on the design additional decision criteria 
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could lead to non-cost-effective abatement and a decrease in the environmental integrity 
level. For instance, imagine that there are three technologies, which can each abate one 
emission unit, and have increasing abatement costs are represented by three interest groups 
that produce these technologies. If the interest group with the most expensive technology 
receives most funds for abatement and insufficient funds are left to abate with the cheaper 
technologies, environmental integrity might become negative (as illustrated by Schedule C in 
Figure 3.9).46  
The problem just described had assumed that the government of country B fully channels the 
funds PR to mitigation action. However, a case can be made that the funds are diverted 
directly to other priorities such as health, education or other issues without any direct 
abatement impact. Here we can distinguish two cases: a) no abatement and no investment in 
GHG relevant sectors, and b) no abatement and investment in GHG sectors that increase 
emissions. In reality, both are extreme cases, but they help to illustrate the impacts on 
environmental integrity. 
No abatement and no GHG investment case: In this case, the government does not abate at 
all, but invests the money for instance in healthcare, education and other issues.47 That 
means that because the investments in GHG unrelated sectors do not reduce emissions, 
global emissions increase by T, the volume of units that country A paid the penalty for but 
which are not offset by reductions in country B. Thus, the volume of non-additionality is 
limited to T.  
No abatement and GHG investment case: In this case, the government does invest in GHG 
relevant sectors such as fossil fuel power plants which affect emissions. In this case, the level 
of non-additionality would not be limited to T but is subject to, and could well exceed T, 
depending on the carbon intensity of the fund. For instance, in the extreme case, the country 
could use the proceeds from the fund to invest in a coal-fired power plant due to regulatory 
capture by interest groups, or availability of the resource (i.e. coal). This coal-fired power 
plant was not projected under the country’s BAUB scenario but due to the proceeds from the 
                                                          
46
 The CDM has similar challenges for setting international standards for technologies and baselines, 
however it is assumed that regulators at the international level are less sensitive to local national 
stakeholders and interest groups. This also means that only well-financed and well-equipped interest 
groups get an opportunity to contribute to the system in case of the CDM relative to a national CDF 
approach. Flues, Michaelowa, & Michaelowa (2009) show that also the CDM regulator has not 
decided always independently. Some CDM-EB members have shown a reluctance to reject large-scale 
projects if these where located in the CDM-EB member’s country of origin.  
47
 The effects of investments in healthcare and education are assumed here to be GHG neutral, thus 
not having any effect on emissions. This effects in practice are not necessarily so. For instance, 
Shepardson et al. (2011) investigated the perceptions and misconceptions of 51 secondary students 
about climate change. Based on their finding, the authors draw recommendations for a curriculum. 
Such a curriculum, if well designed and implemented can have a long-term emission reducing effect. 
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CDF could be realised as a prestige project. The availability of funds thus, draws attention by 
interest groups and thus potentially increases emissions, similar to the subsidy effect 
suggested by Tirole (2008). 
Nevertheless, if the funds are channelled to mitigation as is assumed throughout this section, 
global emissions can be reduced (Figure 3.9 Schedules A and B). This for instance is the case, 
if the “winning” interest group is providing renewables technology and thus lowers emissions 
in country B. Depending on the abatement cost per tonne of the technology, the funds could 
still be insufficient to establish neutral environmental integrity in the short run. However, 
renewables can provide the basis for long-run, deeper emission reductions which are not 
captured by the static perspective of the marginal abatement cost curve. Thus continuous 
support for renewables could support learning curve effects, which already have been 
observed for solar photovoltaics and other renewables (BMU, 2007). 
3.4.2.3 Country B choices on sustainable development 
The previous section has analysed the effects of the CDF on cost-effectiveness and has 
concluded that it depends on four variables: the marginal abatement cost curves, the 
emissions limit R and the penalty level F, in addition to the distribution formula, which we 
briefly discussed in the section on environmental integrity. This section assesses the impact 
the CDF has on sustainable development. In the following it is assumed that the government 
in country B is benevolent and aims at maximizing social welfare. 
We recall that each country has different priorities and interpretations in terms of 
sustainable development depending on its position along the development spectrum.48 The 
direct transfer of funds to governments in countries without a cap enables these countries to 
follow their own sustainable development priorities. Countries in general have an 
information advantage in what regards their national circumstances and needs. Thus, they 
are in a better position to judge where funds should be invested to catalyse their own 
sustainable development priorities and other national priorities. The government is also 
better equipped to change the sustainability criteria once new priorities arise.  
The distribution formula for funds plays a role for sustainability.49 If the CDF distributes 
funds independently (without condition) of any domestic policy in country B, a benevolent 
country B government can act strategically for the long-term without the concern of losing 
funds due to regulatory competition between countries as within the CDM. Thus, depending 
on the fund distribution formula, from a sustainable development point of view, the CDF 
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 See Chapter 2 Section 2.1.2 on sustainable development. 
49
 Different distribution formulae are discussed below in section 3.4.3.1. 
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allows the government to act independent of international developments. For instance, the 
funds could be used to provide long-term support for renewables or a training programme 
for engineers and craftsmen to energetically retrofit buildings. If the fund leads to 
predictable monetary streams to country B, such expenditure can be better managed, in 
comparison to a fluctuating carbon price under the CDM. However, the long-term impact of 
investment in renewables is likely large due to learning curves effects, the immediate effects 
are difficult to quantify.50 
To what extend the country’s sustainable development criteria involve GHG abatement 
priorities determines the environmental integrity and cost-effectiveness of the instrument. 
The transfer receiving country can commit to ensure environmental integrity. Such a system 
would involve voluntary commitment or sanctions for non-compliant developing country 
governments. This would shift the responsibility for reducing emissions to developing 
countries, which is a paradox as the absence of developing country emission reduction 
responsibilities is the main reason for a compliance fund in the first place, and thus is not 
practicable.  
This section illustrated the actions taken by (developing) country B upon receipt of the 
proceeds from the fund. It showed that the environmental integrity of the CDF depends on 
the interaction between the funds channelled and the abatement opportunities in country B. 
If funds are insufficient to cover emission increases in country B, global emissions increase. 
Thus, in addition to the additionality challenges that face both the CDM and CDF, the CDF 
suffers from a lack of environmental integrity if funds are insufficient. In addition, global 
emissions increase if the funds are diverted to non-GHG activities. However, the CDF is 
potentially better suited to achieve long-term strategic growth and sustainable development 
criteria if country B governments are free to decide about the use of the money. This 
presumes, however, that the government is benevolent.  
3.4.3 Fee is distributed to country B 
3.4.3.1 Distribution of funds to more than one country 
The analysis of steps 1 and 3 compared the effect of the CDF in only two countries, a penalty-
paying country (A) and a penalty-receiving country (B). All the penalty payments are in this 
case fully channelled to country B, absent transaction costs. However, if more B-type 
countries exist, a distribution formula for funds from the CDF is necessary. The Brazilian 
Proposal suggested a formula based on projected emissions of countries without a cap to 
                                                          
50
 Nevertheless, for example Germany, which has an increasing share of renewables deployment, has 
built considerable monitoring and reporting capacity that allows the quantification of GHG and 
employment benefits from renewables (BMU, 2007). 
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distribute the penalties collected by Country A. For example, if two countries, B and C, both 
without an emissions cap, have projected emissions of 30% and 70% of all emissions among 
the two countries respectively, the penalties should be distributed in the same proportions to 
these countries. Other distribution formulas could be based on, for instance, gross-domestic 
product (GDP), GDP per capita or population to name a few. However, it is important to note 
that some of these distribution formulae actually incentivise an increase in emissions to 
profit from distributed funds. This is the moral hazard problem discussed by Tirole (2008) 
and confirmed in the CDM (L. Schneider, 2011).  
For environmental integrity and cost-effectiveness purposes, the funds should be channelled 
to the countries with the largest low-cost abatement potential accounting for technology 
cost-reduction potential. Projected emissions and GDP per capita could be a proxy indicator 
for abatement opportunities, as higher emissions also indicate a large absolute reduction 
potential. None of the indicators, except abatement potential itself, is a good guide for 
distribution of the CDF proceeds, if environmental integrity and cost-effectiveness matter. 
The information needed to assess such potential is difficult to gather and might induce moral 
hazard on the side of countries to act inefficiently and increase emissions to claim funds in a 
second step.51 This is the same challenge encountered in the CDM with the incentives to 
exaggerate projected baseline emissions, and pointed out by Faure & Lefevere, (2005) and 
Shrestha & Timilsina (2002).52  
If emission projections are used for the distribution of funds, this will create incentives to 
keep emissions high. Because if actual BAU emissions in countries without a cap turn out to 
be lower than expected, the country should in theory pay back funds received in excess to the 
pool or not receive as large a transfer in the next period. While this is difficult to implement 
in practice it illustrates the incentives to keep emissions at or above projected level.  
Another indicator to channel funds could be advances and stringency of domestic climate 
policy actions taken by governments in countries without caps. For instance, all else equal, a 
country which already implements GHG-reducing policies domestically could receive more 
funds. While the assessment and ranking of such policies and their performance is difficult, 
it would also encounter political difficulties due to both the “conditionality” of funds 
distribution (Sippel & Neuhoff, 2009) and the absence of requirements in the UNFCCC for 
industrialised countries to report regularly on domestic policies and measures. Currently 
developing countries only have to report infrequently on their emissions and policies 
                                                          
51
 Building technical capacity to monitor, report and verify (MRV) GHG emissions and policies at that 
have an impact on emissions at the national or sectoral level is an important first step towards 
effectively reducing emissions (Hogan et al., 2012).  
52
 Chapter 4 provides a short literature on moral hazard related to the CDM to assess the level of 
benchmarks used in additionality testing. 
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through National Communications, while industrialised countries report annually on 
emissions and every four to five years on policies and measures (UNFCCC, 1992). Biennial 
reports are currently under discussion for both developed and developing countries (Moncel, 
2011; UNFCCC, 2010c). 
Thus, in short, the distribution formula will induce rent-seeking behaviour by countries 
which benefit from one distribution formula over the other. In aggregate, this endangers the 
environmental integrity of the instrument.  
3.4.3.2 Bargaining over the fee level 
In the section above, it was assumed that the penalty F is set exogenously. However, in 
practice it is likely that the fee is set through a political bargaining process. Naturally, 
country A bargains for a low penalty fee and country B bargains for a penalty fee that 
maximises penalty revenue (PR), as discussed around Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. Thus, the 
fine setting process will become a bargaining coordination game. The resulting fine is 
unlikely to be set optimally, as the information needed on marginal abatement cost curves 
between countries is not taken into account. 
Summarising, this section illustrated the challenges to distribute the funds of the CDF if 
more than one recipient (i.e. developing) country is involved. Depending on the nature of the 
formula recipient countries have incentives to keep emissions at high levels to continue 
receiving funds (moral hazard). Abatement costs in these countries are a good indicator for 
distribution of funds, but would require an assessment of the MAC curve in country B. The 
CDM fares better in this regard as the price paid for abatement is determined by the two 
MAC curves of country A and B. Furthermore, this section showed that setting the penalty 
fee is likely to involve bargaining by countries, which want to minimise abatement costs 
(country A) and to maximise penalty transfers (country B), respectively. Political decisions 
on the fee level cannot arrive at an optimal solution because the fee level is not connected to 
the MAC curve of both countries, as is the case for the CDM.  
3.5 Discussion 
Our analysis above has shown the various benefits and challenges of the CDM and the CDF. 
The CDM was examined from a theoretical and a practical perspective. The review of the 
literature on the performance of the CDM focused on the three criteria of environmental 
integrity, cost-effectiveness, and sustainable development. Additional analysis was 
conducted to illustrate the development of sustainability of registered and rejected CDM 
projects over time. The rent transferred to CDM host countries was quantified to estimate 
the cost-effectiveness of the CDM. Both the theoretical and the practical examination of the 
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CDM suggest that the instrument is not effective in achieving its stated objectives of 
environmental integrity, cost-effectiveness, and sustainable development. The literature 
shows that many projects were registered and gained CDM support although they would 
have happened anyway. This supports the moral hazard hypothesis that project developers 
aimed at maximising CER revenue by misrepresenting the viability of a project. Particularly 
challenging project types are renewable technologies because they benefit already from other 
revenue streams in the absence of CDM support. Auditing firms charged with cross checking 
the data provided by project developers were unable to conduct their tasks properly. 
Negative validation opinions and the termination of proposed projects by auditors increased 
after the release of new guidance and the suspension of the biggest auditor in 2008. This 
supports the hypothesis that the mere threat of sanctions did not work properly before and 
that auditors had maximised commission fees from project validation until the probability of 
being sanctioned by the EB’s Accreditation Panel increased. 
Regarding sustainable development, the literature finds some evidence in favour of the “race 
to the bottom” proposition. In the absence of a price after-project implementation for 
sustainable development benefits, host countries competed for projects on the basis of costs. 
To the author’s knowledge only China has implemented a tax on low-sustainable project 
types to skim the high rent from these projects. Depending on how this tax revenue is used, 
China is able to leverage abatement efforts and thus decrease global emissions. The analysis 
has shown that sustainability has in general increased over time, and that decisions by the 
EB, auditors and project developers to stop projects, somewhat protected high-sustainable 
projects. One potential reason is that most of these projects apply renewable technologies 
and their additionality test method is difficult to validate in practice.  
Regarding cost-effectiveness, the literature review shows that a large portion of projects 
could have been achieved at a much lower cost, for instance through command and control 
regulation of industrial gases. The large rent that this project type exhibits has led to an 
increase in emissions by projects to subsequently claim credits from reductions. This is in 
line with theoretical predictions. The analysis has quantified the rent transferred to 
developing countries. Despite CDM rules to protect domestic policy being influenced by the 
rent from the CDM (see section 3.2.2), the trade-off between domestic policy and the CDM 
rent is illustrated with two cases: 1) the rejection of Chinese wind projects by the CDM 
regulator, who suspected the Chinese government of acting strategically by lowering the 
domestic financial support for wind, and 2) the reluctance of the Chinese government to 
regulate industrial gas projects more cost-effectively directly or through a faster phase-out 
schedule in the Montreal Protocol. 
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An alternative to the CDM, a fund-approach is presented and analysed to determine whether 
the CDF is better suited to achieve the objectives of cost-effectiveness, sustainable 
development and environmental integrity. Both instruments are preferable to domestic 
abatement in terms of cost-effectiveness and sustainable development. From an 
environmental integrity perspective both mechanisms create incentives for the generation of 
non-additional emission reductions. The CDM creates these incentives for both country A 
and B. In the CDF, the degree of non-additionality depends on the level of the fine, the 
revenue received and the potential for funds being diverted to non-mitigation ends.  
The main challenge of the CDF is its cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity, as the 
marginal abatement cost curves of different countries and the level of the penalty fee are not 
connected in any way. As the level of the fee and the formula on how to distribute the funds 
from the CDF are likely to be decided on political and subjective grounds, environmental 
integrity will suffer. The CDF is particularly favourable relative to the CDM on grounds of 
sustainable development and by removing the perverse incentive to delay domestic policy, as 
funds from the CDF can be used to leverage already existing or even motivate new domestic 
policies if the flow of finance is predictable. This is true as long as the distribution of funds is 
positively correlated or alternatively totally independent of domestic climate policy, as 
country B is encouraged to engage in domestic climate policy without concern to lose funds 
as is the case in the CDM (as discussed above). 
The analysis has shown that ensuring environmental integrity is the main difficulty under 
both alternative approaches. Both the CDM and the CDF require a system to assess and 
reduce non-additionality. The CDM needs an additional system to ensure that domestic 
climate policy is not discouraged, while the CDF needs an additional system to ensure 
enough funds are transferred to enable environmental integrity and that funds are not 
diverted to non-mitigation means that may endanger environmental integrity. Such 
controlling systems entail institutional transaction costs.53 From our analysis, it appears that 
the CDM requires a less costly institutional framework compared to the CDF, because 
decision parameters such as the level of the fine, insufficiency of funds, and incentives to 
divert funds require more administrative layers compared with the non-additionality and 
sustainable development deficiencies of the CDM.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Summarising, this chapter has revisited the emergence of the CDM as a rational choice 
between two alternatives. It has presented the two original proposals to address GHG 
emission reductions in developing countries at the time the Kyoto Protocol was adopted and 
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See for instance, Dutschke & Michaelowa (1998) and Woerdman (2001) 
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provided an overview how the CDM performed in practice. The chapter analysed these 
instruments against the criteria of environmental integrity, cost-effectiveness and 
sustainable development. The choice between the CDM and the CDF does not come to one 
single answer; there are trade-offs between the two instruments. The analysis has shown that 
the CDF’s main strength is sustainable development and the potential leverage of domestic 
policy as developing country governments can independently decide on the use of the funds. 
This benefit has also a potential its drawback if funds are diverted away to meet other non-
climate goals. The CDM’s main strength is cost-effectiveness in theory. However, the 
literature examined and analysis in this chapter have shown that the CDM creates large rents 
which hinder more stringent domestic climate policy in developing countries and have led to 
the entry or inefficient increase in production of polluting companies. Thus, cost-
effectiveness, the main argument in favour of the CDM turned into a lock-in effect of the 
CDM subsidy. Future policy design cannot deny these perverse incentives, as they are 
detrimental to the goal of decarbonising the global economy by 2050. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of sustainability criteria 
Based on the SD benefits counted in PDDs by Olsen and Fenhann 2008, three groups were 
defined on the basis of sustainable development benefits for the project types listed in and 
also categorized in the previous section categorized according to Schneider (2007): 
- Low sustainable development benefits (SDA) 
- Medium sustainable development benefits (SDB) 
- High sustainable development benefits (SDC) 
Table A 3.1 shows the categorization by SD-type allocated on the basis of similar number of 
project types in each category.  
Table A 3.1 SD benefits and categorization  
  
SD 
Benefits 
SD 
Labels 
Energy distribution 550 
SDC 
Solar 400 
Cement 373 
Hydro 354 
Wind 354 
Geothermal 350 
Methane avoidance 341 
SDB 
Landfill gas 330 
Tidal 300 
Transport 300 
Biomass energy 280 
CO2 usage 280 
Fossil fuel switch 274 
Coal bed/mine methane 250 
SDA 
 
EE Industry 200 
EE own generation 200 
EE supply side 200 
Fugitive 200 
HFCs 185 
N2O 100 
Source: Olsen and Fenhann (2007); author calculation based on Risoe (2011) 
For the categorisation into SDA, SDB, and SDC a simple differentiation was chosen in which 
first six project types were allocated to SDC and the remainder equally split between category 
SDB and category SDA, respectively. All renewables except tidal are labelled with high 
sustainability (SDC). Coal bed methane, energy efficiency projects in industry and supply 
side, as well as industrial gas projects are labelled with the lowest category SDA. Medium 
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sustainable projects, category SDB, includes methane avoidance, landfill gas and biomass 
energy projects. The allocation of hydro projects to the high sustainability category might be 
contentious for some observers. Large hydro projects, above 20 Megawatts, can have adverse 
effects on the environment and the living conditions of the population affected by the 
project. One-third, about 300 projects, of all hydro projects are large-scale. These projects 
are included in the high-SD category. 
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Appendix 2: Abatement cost estimates per project type 
To assess the rent conferred to host country actors, abatement cost estimates are used Green 
(2008) and Castro (2012). Green (2008) has quantified abatement costs for almost all 
registered CDM project types except for solar, cement, reforestation, tidal, energy 
distribution and transport. The abatement costs for the first two project types have been 
taken from Castro (2010), while the others are excluded from the analysis. This analysis 
assumes that all the abatement costs need to be covered through the CER price. In practice 
this is not always true, especially for renewables, which have other income streams. Due to 
this income from the sales of electricity or subsidies, these project types can also be 
financially operational at lower CER prices than abatement costs. Still for the purpose of rent 
calculation, project types with higher abatement costs than the CER price lower the rent. 
Table A 3.2 Abatement costs per project type in €/tonne of CO2-equivalent  
Project Type 
Euro/t CO2-
equivalent  
HFCs 0.5 
Fugitive 0.65 
Landfill gas - Biogas 1.38 
Coal bed/mine 
methane 1.8 
Methane avoidance 1.86 
Landfill gas - Flaring 2.42 
Energy Efficiency 2.5 
Landfill gas - 
Composting 3.5 
Cement 4 
Biomass energy 5.7 
Fossil fuel switch 8.6 
Hydro - Existing dam 10.3 
Hydro - Run of river 10.7 
Wind 10.9 
Hydro - New dam 12.79 
Geothermal 18.77 
Source: Castro (2012) and Green (2008) 
Limitations 
Some limitations of this methodology apply. The data in Table A 3.2 excludes transaction 
costs and thus the figures quoted in Table A2 could be higher for some project types in 
reality. The largest share of CDM-specific transaction costs arises in the documentation of 
additionality (Fichtner, Graehl, & Rentz, 2003; Michaelowa & Stronzik, 2002; Woerdman, 
2001). For the purpose of categorizing project types, the analysis excludes transaction costs 
as it is assumed that these costs do not alter the ranking of projects significantly. For the 
calculation of the aggregate calculation of the rent created, both the median and the high 
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cost-estimates from Green (2008) are used. Energy efficiency projects have been bundled 
together, thus energy efficiency for industry, own generation and households have the same 
abatement costs in Table A 3.2. Furthermore, new projects do not necessarily have the same 
costs relative to older projects if technology is expected to become more efficient and thus 
cheaper over time. These limitations are likely to alter the size of the total rent. However, 
they do not alter the conclusion that the presence of the rent can adversely affect domestic 
climate policy in developing countries. 
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4. WHAT INCENTIVES EXIST TO SET THE BENCHMARK RIGHT FOR THE 
CDM ADDITIONALITY TEST? A CASE STUDY OF INDIAN AND CHINESE 
RENEWABLE PROJECTS 
he first Kyoto commitment period is coming to an end in 2012 and climate 
negotiators are discussing mechanisms and modalities for a follow-up commitment 
period. The Clean Development Mechanism is one key element of the first Kyoto 
commitment period, and currently the only operational mechanism that supports mitigation 
of emissions in developing countries under the UNFCCC. It also allows developed countries 
to lower their Kyoto compliance costs. CDM projects are conducted according to an 
institutionalised procedure (as outlined in Chapter 2). The analysis in Chapter 3 has shown 
that renewable energy projects under the CDM fulfil the criteria of sustainable development 
and cost-effectiveness required in the CDM. At the same time, it is difficult to prove 
additionality (i.e. that a project would not have happened without support) for renewables 
CDM projects because of the different revenue streams these projects receive. 
 Renewables have the largest expected sustainable development benefits and need the least 
incremental CER revenue to make them operational relative to other project types (Castro, 
2010; Green, 2008; Olsen & Fenhann, 2008). Most renewable projects, especially wind and 
hydroelectric (henceforth ‘hydro’)power plants are located in China and India (Risoe, 2011). 
These two countries make up more than half of all projects. Wara & Victor (2008, p. 13) 
argue that project developers proposing new hydro capacity in China have applied for CDM 
status. Thus, analysing whether these projects would have occurred also without CDM is 
important to safe-guard environmental integrity in terms of additionality. 
The revenue streams for renewables include cash flow from the sale of electricity and 
potential promotional subsidies. These are furthermore dependent on the availability and 
reliability of the respective energy source (e.g. wind, hydro, solar radiation).1 However, 
Alexeew et al. (2010) point to the trade-off between sustainable development and 
additionality, using a case study of 40 Indian CDM projects.2 Renewables might also be 
subject to technological barriers, such as the absence of a well-functioning grid. Thus, 
illustrating that a particular renewables project would not have happened without CDM 
support is challenging (Michaelowa, 2005). Furthermore, arguing that most large hydro 
plants require long-lead times and government involvement Haya & Parekh (2011) questions 
the additionality of these projects in China. However, if the institutional framework of the 
CDM is able to filter truly additional renewable energy projects, it can fulfil all three criteria 
                                                          
1
 The non-continuous availability of renewable energy sources is called intermittency. 
2
 See Section 3.4.2.2 in Chapter 3 for further detail. 
T 
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of sustainable development, cost-effectiveness and environmental integrity. 
The CDM has allowed the choice of either the barrier test or the investment analysis to 
demonstrate the additionality of renewables projects.3 The barrier test aims at 
demonstrating that the CDM support can overcome any financial or technological barriers 
that the proposed project faces. The investment analysis allows the investment comparison 
approach and the benchmark approach to be used. Within the investment analysis the 
benchmark approach has been the most frequently used test for renewables (Schneider, 
2009 p. 247). While previous research has focused on the possibilities to manipulate the 
benchmark, this chapter looks at how benchmark rates were chosen over time to better 
understand the incentives to set the benchmark rate. 
The benchmark test requires the project developer to show that the proposed project is not 
financially viable without CDM support. To demonstrate this, the project developer needs to 
calculate the internal rate of return of the project without CDM support (IRRno CDM) and 
compare it with a benchmark rate. To be deemed additional, the project needs to show that 
the benchmark rate is higher than the return without CDM support.4 Rational project 
developers calculate the profitability rate of the project without CER revenue and then select 
a benchmark rate that is above this rate to demonstrate additionality. 
Setting the benchmark rate thus has direct implications for the number of projects deemed 
additional. Greiner & Michaelowa (2003, p. 1012) write that the “[…]standard argument 
against the criteria is the difficulty in fixing the [benchmark] threshold values.” A high 
benchmark rate deems more projects additional, all else equal. Each individual activity faces 
project-specific and technology-specific risks so that in the ideal case the benchmark rate 
needs to account for these risks. The question then arises as to who should set the 
benchmark rate? Two options are allowed in the benchmark test according to guidance by 
the CDM regulator: Either the benchmark rate is set by the government or by the project 
developers. However, both actors might have an incentive to set benchmark rates 
strategically so as to maximise project inflow and to gain CDM support.  
If the government sets the benchmark rate, it has an incentive to set it high enough so as to 
maximise the number of projects supported by the CDM so as to maximise the wealth, 
monetary cash flow and power that comes along with these projects. Each project that is 
supported through the CDM does not need to be financed through expenditure from state 
budgets. Shrestha & Timilsina (2002) and Faure & Lefevere (2005, p. 168) point to this 
                                                          
3
 For an explanation of these additionality tests, see Chapter 2. 
4
 The project does not need to show that the project is more profitable with CDM support than with 
the benchmark rate. 
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moral hazard challenge. The authors claim that countries have an incentive to misrepresent 
their financial capacity to conduct emission reduction projects on their own. Determining 
misrepresentation in practice is difficult. To misrepresent the financial profitability of 
projects, governments have two possibilities: they can either set the benchmark rate high 
enough so as to show that projects would not happen, or they can alter the revenues of 
certain projects. For the latter possibility, He & Morse (2010) discuss a case of the decreasing 
Chinese support rate for wind projects, which triggered a rejection of proposed wind projects 
by the CDM regulator. The CDM-EB feared that the Chinese government deliberately lowers 
feed-in-tariffs so as to make wind projects viable under the CDM.  
If the project developer sets the benchmark rate, it has incentives to choose high rates to 
render its project additional. Schneider (2007) illustrates, based on a sample of 93 registered 
CDM projects, that 60% of projects have used company internal benchmarks to assess 
profitability. These rates are in general higher than average market rates. Michaelowa (2009) 
discusses the paradox for the project developer. To secure loans from banks or other lenders 
the project developer will want to show that the income streams from the project will be 
enough to pay back the loan and thus, represent the project as positive as possible (Pearson, 
2007).  
However, to receive CDM support the project developer needs to show the opposite, i.e. that 
the project is not viable on a stand-alone basis. Michaelowa (2009: p. 258) cites an example 
where this has happened with two Indian wind projects, which were the first projects to be 
rejected. In the annual reports, the project developer bragged that the rate of return is in 
excess of 28% and includes income tax shields, while in the CDM project documentation, the 
project was depicted as not financially viable. The author claims that many projects with the 
same characteristics, which have avoided bragging publicly, have achieved registration, 
partly because they omitted tax-benefits in their revenue calculations (Michaelowa & 
Purohit, 2007). This suggests that projects were able to game the benchmark, by 
misrepresenting an otherwise financially profitable projects as not financeable. 
When this gaming of the benchmark became apparent, the CDM-EB issued additional 
guidance on the investment analysis to be followed by project developers. This guidance 
restricted the use of company internal benchmark rates to cases where the project developer 
is the only actor that can implement the project (e.g. retrofitting or upgrading an old wind 
park) (Michaelowa, 2009; UNFCCC, 2008b). Furthermore, large renewable energy projects 
should use the investment analysis (e.g. benchmark or investment comparison test) to 
determine additionality, and should not use the barrier test (UNFCCC, 2008, Annex 10 para. 
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5).5 Small-scale projects can continue to use either one of both the barrier or the investment 
analysis test. The guidance of the CDM-EB is aimed at diminishing the subjectivity of the 
benchmark test, which requires a transparent identification of benchmark rates.  
The aim of this chapter is to assess the choice of benchmark rates over time in China and 
India and analyse whether and how the level and origin of benchmark rates changed over 
time. The chapter aims at answering the questions: “What data and information is available 
on benchmark rates used in the past to determine the additionality of renewables projects?” 
and “What can be concluded from the data available?” The focus of this chapter is on China 
and India since these are the two biggest host countries for CDM projects in general and for 
renewable energy projects in particular (UNEP Risoe, 2011). Comparing the approaches of 
these two countries in setting the benchmark rate yields several advantages. China imposes a 
government rate, while India leaves it to project developers to choose the benchmark rate. 
An analysis of how the level and origin of these rates between government, market, and risk-
adjusted or company rates differs is expected to provide insights into benchmark setting. The 
analysis does not detect non-additionality for the projects examined. It aims to provide an 
overview of the data which are readily available and of open questions arising from the 
analysis. 
To answer this research question the chapter proceeds as follows: the section 2 following the 
introduction is split into three sub-sections. First, it provides an overview of CDM projects 
registered by November 2011 and of the use of the benchmark test by these projects. Second, 
it reviews the benchmark approach and the key parameters used to determine additionality. 
Third, it describes the responsibilities of auditing firms with regards to the benchmark rate. 
Section 3 provides the methodology and the data sources used to examine benchmark rates. 
Section 4 presents the results of the analysis and is split in two sub-sections. The first 
provides an overview of the sample used in the analysis and the second sub-section 
illustrates the findings of the analysis. Section 5 discusses the results and limitations of the 
analysis, and section 6 concludes. 
4.1 Why are renewables and the benchmark approach important? 
4.1.1 Overview of CDM projects and the use of the benchmark approach 
The benchmark test has replaced the barrier test as the predominant method to determine 
additionality. Figure 4.1 illustrates the number of registered CDM projects and their use of 
                                                          
5
 Large scale renewable projects are denoted by their use of the baseline methodology ACM2 
“Consolidated baseline methodology for grid-connected electricity generation from renewable 
sources”. Small scale-projects are denotes by their use of baseline methodology AMS-I.D. “Grid 
connected renewable electricity generation” (UNFCCC, 2011c). 
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different additionality tests over time by date of registration. The benchmark test, the 
investment comparison and the simple cost analysis all belong to the investment analysis 
test.6 The barrier test is the alternative to the investment analysis test. Highlighted in blue 
are the most frequently applied approaches, the barrier test and the benchmark test.7 The 
barrier test was prominent from the beginning of the CDM, however following reports of 
gaming (e.g. (Michaelowa & Purohit, 2007; L. Schneider, 2007) and more generally the 
literature review in Chapter 3), the executive board has made criteria stricter. The executive 
board issued guidance on both the barrier and the benchmark test in 2008 (UNFCCC, 
2008b; Michaelowa, 2009). The application of the benchmark test increases significantly 
thereafter. Thus, the application of this approach merits further attention.  
Figure 4.1 Number of registered projects and additionality tests over time 
 
Source: IGES, 2011; author calculations 
The benchmark approach is mainly applied by wind and hydro projects. Figure 4.2 shows 
that of the 2,296 projects registered by November 2011 and applying the benchmark 
test(Schedule A), more than half of the projects fall into the project types wind and hydro 
(Schedule B).These project types have been identified in chapter 3, applying criteria 
identified by earlier research, to exhibit high sustainability benefits and high cost-
effectiveness.  
 
                                                          
6
 See Chapter 2 – Section 2.3 for details. 
7
 The simple cost analysis is primarily used for industrial gas projects, and the investment comparison 
has mainly been used by methane avoidance and biomass energy projects. In total, thirteen wind and 
eleven hydro projects have applied the investment comparison approach. Of these five projects were 
conducted in India (4 Wind and 1 Hydro) and one Wind project was conducted in China. These 
projects are not subject of the analysis in this chapter. 
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Figure 4.2 Overview of application by benchmark test by different project types  
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
However, projects applying the benchmark test have been rejected more often relative to 
others. By November 2011, in total 206 CDM projects were rejected by the executive board. 
However, as Figure 4.3 shows, of all projects submitted for registration under the benchmark 
test, 95% of projects (red) have been registered.  
At the beginning of November 2011 both the number of rejected projects (blue) and the 
corresponding CER volume of these projects (green) are about 5%, which means, still 95% of 
all projects with a benchmark test have been registered by November 2011. Projects rejected 
before September 2010 where on average smaller than their registered counterparts as 
shown by the difference between the number of projects rejected and the corresponding CER 
volume. That suggests that when the CDM-EB and its panels rejected a project before 
September 2010, it was likely to be a small project. Flues, Michaelowa, & Michaelowa (2009) 
point to the political interests of board members, who were sometimes reluctant or unwilling 
to reject large scale-projects if these projects were situated of the board members origin.  
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Figure 4.3 Registration (red) and Rejection (blue) rates of benchmark test project (rejected 
CER volume in green) 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
This section provided an overview over the use of the benchmark test for projects registered 
by November 2011. The application of the benchmark test has increased over time, and has 
replaced the barrier test as the predominant means to prove additionality. The largest 
project types that apply the benchmark test are hydro and wind. Combined with their low 
additional incremental costs necessary to make them competitive with fossil-fuel based 
alternatives, wind and hydro projects are an important project category that can pave the 
way towards a long-term decarbonisation of the electricity sector. Thus, these project types 
merit further attention and are the focus of the analysis in following sections. 
4.1.2 Benchmark approach and key parameters 
The previous section examined the application of the benchmark test in practice and over 
time. This section describes the parameters applied in the benchmark test. Project 
developers use the benchmark approach to demonstrate additionality by showing that the 
financial returns of the proposed CDM project activity are insufficient to justify the required 
investment. That means that the proposed project is not financially attractive when 
compared to a benchmark return on investment (ROI).8 This benchmark rate of return is 
usually a national or sectoral profitability rate achieved by similar projects. The benchmark 
test does not require that the project reaches the benchmark rate with the extra CDM 
                                                          
8
 These rates vary between and within an industry. A coal-fired power plant has a different risk-return 
profile than an industrial cement plant. One potential reason is that the cement plant is subject to 
global competition all else equal. However, also different cement plants might exhibit different risks, 
depending on their access to and cost of transportation. 
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revenue, the project’s profitability should only be below the benchmark rate without CDM 
support. 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the functioning of the benchmark test. Readers familiar with the 
benchmark text can skip to section 4.1.3.9 The figure shows several projects A to L and their 
profitability in terms of return on investment (ROI) without and with the extra revenue (in 
grey) from CERs. For a firm to conduct a project, the ROI of a project needs to be above a 
minimum threshold ROImin, the benchmark rate. In Figure 4.4, the ROI of projects A to D is 
already equal or above ROImin. These projects are financially viable without CDM support 
and will not be registered under the CDM. The CDM revenue provided to projects E to H 
pushes these projects beyond the ROImin threshold. These projects would not happen without 
the CDM because they do not reach the benchmark ROI. These projects are thus additional. 
Projects I to L are not financially viable even with CDM support. The incremental ROI from 
the CDM is still not enough to reach the ROImin. While these projects would in theory not be 
implemented, in practice the benchmark test does not require that the project reaches the 
ROImin benchmark threshold. Thus, the benchmark test would render all projects from D to L 
additional.10 
Figure 4.4 Benchmark approach to determine additionality 
 
Source: Rentz (1998) 
                                                          
9
 The effect of the benchmark rate on additionality has been illustrated in Chapter 2, but is reviewed 
here for convenience. 
10
 There is thus an incentive for both project developers and host countries to choose a high 
benchmark rate so as to render more projects additional. Chapter 4 assesses the importance of 
benchmark parameters applied for registered Chinese and Indian CDM projects that have supported 
wind parks and hydroelectric power plants. 
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By choosing a higher benchmark, more projects become additional according to the 
benchmark test. While Rentz (1998) has assumed that only projects E to H are deemed 
additional, the benchmark test would render all projects E to L as additional. Projects 
without CER revenue need to be below the benchmark to be additional. If the benchmark 
(ROImin) is increased also projects to the left of project E become additional. Thus, the choice 
of benchmark rates matters for additionality determination. 
4.1.3 Net present value and the internal rate of return 
To calculate the profitability of a project the project developer discounts all revenues and 
costs expected from the proposed project. The discount rate that makes the net present value 
(NPV) equal to zero is called the internal rate of return (Brealey & Myers, 2003). Equation 1 
shows the NPV formula and the various parameters needed to calculate the IRR. To pass the 
benchmark test, the project developer has to show that the IRR without CDM support is 
below the benchmark rate b. According to guidance for additionality determination, the 
benchmark rate should be based on government or market rates (UNFCCC, 2008).  
Equation 1 Net present value and internal rate of return
11
 
   (1) 
Rule: Project is additional if IRRnoCDM< b 
Where:  
I  =  Initial investment 
R   =  Revenue (Cash flow from sale of electricity, subsidies) 
C  =  Costs (Operation, Maintenance, Depreciation, Debt) 
IRRno CDM = Internal rate of return without CDM (NPV = 0) 
b  = Benchmark rate 
t  =  Time of project duration 
Each of the parameters in Equation 1 determines the IRR. The initial investment (I) is for 
instance the cost to build a new renewables site (e.g. buying and installing wind turbines) or 
the cost to retrofit an existing site. This investment is usually made at the beginning of the 
project. The revenue (R) includes all positive cash flows that the renewable project receives, 
                                                          
11
 The description of the net present value calculation is based on simplified assumptions. In practice 
many variables such as different return rates for debt and equity holders enter the calculation. These 
rates are usually used to calculate a weighted cost of capital (WACC), where the debt and equity rates 
are weighted by the respective shares of debt and equity. The capacity to receive favourable debt and 
equity rates depends on the risk of the underlying activity to be undertaken (Brealey& Myers, 2003). 
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for instance from the sale of electricity for the time interval t, the duration of the project. If 
the project receives any subsidies or a feed-in-tariff that grants any additional income from 
the sale of renewable electricity, this should be accounted under revenues. On the cost side 
(C), the project developer needs to expense the operation and maintenance cost of the 
project. Furthermore, taxes and the costs of servicing the debt should be accounted for. Any 
tax benefits that the project faces, should be accounted by reducing costs. The IRR is then 
calculated by setting the NPV equal to zero.  
The parameters described above are not always easily quantifiable in practice. For instance, 
revenues for the sale of electricity depend on the availability of for example wind and the 
efficiency of the turbines. Thus, revenues are likely to fluctuate over time and are difficult to 
predict. Costs are dependent of the projects access to the grid. Where a wind park operated 
by a utility, costs are likely to be different than for an independent power producer that 
produces electricity for its own use and sells the remainder to the grid. Large projects are 
likely to be able to diversify their risks better than small-scale projects. The IRR will vary 
depending on the level and certainty of investment, costs and revenues. 
In comparison to the parameters just described, the benchmark rate is chosen either by the 
government or supposed to be set by project developer according to market rates (UNFCCC, 
2008). As experience with a technology increases, risks, revenues and costs get more 
predictable (Junginger, Faaij, & Turkenburg, 2005), project developers are able to assess 
better what rate of return can be expected from a particular project. The project developer 
will communicate this rate to its debt (e.g. a bank) or equity-holders (e.g. shareholders) and 
thus promise a certain rate of return. The average market rate promised to these 
stakeholders is the rate which the CDM guidance expects as a benchmark rates. Government 
rates are sometimes offered by some host country governments, e.g. China. Where project 
developers can show that government rates are used in the profitability calculation, these 
rates should be used. The next section determines the method and data needs to analyse the 
choice made by project developers for benchmark rates. 
4.1.4 Responsibilities of auditing firms with respect to the benchmark 
Following criticism on the benchmark test in the literature (Chapter 3), the executive board 
has established a validation and verification manual to be applied by DOEs that validate the 
accuracy of the information by project developers.12 With regard to the investment analysis 
(e.g. benchmark test), the project documentation has to justify that the project is not “the 
most economically or financially attractive alternative” or the “economically or financially 
feasible, without the revenue from the sale of certified emission reductions.” Specific to the 
                                                          
12
DOEs enter the project cycle at Step 3 (Validation). See Chapter 2 for details. 
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benchmark test, project participants can show that the “financial returns of the proposed 
CDM project activity would be insufficient to justify the required investment.” (UNFCCC, 
2008a, sec. Annex 3 para 107). 
The main responsibilities of validators in terms of the evaluation of the benchmark test are 
to check all the parameters and assumptions behind the financial indicator (i.e. IRR) and the 
benchmark rate (UNFCCC, 2011-EB55). The DOE shall cross-check the parameters used in 
the benchmark test using third-party publicly available sources, including invoices and price 
indices, as well as feasibility reports, public announcements and annual financial reports 
related to the proposed CDM project activity and the project participants. The DOE shall, 
furthermore assess the correctness of calculations and assess whether the sensitivity analysis 
conducted by project participants is credible. 
With regard to the benchmark, the DOE shall determine that the chosen benchmark is 
suitable, and “ensure” that risk premiums that are applied also reflect project related risks. 
In addition, the DOE shall “determine” whether no investment would be made at a rate of 
return lower than the benchmark. This can be done by analysing previous investment 
decisions. The guidance on the investment analysis mandates that where an entity other than 
the project participant could develop the project, the benchmark should be based on publicly 
available data sources. This regulation aims at isolating the unwillingness of one investor to 
assume the associated project risks from the justification of additionality, because the 
unwillingness might be based on the subjective profit expectations (UNFCCC, 2008, Annex 
35 para 11). 
The three sub-sections above have illustrated the importance of the benchmark test in 
practice, the key parameters, and the responsibility of validators to check claims in the 
benchmark test by project developers. The benchmark rate has been identified as a crucial 
component of the benchmark calculation (section 4.2.2). The next section describes the 
methods to analyse the choice of benchmark rates over time. 
4.2 Methods and Data 
To answer the research question regarding how benchmark rates were chosen, this chapter 
divides benchmark rate between the following criteria: 
- Source of benchmark rate (government, sector etc) 
- Level of benchmark (in percent) 
- Project type (hydro or wind) 
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- Location of the project (China or India) 
- Project size (small or large) 
These criteria are used to assess the use of a benchmark over time. It is expected that the 
number of sources of the benchmark rate used decreases with time as the CDM regulator has 
made guidance more stringent. The level of the benchmark is also expected to decrease over 
time due to the same reason. These findings do not necessarily mean that projects that have 
used a higher benchmark have been non-additional, or that conversely projects with a lower 
benchmark are additional. As the discussion in section 4.2.3 shows, benchmarks vary with 
risk and potentially also with project size. Thus, the analysis also aims at showing the level 
and sources of benchmark rates for small versus large-scale projects. According to the 
guidance issued in 2008 by the CDM executive board, large-scale projects should only need 
to conduct the investment analysis. This implies that small-scale projects can still use the 
barrier test. Finally, the benchmark rates are expected to vary with project type and host 
country. 
The data used for this analysis are publicly available in the IGES CDM Database (henceforth: 
IGES), which is updated monthly. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the data parameters 
used in the analysis. The sample chosen aims at including the main renewable technologies 
that apply the benchmark test. From the data in the IGES database a sample will be drawn 
on the basis of data availability for the benchmark rate and source of the benchmark. The 
sample will be discussed in the following results section. 
Table 4.1 Data requirements 
Data IGES Database 
Status of projects Registered, Rejected, 
Withdrawn 
Project type and size Biomass, Industrial Gas, 
Methane, Renewables 
Benchmark rate in per cent 
Benchmark source Government, sectoral or 
and risk premium rate 
Registration date by month 
Start comment date by month 
Host country   
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4.3 Results 
This section provides a brief overview of the sample used in the analysis and the findings. 
4.3.1 Sample overview 
In total, there are 3,556 CDM projects registered by November 2011. Of these IGES provides 
benchmark data for 1,216 projects registered by September 2010. As  Figure 4.5  illustrates, 
over 70% of the projects registered by September 2010 are either hydro or wind projects, 
with hydro capturing the larger share (43%). These two technologies are mainly 
implemented in two host countries, China and India, as the right pie chart indicates. Other 
countries make up a significantly lower share for these projects. Thus the analysis will focus 
on hydro and wind projects conducted in China and India to avoid the influence of single 
outliers.  
Figure 4.5 Registered projects using benchmark test  
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
Within the two selected host countries, the distribution of projects varies significantly 
between project size and technologies. Table 4.2 shows that China and India have 
implemented both large-scale and small-scale projects. Most projects in China are large for 
both hydro and wind projects. Over 200 projects are conducted for both of these 
technologies. Still China also hosts a considerable number of small hydro projects (188), 
while small wind projects seem side-lined as only five projects are conducted in this 
category. India in general hosts less projects than China, and most of these projects are wind 
power projects with a focus on small scale projects. For instance, the largest project category 
in India is small-scale wind with 59 projects, followed in number by large wind projects 
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(29).13 Summarising, most renewable CDM projects occur in China, while only small wind 
power projects are more numerous in India. The analysis in the following section examines 
both small and large project types with a focus on wind projects, where Indian data is 
relatively more numerous compared to hydro projects. 
Table 4.2 Number of registered projects (Sept. 2010) 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
4.3.2 Findings 
The projects in Table 4.2 use benchmarks from different origins to demonstrate 
additionality. Table 4.3 illustrates that despite the larger number of projects in China, the 
number of benchmarks is considerably lower. China has issued official government 
benchmark rates, either the government code or the “power industry sector's benchmark,” 
which project developers can use.14Most all of these benchmarks precede both the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005.15The number of benchmarks in India is 
considerably larger. Alone for large scale wind projects, Indian project developers have 
applied 18 different benchmark sources. Most projects use a weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) rate, where debt and equity costs are weighted with their respective share.16This is 
true for all Indian projects, but for large wind projects, which have applied the return on 
equity more often.17 Thus, Table 4.3 suggests that benchmark sources in China are 
exclusively based on government figures, while in India project developers have enjoyed 
considerable leeway to choose from a range of sources. 
 
 
                                                          
13
 China has an estimated potential of 675 GW of hydroelectricity. (Crompton & Wu, 2005) India has 
an estimated potential of 150 GW of which 20% was exploited in 2009 (Madan, 2009). 
14
 One large hydro project, applies a rate calculated through a feasibility study, but the rate is also 
equal to the power industry sector's benchmark. Two large Chinese hydro projects and one large wind 
project have not specified the benchmark origin. This explains the total number of benchmark sources 
for Chinese projects in Figure 4.3. 
15
 Only thirteen projects use a benchmark issued in the year 2006. 
16
 Appendix 1 to this chapter provides a detailed table on the different benchmark sources applied. 
17
 See Appendix 1. 
small large small large
China 188 243 5 233
India 18 11 54 29
Total 206 254 59 262
Hydro Power Wind Power
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Table 4.3 Number of benchmark sources used 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
Table 4.4 presents the average levels of the different benchmark rates used. The aim is to 
show how levels vary between project types, project size, and project location. The table 
presents the benchmark rates in percentage terms. This profitability rate is expected by the 
project developer to be achieved on an annual basis. First, it is interesting to note that in 
general average benchmark rates are lower in China than in India. Thus, the rate chosen by 
the Chinese government is smaller than the rate chosen by Indian project developers. 
Second, it is interesting to note that while Indian project developers have freely chosen the 
benchmark rate, the average benchmark rate is similar for both hydro and wind projects 
across project sizes. All Indian projects use on average a benchmark rate of around 14%. 
Third, the variability of benchmark rates is much higher in India than in China indicated by 
the higher standard deviations (in brackets in Table 4.4). In summary, Table 4.4 suggests 
that Indian projects have applied on average higher benchmark rates, and that rates varied 
more in levels than for Chinese projects. 
Table 4.4 Average benchmark level (standard deviation in brackets) 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
Figure 4.6 shows the development of benchmark rates in the wind sector over time.18 The 
figure illustrates the level of benchmark rates in China (blue) and in India (red), as they have 
been mentioned in the project documentation. The date on the x-axis is the date of 
submission for comments.19 Schedule A shows the development for small wind projects and 
schedule B for large wind projects. Due to the fixed Chinese government rate, the benchmark 
rate for Chinese wind projects, both small and large, is constant over time, except of two 
                                                          
18
The wind sector is chosen here for illustration because it offers the best data availability (Table 4.2). 
The figure for the hydro sector (not shown here) indicates a similar development as Figure 4.6. 
However, it is based on much less data observations.  
19
 This is described as Step 3 (Validation) of the project cycle in Chapter 2. 
small large small large
China 2 4 1 3
India 8 4 18 14
Total 10 8 19 17
Hydro Power Wind Power
small large small large
China 9,9% (0,4%) 9% (1,0%) 8% (0%) 8% (0,2%)
India 14,1% (2,9%) 14,7% (2,3%) 14% (1,9%) 14,3% (1,8%)
Hydro Power Wind Power
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outliers, which have a higher benchmark rate of 10%.20The situation in India is different. 
Benchmark rates applied vary in level and have declined over time as the trendline in 
Schedule A and B suggests. This trendline has to be taken with caution, as the number of 
observations, and the influence of large differences in benchmark values can have a strong 
influence on the trend. However, Figure 4.6 confirms and expands the findings of Table 4.4. 
Benchmark rates in India have been consistently and without exception higher than rates 
used in China. Furthermore, while there is some evidence of the decline in benchmark rates 
over time, this is based on only few observations. 
Figure 4.6 Development of benchmark rates over time for wind projects in China and India 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
4.3.3 Discussion 
This chapter set out to contribute to an understanding of the evolution of benchmark rates 
over time. The findings in this chapter fulfil this aim to some extent. The data examined 
illustrates that there is a general difference between the benchmark rate setting in China 
relative to India. Chinese project developers apply a government rate, while Indian project 
developers can choose market or sectoral rates. This leads to a high variability between the 
benchmark rates for projects conducted in India. The analysis furthermore finds, through 
the example of small and large wind projects, that benchmark rates have fluctuated over time 
and exhibit a decreasing trend. This could suggest that guidance by the executive board, 
which increased the demand on benchmark rate setting and auditing of rates, was successful 
in reducing the subjectivity of the benchmark rate setting.  
                                                          
20
 These two wind projects are registered under the name “Liaoning Zhangwu 24.65 megawatt Wind 
Farm Project” and have the registration numbers 537 and 539 with the CDM executive board, 
respectively (IGES, 2010).  
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However, this result needs to be taken with caution as the findings in Figure 4.6 are based on 
a small number of observations. Even if changes in benchmark rates can be observed and 
proven this could have at least three alternative explanations which take into account the 
riskiness of projects and information costs. First, it could be that learning curves for wind 
technology drive down the risk of the technology and thus lower benchmark rates are 
naturally required. Second, an increase in benchmark rates could be a signal that all low-risk 
wind capacity suitable for CDM status is already registered and that future wind CDM 
projects require higher benchmark rates as they are located in locations with less wind 
availability. Third, it could be an indication that the guidance by the executive board is too 
stringent and weeds out actual additional projects due to the increase in information costs. 
While the first two explanations are subject to market developments, the third would lead to 
an adverse selection of non-additional projects. The information needs and costs for auditing 
firms and the regulator to verify information necessary for the benchmark test are increasing 
with the new guidance and might become too onerous for some project developers to invest 
in the CDM registration process. Unfortunately, projects that are profitable without the CDM 
can bear these costs better, as giving up part of the profitability due to information and 
transaction costs might be outweighed by the potential benefit of receiving CDM support. 
Additional projects which, by definition are not financially viable without support, will not 
apply for registration if information costs are too high. The adverse selection result of too 
stringent a regulation has been discussed in the framework of transaction costs (Michaelowa 
&Jotzo, 2005). It however still remains a difficult challenge for the regulator.  
The chapter however draws on an additional question, namely whether a fixed benchmark 
does solve the moral hazard problems of the benchmark test. While the findings of the 
chapter cannot answer this question, they can guide future analysis. Taking the example of 
the Chinese government benchmark rate, the question is whether it precludes gaming by the 
government, as the government can set the benchmark strategically so as to render more 
projects additional (Faure &Lefevere, 2005; Shrestha&Timilsina, 2002).  
Equation 1 and Figure 4.6 illustrate the dilemma of the benchmark test. The question that 
arises from this analysis is, why should a government choose a benchmark rate that makes a 
large share of its nations’ projects non-additional? Proving that governments have 
strategically set benchmark rates to make projects additional is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Furthermore, most benchmark rates set by the Chinese government precede the 
CDM and Kyoto Protocol, which make strategic benchmark setting unlikely. However, the 
Chinese wind support example by He & Morse (2010) indicates the difficulties for 
governments in designing national policy without losing CDM revenue. So while the 
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benchmark rate is fixed in China, other support mechanisms’ rates, such as a feed-in-tariff, 
are not, and thus can alter the additionality determination of a project. Further research is 
needed to analyse the strategic interaction between national policy and domestic policy so as 
to maximise the benefits of national and international climate cooperation. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter has provided an account of benchmark rate setting in India and 
China for wind and hydro projects. The literature suggests that the determination of 
investment additionality and specifically the setting of the benchmark rates is complex. The 
analysis in this chapter has shown that the benchmark rate varies greatly between the two 
countries examined. Still China, with a lower benchmark rates has managed to register 
substantially more projects. The question however arises as to whether, even if the level of 
the benchmark is fixed, other parameters in the benchmark test are subject to estimations by 
project developers and thus potentially prone to gaming. The findings of this chapter confirm 
the earlier results in the literature that benchmark setting is an important issue, as well as 
drawing tentative conclusions for future research. The setting of the benchmark by 
governments instead of project developers can have potential strategic interactions with 
domestic energy and climate policy. If this is the case, the CDM does actually increase global 
emissions and hinders a transition to a low-carbon economy in developing countries. The 
findings of this chapter can serve as a starting point for further examination of this 
important issue.  
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Appendix 1 Benchmark sources used 
Table A 4.1 Benchmark sources and number of applications for Chinese projects 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Small Large Small Large
Power industry 
sector's benchmark (5)
Power industry 
sector's benchmark 
(220)
Government code (182) Government code (134)
Government code (11) Power industry 
sector's benchmark (6)
Power industry 
sector's benchmark 
(106)
NA (2) NA (2)
Feasibility study report 
(1)
China
Hydro Wind
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Table A 4.2 Benchmark sources and number of applications for Indian projects 
 
Source: IGES, 2010; author calculations 
 
Small Large Small Large
Weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) (16)
Return on equity (ROE) 
(5)
Weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) (10)
Weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) (7)
Return on Equity (RoE) 
(8)
Weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) (4)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR) (2)
Prime lending rate for 
public sector bank (2)
Required rate of return 
(RRR) (7)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR)  (3)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR) + Risk premium 
(1)
Government bond rate 
+ Risk premium (1)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR) (3)
Internal hurdle rate (2) Prime lending rate 
(PLR)  (1)
Government bond 
rate?Country risk 
premium (1)
IPP industry Hurdle 
rate (3)
Required rate of return 
(RRR) (2)
Government bond rate 
+ Risk premium (1)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR)  (2)
Confirmation letter (2) Required rate of return 
(RRR) (1)
Required return of 
equity (RoE) (2)
Return of Equity in IPP 
(2)
Commercial lending 
rate (1)
Interest rate (2) IPP industry Hurdle 
rate (2)
Cost of debt (1)
Internal hurdle rate (2) Power industry 
sector's benchmark (2)
Required return on 
equity (RoE) (1)
Prime lending rate 
(PLR) (1)
Cost of equity (1) Commercial local 
lending rate (1)
Commercial local 
lending rate (1)
Government bond rate 
+ Risk premium (1)
Government bond rate 
+ Risk premium (1)
Cost of equity (1)
Lending rate (1) Lending rate + risk 
premium (1)
Commercial lending 
rate (1)
Interest rate + inflation 
rate (1)
NA (1)
Power industry 
sector's benchmark (1)
Hydro
India
Wind
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5. CERTIFIED EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS AND CDM LIMITS IN THE 
DEMAND MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME  
he EU has agreed to cut its GHG emissions by 20% by the year 2020 relative to 
1990 emissions.1 Part of the emissions reductions can be achieved outside the EU 
in developing countries. In its efforts to reduce emissions, the EU distinguishes 
between the emissions trading sector and those sectors not covered by the EU emissions 
trading scheme (see section 1.1). In the period 2008-2012, installations are freely allocated 
EU Allowances (an allocation mechanism known as ‘grandfathering’). In addition, to cover 
their emissions each installation can use, subject to a country-specific limit, CERs generated 
through the Clean Development Mechanism in developing countries.2 If an installation has 
emissions of 100 emission units, it can use as many EUAs as it wants, but only a limited 
amount of CERs to cover these 100 units. This country-specific limit of CERs is currently 
expressed as a percentage of freely allocated EUAs to the relevant installation and is 
differentiated between EU Member States, with limits ranging from 0% in Estonia to 22% in 
Germany.3 Thus, installations in Germany can use more CERs than installations from the 
same sector in Estonia.  
These limits have been and continue to be the basis for heated debate within the EU. A 
higher limit, ceteris paribus, suggests that EU ETS installations could use more of the 
relatively cheap abatement options in developing countries, thus enabling them to achieve 
their compliance target at a lower cost.  
CDM limits are differentiated between EU Member States in order to cater to the varying 
levels of emissions reduction ambitions, the progress made when the limits were established, 
and the ability each Member State to reduce their emissions. The financial transfers created, 
however, are potentially substantial and in 2008 the EUA-CER arbitrage rents reached about 
€250 million. 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is a slightly reworked version of an article recently published in Climate Policy (Vasa, 
2011). 
2
 Flues (2010) assesses the political economy of CER limits and finds that while CER import limits 
increase with the sector’s emissions, government valuation of lobby contributions and voter’s budgets 
decrease with the voter’s valuation of consumption over environmental integrity and abatement costs. 
3
 The limit on the use of CERs is imposed to fulfil the supplementarity condition of the Kyoto Protocol. 
The supplementarity condition is a normative concept that states that CERs should only be used to 
achieve only part of the overall mitigation effort (UNFCCC, 1997, Article 12) and is designed to ensure 
that significant abatement occurs within the EU, while emitters can profit in a limited way from the 
cost-reducing nature of cheaper CDM credits. The EU implemented the supplementarity condition 
under Directive 2004/101/EC (European Parliament and the Council of the EU, 2004). Woerdman 
(2004) explains that the EU committed to supplementarity partially due to equity concerns. 
T 
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The current rule potentially leads to a distortion of the internal market, when emitters that 
compete in the same market are treated differently in different EU member states. From a 
legal and economic perspective, interference in the market is only warranted if the market 
cannot solve the issue by itself, and the interference substantially improves the situation.4  
Specifically, the decision parameters for an implementation of the CDM limit and the 
efficiency gains expected are analysed. The gap in the literature on this issue is surprising 
since, as mentioned above regarding the free allocation of allowances, large rents conferred 
to emitters have encouraged rent-seeking behaviour Hepburn et al. (2006). Zhang (2001) 
and Tol (2009) confirm that rents are created by CDM usage limits. Tol (2009) draws 
attention to the literature gap regarding the allocation of the usage limit to emitters in non-
ETS sectors.5 Also, De Cendra de Larragán (2006) points to the allocation of rent established 
through the right to use offsets, as does Gorecki et al. (2010) for the non-ETS sector. 
This article attempts to fill the gap in the literature on the interaction of offset mechanisms 
with ETSs and potential options in the implementation of limits to the CDM, on the 
compliance side, are analysed. This article extends the analysis of Gorecki et al. (2010) to the 
EU ETS sector, and focuses on the existing rules in Phase II to illustrate current challenges. 
The following questions regarding the CDM limit allocation for the period 2008-2012 are 
addressed: 
§ What are the effects of a CDM limit? 
§ Which options exist to implement CDM limits? 
§ How has the CDM been used in the EU ETS? 
§ What is the value of rents created through the CDM? 
Three options for the allocation of this rent, which arises from reducing compliance costs 
through the CDM, are assessed: 1) the status quo, 2) establishment and allocation of CDM 
usage rights and 3) the pre-commitment option. In the first case of status quo, the right to 
use CERs is freely allocated, proportional to the allocation of allowances. Alternatively the 
limit can be allocated proportional to the verified emissions of an installation. Trading of the 
                                                          
4
 It could be argued that the supplementarity criterion, the limit on the use of CERs, is the cause for 
the inefficiencies. However, the supplementarity condition has been aimed at maintaining significant 
domestic effort and the supplementarity criterion ‘does not significantly decrease the economic 
benefits from project-based crediting, as the respective thresholds of CDM imports are generally not 
yet reached under unlimited CDM access’ (Anger, 2008: 2046).  
5
For an analysis of the impact of the use of CERs in the non-ETS sector, see Neuhoff and Vasa (2010). 
The use of CERs in the non-ETS sector has to take into account the supplementarity criterion and the 
use of CERs in the ETS sector. Thus, it is not explicitly limited to the period 2008-2012. 
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right to use CERs is not allowed under these options. Secondly, the right to use CDM credits 
can be established as a property right and be auctioned or freely allocated (grandfathered), 
and subsequently traded between EU ETS participants. A third option is for the EU to sell 
allowances for the same amount of the aggregate CDM limit granted, and then subsequently 
buy the amount in the CDM market.  
It is found that making the right to use CERs tradable or pre-committing the regulator to 
buying CERs at the level of the relevant limit reduces the inefficiencies connected to the 
current regulation. Auctioning CER usage rights and pre-committing furthermore shift the 
rents created through the CER-EUA spread to the relevant Member State itself and thus can 
potentially enhance mitigation efforts.  
Some background on the legal foundations of the allowed use of the CDM within the EU ETS 
is presented in Section 2, and it is shown in Section 3 how access to CERs affects abatement 
and compliance decisions. In Section 4 data on the surrendered CERs in the EU ETS for 
2008 are analysed. In Section 5 three options on how to give access to the CER limit to 
participants in the EU ETS are discussed, while a conclusion is offered in Section 6. 
5.1 Background: legal foundations of the CDM in the EU ETS 
5.1.1 EU Kyoto targets and compliance options 
The EU is bound by its own Council Decision 2002/358/EC to reach its emissions reduction 
goal jointly under the ‘Bubble’ mechanism.6 If the EU fails to deliver the agreed joint 
emissions reductions, each EU Member State is responsible for its own target (CEC, 2002).  
In order to achieve the emissions reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU’s 
Energy and Climate Package (also known as ‘the 20-20-20 targets’) cost-effectively7, the EU 
divides emitters into two categories: those covered by the EU ETS and those that are not 
                                                          
6
  Article 4 (sometimes called the `bubble mechanism´) of the Kyoto Protocol allows parties to 
fulfil their commitments jointly, where emission reduction targets of individual parties can be 
differentiated, but in sum are equal to an overall (e.g. European Union) commitment. If the EU, which 
applies Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol, does not reach its reduction target, compliance is evaluated 
according to individual party commitments (UNFCCC, 1997). 
7
  The Energy and Climate Package is an integrated approach to climate and energy policy 
endorsed in March 2007. The `20-20-20 targets’ refer to three separate targets to be attained by 
2020: a) the reduction of EU GHG emissions of at least 20% below 1990 levels, b) covering 20% of EU 
energy consumption with renewables, and c) reducing primary energy use by 20% (through increased 
energy efficiency) compared with projected levels. 
The packages comprises four core components: the revision of the EU ETS, the effort sharing decision 
for non-ETS sectors, binding national renewable energy targets and a legal framework for Carbon 
Capture and Storage (http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm).  
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(non-EU ETS sectors).8 The EU ETS and its rules for the period 2005-2020 are established 
through the ‘ETS’ Directive 2003/87/EC (Council of the European Union & European 
Parliament, 2003) and the ‘Linking’ Directive 2004/101/EC (Council of the European Union 
& European Parliament, 2004).9 The EU ETS Directive sets up a cap-and-trade system, 
which runs in three distinct phases: Phase I from 2005 to 2007, Phase II from 2008 to2012 
(the Kyoto commitment period), and Phase III from 2013 to 2020.10  
For compliance purposes, installations in the EU ETS can use EUAs, and CERs, which are 
subject to country-specific limits. The use of offset credits within the EU ETS sector lowers 
an installation’s average compliance costs and is thus likely to be a critical decision element 
for individual emitters. The chapter focuses on the EU ETS sector in Phase II.11  
5.1.2 Establishment of Phase II CER limits 
In Phase II, the allocation of EUAs and the CER limit itself are set through individual 
Member State National Allocation Plans (NAPs). The sum of these constitutes the total cap 
in the EU. According to the Linking Directive, the National Allocation Plans need to specify 
the maximum annual amount of project-based (JI and CDM) credits which may be used by 
operators as a percentage of allocation of the allowances to each installation (Council of the 
European Union & European Parliament, 2003, 2004).  
The main reason for differentiated CDM limits are different emission reduction targets by 
each Member State. The Linking Directive implements the supplementarity criterion of the 
Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997: Article 12). While the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh 
Accords do not define supplementarity, according to the Linking Directive, at most half of 
the abatement effort can be conducted through CDM and JI (Council of the European Union 
& European Parliament, 2004; UNFCCC, 1997a, 2005a).12  
                                                          
8
The economic impact of the separation of emissions reduction targets into a trading and non-trading 
sector is covered in Böhringer, Koschel, & Moslener (2008), Kallbekken (2005), and Michaelowa & 
Betz (2001).  
9
 According to the revised EU ETS Directive 2009/29/EC (European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU, 2009a), the emissions cap beyond the year 2020 decreases with a linear factor of 1.74% of 
mid-2010 emissions per year (Article 9). The linear factor is subject to revision by 2025. 
10
 The rules governing these phases differ, so that for instance the banking of EU allowances is not 
allowed between Phases I and II; auctioning is mandatory in Phase III for power installations; and 
energy-intensive industry emitters are exempt from auctioning subject to benchmarks, when they are 
found at risk of carbon leakage (European Parliament and the Council of the EU, 2003, Article 10a). 
The list of sectors exempt from auctioning and subject to free benchmark allocations can be found in 
Official Journal of the European, (2010). 
11
In the non-ETS Sector, the government has a mandate to buy CERs. Gorecki et al. (2010) and Tol 
(2009) assess the use of the CDM within the non-ETS market and reach similar conclusions to those 
presented in this article regarding the EU ETS. 
12 The text of the Marrakesh Accords was finished at the seventh Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC in 2001, but only entered into force in 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol was ratified.  
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A more stringent emission reduction target leads to a higher allowed volume of project 
credits. If for instance country A has agreed to reduce emissions to a level YA from level X. 
The difference between these two levels is the reduction RA. According to the 
supplementarity criteria (“half of the effort through project credits”), this country can use 
project credits to achieve RA/2 of the whole reduction target RA. The percentage allowed PA 
will be equal to RA/2 divided by the level YA. Correspondingly, if country B has a higher 
target, where RB > RA, PB the share of project credits allowed in country B will also be higher 
than PA.
13 
The final Phase II CDM limits approved by the European Commission vary considerably 
between countries, as can be seen in Table 5.1.14 The figures suggest that company 
installations in the EU ETS are potentially treated differently. For example, in Phase II, if a 
Belgian installation receives 100 EUAs free, it can use about 8 CERs (8.4%) towards 
compliance. If the same installation is situated in France, it can use about 14 CERs (14%) 
towards compliance.15 In the presence of the free allocation of the allowance to use offsets, 
this difference is likely to enhance the competitive distortions originally created by the free 
allocation mechanism, as CERs are cheaper than EUAs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 For a numerical example, assume that X = 100 emission units in both countries, and that YA and YB 
are 90 and 80 emission units, respectively. PA and PB will be 5.5% and 12.5%, respectively. 
14
 In what follows, only the CDM limit is analysed, while it implies the limit on emissions reduction 
credits from Joint Implementation. Due to its late start, the JI market is considerably smaller than the 
CDM market in terms of volume. Nevertheless, some observers see the potential for a prosperous JI 
market (Hobley & Roberts, 2009; Hoogzaad, 2009). 
15
 See section 5.1.3 for an explanation of the CER limit. 
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Table 5.1 Member State National Allocation Plan CER limits approved by the EU 
Commission 
  (I)  
Annual Cap allowed 
in 2008-2012 in Mt 
(II)  
Absolute annual CDM 
limit in 2008-2012 in Mt 
(III) = (I)*(II) 
CDM limits as 
share of allocation  
 Austria  30.7 3.1 10.0% 
 Belgium  58.5 4.9 8.4% 
 Bulgaria  42.3 5.3 12.6% 
 Cyprus  5.5 0.5 10.0% 
 Czech Republic  86.8 8.7 10.0% 
 Denmark  24.5 4.2 17.1% 
 Estonia  12.7 - 0.0% 
 Finland  37.6 3.8 10.0% 
 France  132.8 17.9 13.5% 
 Germany  453.1 99.7 22.0% 
 Greece  69.1 6.2 9.0% 
 Hungary  26.9 2.7 10.0% 
 Ireland  22.3 2.2 10.0% 
 Italy  195.8 29.3 15.0% 
 Latvia  3.4 0.3 10.0% 
 Lithuania  8.8 1.8 20.0% 
 Luxembourg  2.5 0.3 10.0% 
 Maltaa  2.1 0.2 10.0% 
 The Netherlands  85.8 8.6 10.0% 
 Poland  208.5 20.9 10.0% 
 Portugal  34.8 3.5 10.0% 
 Romania  75.9 7.6 10.0% 
 Slovakia  30.9 2.2 7.0% 
 Slovenia  8.3 1.3 15.8% 
 Spain  152.3 31.4 20.6% 
 Sweden  22.8 2.3 10.0% 
 UK  246.2 19.7 8.0% 
 Total  2,080.9 288.5 13.9%16 
Source: Europa (2007).17 
The European Commission assessed the EUA allocation and CER limits in Member States’ 
National Allocation Plans with regard to the competitive effects of allocation and the 
potential for reduction.  
                                                          
16
 The average for the EU is calculated by dividing the sum of allowed project credits (column II) by 
the amount of EUAs (column I of Table 5.1). 
17
 Note: a The European Commission stated in its NAP II decision that Malta did not specify its 
maximum CER limit. For the purpose of this analysis the limit is assumed to be 10%. 
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“For greater flexibility, Member States are recommended to apply the [CDM] limit for 
the entire trading period and collectively to all installations” (European, 2005: para. 
3.5.25)  
The annual CDM amount, approved by the European Commission, can be spread over the 
whole trading period in Phase II. Entities are thus entitled to bank their CDM usage until 
later in the period. All Member States define the offset usage entitlement as a percentage of 
allocation rather than as percentage of actual verified emissions. As a result, installations 
that receive an over-allocation of allowances also profit from the resulting generous CDM 
and JI limit. 
5.1.3 CER limit formula 
The European Commission formula applied for setting the CDM limits can be found in 
Article 2.3 of (European Commission, 2006a). In order to reach the Kyoto targets, the CDM 
limit is based on half of the highest reduction effort needed from either 1990, 2004, or 2010 
emissions, (European Commission, 2006b). For instance if the highest emissions in these 
three years for one particular country is equal to 100 units and the Kyoto target emissions 
are equal to 80 units, the total effort for the country to achieve its target is equal to 20 units. 
Half of this effort, 10 units, can be covered through the CDM. Hence, the CDM limit as a 
percentage of allocation is equal to 12.5% (10/80 units). For another country with emissions 
of 100 units but a less stringent Kyoto target of 90 units, the effort is 10 units (the difference 
between highest emissions and Kyoto target) while the absolute CDM limit, equal to half of 
the abatement effort, is 5 units. As a percentage of the target the CDM limit is 5.6% (5/90 
units). 
Each Member State then allocates the absolute limit to the ETS and non-ETS sectors. All 
CDM credits that are not allocated by the government to the non-ETS sector can be used by 
the ETS sector. If the percentage to be used by ETS installations is below 10% as a percentage 
of allocated emissions within the ETS, the respective Member State can choose 10% as its 
offset import limit to support the promotion of the carbon market.18 The following section 
provides a theoretical framework as to how the allocation of CERs leads to reductions in 
average abatement costs and the transfer of rent.19 
 
 
                                                          
18
 In at least one case, the European Commission agreed to allow CDM limits equal to the difference 
between 2005 verified ETS emissions and the proposed cap for Phase II of the EU ETS  (European 
Commission, 2007). 
19
 See also the discussion on cost-effectiveness and rent in Chapter 3. 
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5.2 Effect of CERs on abatement and compliance decisions 
5.2.1 Rent transfer through CDM limits 
The option to use CERs reduces average abatement costs. Schedule 1A of Figure 5.1 shows a 
stylised marginal abatement cost curve for the EU ETS. The domestic carbon price PD is a 
function of the demand for emission reductions and the supply of abatement opportunities. 
The demand for emission reductions is given by the target, denoted by the reduction effort R. 
The supply curve of abatement MACEU is the aggregation of the individual MAC curves for all 
ETS emitters in the EU. The costs to fulfil the target domestically are equal to the area B, the 
area under MACEU up to R on the x-axis.20 To the right of R, denoted verified emissions are 
the remaining actual emissions that are not abated and for which allowances have been 
allocated. 
Schedule 1B assumes that in a non-Annex B (developing) country, the opportunity to 
produce abatement in the form of CERs exists at a flat fee of PCER (i.e. the MAC curve in the 
non-Annex B country is flat) for a certain volume.21 Hence, the EU faces a new MAC*, a 
combination of MACEU with the flat rate CER abatement options. This leads to a price of P* 
and abatement costs equal to the sum of the areas below the new MAC* curve (D + E + F + 
G). Abatement conducted within the EU is equal to the sum of A1 and A2. Abatement 
conducted externally through the CDM is denoted C1. Total costs (D + E + F + G) in schedule 
1B are smaller than total costs (B) in schedule 1A.  
In schedule 1C, the supplementarity limit is introduced, which reduces the volume of CERs 
allowed to be used from C1 (schedule 1B) to C2 and increases the price to PL. Furthermore, 
the limit increases compliance costs in comparison to schedule 1B, by the amount denoted by 
area H. Domestic abatement is higher in schedule 1C relative to 1B by the amount A3. 
External abatement through the CDM is now limited to C2. Actual emissions under all three 
schedules are the same, as the country has a binding reduction target. Only compliance costs 
vary with highest costs in schedule 1A (only domestic abatement) and lowest in Schedule 1B 
(unlimited CDM access).22  
                                                          
20
 In mathematical terms, total costs B are equal to the integral of the MAC curve between the origin O 
and the reduction target R. 
21
 In practice, CER prices vary in the primary market where projects are conducted, while they are 
uniform on the secondary market prices. For simplicity, it is assumed that most EU ETS participants 
buy CERs on the secondary market. 
22
 If the target R is low, or conversely unlimited, CDM is allowed and only the amount A1 will be 
abated with the remainder covered through CERs. In this case, the CER price equals the EUA price. 
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The price PL in schedule 1C will be the EUA price in the EU ETS, which accounts for the 
increased but limited (due to the supplementarity criterion) supply of abatement 
opportunities through the CDM. The CER price in the EU ETS will be the flat price PCER. 
23 
Figure 5.1 Domestic and aggregate marginal abatement curves with and without 
supplementarity limit for the European Union 
 
The EU’s CDM limit, equal to C2 in Figure 5.1, is transferred through the CDM limit formula 
to Member States, who translate the country limit to CDM limits for installations. Member 
States with more stringent targets have a higher CDM limit.  
5.2.2 Compliance and abatement strategy 
Installations compare their marginal abatement costs of internal measures and allowed 
external abatement measures (i.e. CERs) with the EUA price PL and abate up to where the 
marginal abatement costs are equal to the EUA price. Firms whose MAC curve starts above 
the price PL do not abate internally, because using EUAs and CERs will be cheaper. If 
installations have surplus allowances, they can sell them on the market. Surplus allowances 
can be generated through internal abatement, an exchange of EUAs for CERs, or initial free 
allocation. If after abatement, installations need more allowances they can buy them on the 
market once internal abatement opportunities below the EUA price have been harvested (see 
also Gorecki et al., 2010). 
 
 
                                                          
23
 The discussion assumes an absence of Assigned Amount Units supply at zero marginal cost, which is 
only the case if ‘hot air’ AAUs are scrapped. In the presence of ‘hot air’, a new marginal abatement cost 
curve MACAAU is introduced, is horizontal and shifts the MAC in all schedules of Figure 5.2 to the 
right. I am grateful to Axel Michaelowa for drawing attention to this restriction. 
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5.2.3 Effect of CER use on compliance strategies  
Figure 5.2 compares two identical installations A and B that face the same internal 
abatement opportunities (i.e. their MAC curves are equal). The two installations differ only 
with respect to their CDM limit as the installations are situated in different Member States. 
Figure 5.2 Installation specific MAC curves - compliance strategies with and without CDM 
 
Schedules 2A to 2C in Figure 5.2 denote the installation A, and Schedules 2D to 2F denote 
installation B. Schedules 2A and 2D illustrate the baseline case in which no installation in the 
EU ETS, thus also neither installations A nor B, can use CERs. Initially, without a carbon 
price, installation A emits business-as-usual emissions equal to B* units. With a carbon price 
PD (the same price as in schedule 1A in Figure 5.1), installation A emits verified emissions 
equal to V* units and abates A* units. The verified emissions V* are covered through EUAs. 
The EUAs can either be taken from the free allocation or can be bought on the market if 
allocation is lower than V*. The total compliance cost for installation A is the sum of the 
areas I and Q*, equal to the abatement cost and the cost of EUAs to cover remaining 
emissions (V*). 
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5.2.4 Impact of CER use 
Introducing the possibility of using CERs reduces average compliance costs for installations. 
The compliance strategy, which uses a limited volume of CERs, is illustrated in schedule 2B 
for installation A. Using CERs, the MAC curve in schedule 2B is the result of a combination 
of the installation’s MAC curve, the flat MAC curve for CERs, the flat price PCER and the EUA 
price PL.24 Installation A now abates the sum of A1* and A2* internally. Installation A abates 
externally C1* units in a developing country by buying (or conducting the project in a 
developing country which generates) C1* units of CERs. For the remaining verified emissions 
V1*, installation A uses the corresponding amount of EUAs. The total compliance cost is the 
sum of internal abatement costs (areas J, L), external abatement costs (areas K1 and K2) and 
the area Q1 for buying V1* EUAs.  
Schedule 2C is a rearrangement of schedule 2B. It illustrates, from left to right, the amount 
of abatement, the number of CERs used, and the amount of EUAs used. The sum of EUAs 
(V1*) and CERs (C1*) equals the verified emissions of the installation. Schedule 2C illustrates 
that abatement (A1*+ A2*) in schedule 2C is lower than A* in schedule 2A. Thus, verified 
emissions in schedule 2C are also higher than in schedule 2A. This is not surprising as it 
results from the lower price PL relative to the price PD in schedule 2A.  
A lower CER limit, ceteris paribus, leads to higher compliance costs but not to lower verified 
emissions. Schedules 2D to 2F illustrate the situation for installation B, which has the same 
internal MAC but a smaller CDM limit relative to installation A.25 When CERs are allowed, 
the new MAC curve for installation B results from a combination of the installation’s MAC 
curve, the flat MAC curve for CERs, with the flat price PCER and the EUA price PL. The 
rearrangement of schedule 2E in schedule 2F illustrates that the difference between 
installations A and B is the greater reduction in abatement costs created for installation A 
due to the larger CDM limit.  
Interestingly, verified emissions of installation B (C2*+V2*) are the same relative to verified 
emissions for installation A (C1*+V1*). A larger share of total verified emissions is covered 
through CERs in installation A (C1*) than in installation B (C2*). Due to the fact that 
                                                          
24
 The possibility of using CERs lowers the carbon price from PD to PL as illustrated in Schedule 1A to 
Schedule 1C in Figure 5.1. 
25
 In the situation without the CDM, both installations face the same price PD and thus abate the same 
amount A* internally. The compliance costs are equal (areas I and Q*) for both installation without 
the use of CDM. The rent from internal abatement is equal to the sum of the difference between the 
price PD and the internal marginal abatement costs, equal to the hatched areas. This rent is the same 
for installations A and B and is generated by exploiting internal abatement measures within the 
installations. 
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Installation B cannot use as many CERs as installation A, it has to cover this part of 
emissions with EUAs.  
Installation A has an advantage relative to installation B in terms of the reduction in 
compliance costs (equal to the area E2 in schedule 2C). The area E2 is equal to the difference 
in the amount of CERs allowed, multiplied by the difference between the EUA price PL and 
the CER price PCER. Depending on the difference in C1* and C2* the analysis in Figure 5.2 
shows that installation A can gain a competitive advantage merely by its location in a specific 
Member State, rather than one based on any emission reduction or innovative effort.26  
As the preceding sections have shown, the compliance strategy of installations is determined 
by their internal and external abatement opportunities. If allocation of allowances is free, as 
is the case in Phase II of the EU ETS, a profitable arbitrage opportunity exists for some 
installations. The conditions for arbitrage are illustrated in the next section.  
5.3 EUA-CER Arbitrage  
With free allocation of EUAs and CDM limits, installations can lower compliance costs by 
engaging in arbitrage. Arbitrage involves the sale of previously freely allocated allowances 
and purchase of CERs with the sales proceeds. This gives a tangible cash-inflow to 
installations that engage in such a strategy. Equation 1 illustrates the condition for arbitrage: 
AEUA*(1+CERi) > Vi given CERi > 0       (1) 
Where: 
AEUA  = Free initial allocation of EUAs 
Vi = Verified Emissions of installation i 
CERi  = Percentage of CERs that can be used, differentiated by installation i’s Member  
  State limit 
Arbitrage is possible, if the sum of freely allocated allowances (AEUA) and the amount of 
allowed CERs (CERi*AEUA) is higher than verified emissions (Vi). Actual arbitrage occurs, 
however, only if AEUA*(1+Actual CERi) > Vi, where: ‘Actual CERi ' is positive and equal to the 
actual CERs used as a share of free allocation of installation i.  
                                                          
26
It is not clear if this case in which an installation in country A has an advantage over an installation 
in country B, meets the criteria for state aid. However, in light of the competitiveness effects and the 
difference between existing entities and new entrants, it is interesting to analyze this issue. To the 
authors’ knowledge, this analysis has not yet been conducted. 
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It has been shown in Figure 5.2 how differential access to CERs can lead to different 
reductions in abatement costs for the same installation. Hence, this suggests that two similar 
installations from the same sector located in different countries are treated differently. The 
next two sections briefly explore the CER spread and the way EU Member States pass on the 
CER limits to EU ETS installations. 
5.3.1 Experience with the CDM in the EU ETS 
5.3.1.1 Historical EUA-CER spread 
CERs trade at a discount to EUAs in the market.27 Figure 5.3 shows the co-movement and 
historical spread between EUA and CER December 2012 futures prices. The spread, 
assuming equally distributed trade over the three years, is €4.67.28  
Figure 5.3 EUA (black) and CER (grey) December 2012 futures prices in €/tCO2 
 
Source: ECX (2010) 
Regulators are faced with the decision on how and to whom to give access to the opportunity 
to lower compliance costs, hence to the rent created by the price spread. On the one hand, 
lower mitigation costs might protect the competitiveness of the industry from unilateral 
shocks. On the other hand, the profit from the regulation could distort EU-internal 
competition. The rent, E1 and E2 in schedules 2C and 2F, could similarly be assigned to 
                                                          
27
 Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2010) find significant evidence that this spread is influenced by three 
factors: 1) the uncertainty inherent in CER project delivery relative to EUAs, 2) the limit imposed on 
the usage of CERs, and 3) the non-fungibility of CERs and EUAs for speculative traders (relative to 
compliance buyers, who can profitably arbitrage between CERs and freely allocated EUAs). 
28
 Transaction costs are not accounted for here. Furthermore, using the direct purchase of CERs from 
project developers might increase the spread relative to the spread between EUA and CER futures 
contracts. 
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national governments, if the revenue were used to enhance mitigation or lower distortionary 
taxes. The following section explores how the CDM has been used in 2008, and which sectors 
have profited most from the CDM limit allocation.  
5.3.1.2 Empirical Results– CERs surrendered in 2008 
In the discussion so far, it t was assumed that the right to use CERs is valuable and will be 
used to the upper limit by each installation, to fully capture the opportunity to reduce 
compliance costs through the CDM (Figure 5.2). However, in 2008, for reasons to be 
discussed, EU ETS installations did not use CERs up to the full volume allowed. 
The EU ETS data for 2008 covers 12,114 installations: 9,970 installations (82% of all EU ETS 
installations) – were allocated EUAs, while 10,397 had verified emissions, i.e. they 
participated in the EU ETS.29 Of these 10,397 installations 1,737 installations have used CERs 
(Table 5.2). Using the ten sectors distinguished in the EU ETS, it is possible to assess the 
extent of CER usage by sector relative to the allowed volume (illustrated in Table 5.2 for the 
EU-27).30 Notably not all installations used their allowed CDM limit fully. For instance, in 
the power sector, 1,115 installations used 55 million CERs, each allowing for the emission of 
one ton of CO2-e. This means that only 16% of all installations that could have used CERs did 
so.31 Furthermore, only 31% of all CERs allowed in 2008 alone were used by all the 
installations. This is a rather low number, given the potential of installations to reduce their 
average abatement costs by using CERs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 About 2/3 of the 2,144 installations that did not receive any allocation in 2008, were allocated EUAs 
in Phase I of the EU ETS.  
30
The ten sectoral scopes for Annex I are: Power, Refineries, Coke Ovens, Metal Ore, Iron and Steel, 
Cement and Lime, Glass, Ceramics, Pulp and Paper, and installations that ‘Opted in’ (see Council of 
the European Union & European Parliament (2003). Most of the information to calculate these 
measures is available in the EU ETS registry, the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). 
Each April, EU ETS verified emissions data is published for the preceding year, indicating, for 
instance, the installation name, the Member State the installation is located in, the sectoral scope, the 
verified emissions of the installation, the EUAs freely allocated to the installations, and the CERs and 
emission reduction units used by the respective installation for compliance. It is not readily 
observable what the business-as-usual emissions are, i.e. what would have happened in the absence of 
the EU ETS. Hence the abatement conducted as the difference between BAU and actual verified 
emissions, cannot be calculated without additional data. 
31
 Potential reasons for this low usage of CERs are elaborated below in Section 5.3.2 and include: 
expected higher CER-EUA spread in the future, the lack of either sufficient CER supply or competition 
from public (government) buyers, and a lack of (financial) management attention to arbitrage and 
profit opportunities and transaction costs.  
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Table 5.2 CER actual versus allowed use in 2008 
  Installations 
using CERs 
(as share of 
total 
installations 
in the 
respective 
sector) 
Used CERs 2008 in 
Mt (as share of 
allowed annual 
CERs) 
Rent conferred to 
installations in € 
(millions) at average 
EUA-CER spread of 
€4.67 
Power 1,115 - (16%) 55.21 - (31%) 257.85 
Refineries 36 - (25%) 4.53 - (20%) 21.14 
Coke ovens 4 - (19%) 1.41 - (52%) 
6.58 
Metal Ore  3 - (11%) 0.17 - (7%) 0.79 
Iron or steel 31 - (13%) 8.92 - (31%) 
41.66 
Cement and Lime  158 - (30%) 8.19 - (27%) 
38.26 
Glass  44 - (10%) 0.96 - (27%) 4.48 
Ceramics 189 - (19%) 0.59 - (22%) 2.77 
Pulp and Paper 146 - (19%) 2.27 - (40%) 
10.62 
Opted-in  11 - (3%) 0.02 - (9%) 0.08 
Total 1,737 - 
(17%) 82.28 - (29%) 384.23 
Source: CITL (2010) 
Table 5.2 also indicates the reduction in abatement costs that was granted to installations in 
2008. Using the average price spread of €4.67 between EUAs and CERs for the year 2008, 
the actual advantage conferred to installations is equal to €384 million.32 For instance, the 
iron and steel, and cement sectors have profited from reductions in average abatement costs 
by €42 and €38 million, respectively. 
5.3.1.3 EUA-CER arbitrage 
Table 5.3 indicates that in 2008, 1,353 installations actually engaged in arbitrage, satisfying 
Equation 1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
32
 That is, the product of €82.3 million and €4.67. 
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Table 5.3 EUA-CER actual versus potential arbitrage in 2008 
  
Installations 
arbitraging (share 
of total 
installations able 
to arbitrage) 
Volume of EUAs 
arbitraged for 
CERs in Mt (share 
of total arbitrage 
possible) 
Arbitrage rent in € (millions) 
at average EUA-CER spread 
of €4.67 (share of total rent 
conferred through CER 
limits) 
Power 809 - (15%) 29.0 - (29%)  135.6 - (53%)  
Refineries 23 - (20%) 3.8 - (19%)  17.7 - (84%)  
Coke ovens 
3 - (17%) 1.3 - (55%)  6.1 - (93%)  
Metal Ore  2 - (9%) 0.1 - (7%)  0.7 - (86%)  
Iron or steel 
25 - (14%) 8.7 - (30%)  40.7 - (98%)  
Cement and Lime  
140 - (30%) 7.6 - (26%)  35.5 - (93%)  
Glass  39 - (10%) 0.9 - (28%)  4.4 - (97%)  
Ceramics 174 - (19%) 0.6 - (22%)  2.6 - (95%)  
Pulp and Paper 
133 - (20%) 2.1 - (40%)  9.9 - (93%)  
Opted-in  5 - (5%) 0.02 - (9%)  0.1 - (92%)  
Total 1,353 - (17%) 54.2 - (28%)  253.2 - (66%)  
Source: CITL (2010). 
Thus, a majority of the 1,737 installations that used CERs arbitraged. However, only 17% of 
all installations that were able to arbitrage due to their free allocation and their CDM limit 
did in fact do so. In terms of volume, 54.2 Million CERs were arbitraged, with most of this 
amount falling in the Power sector. In total, 28% of all possible arbitrage actually occurred. 
Given the assumed EUA-CER price spread of €4.67 for 2008, arbitraging installations 
benefited from a financial transfer of €253.2 million. Thus, 66% of the total rent of €384 
million (Table 5.2) was transferred as profit to installations. This amount is equivalent to the 
loss in revenue for the regulator from not selling the right to use CERs to EU ETS 
installations. This revenue could be used to enhance high cost mitigation, in the EU or 
developing countries, conducting low-carbon projects which are not feasible at current 
carbon prices. 
The Iron and Steel, and the Cement and Lime, sectors were most effective in employing the 
economically rational arbitrage strategy, with almost all (98% and 93%, respectively) rent 
granted through the CER allowance ending up as arbitrage profits. The discussion indicates 
that a substantial rent transfer occurred from the government to installations. A large share 
of installations reacted rationally and exchanged freely allocated EUAs for CERs at a profit. 
However, not all installations used their arbitrage opportunities.  
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5.3.2 Reasons for CER use below maximum 
There are at least four reasons for not fully using the whole CDM entitlement in one year and 
to bank it for subsequent years: expected higher CER-EUA spread in the future, the lack of 
either sufficient CER supply or competition from public (government) buyers, and a lack of 
(financial) management attention to arbitrage and profit opportunities and transaction costs. 
First, entities that expect the spread between CERs and EUAs to widen could profit even 
more from using CERs when EUAs are priced higher relative to CERs. The right to use CDM 
credits thus entails a rent equal to the price spread between allowances and CERs. The value 
of this rent has varied over time within the second trading period, from a peak of €11.50 in 
April 2008 to €1.58 in February 2009. The spread, assuming equally distributed trade over 
the three years, is €4.67. However, historical data does not support the hypothesis that 
installations speculated on a higher spread as the gap between EUA and CER prices 
narrowed rather than increased ( Figure 5.1 ).33 Second, it could be that the supply of credits 
does not meet demand by the EU ETS. Although at the beginning of 2010 there were more 
than 400 million CERs (225 million by the end of 2008) issued through the CDM, a large 
share could already be contracted by public funds for use in non-ETS sectors or other Annex 
B countries such as Japan. This is a temporal problem, because the registered CDM projects 
are expected to issue more than one billion CERs by the end of 2012 (Risoe, 2010). Thus, the 
potential current supply gap can arguably vanish till the end of the commitment period so 
that installations can use CERs to a higher extent. Third, it may be that the current economic 
slowdown has not warranted the extensive use of CERs for compliance and hence reduced 
competition for CERs. This is not relevant however in the continuing presence of the price 
spread. Fourth, it is possible that operators of installations are not attentive to the 
compliance cost-decreasing impact of the CDM and thus have not yet used the CDM to the 
allowed extent. In addition, transaction costs for using CERs are not zero and can play a 
significant role for smaller installations. Transaction costs involve, for example, the setup of 
a procurement or trading desk for CERs. Furthermore, CER procurement always entails 
counter-party risk, i.e. the risk that one the party supplying the credits will fail to generate 
the credits and thus break the contract provisions. Larger installations are better equipped to 
deal with and diversify such risks. Hence, smaller installations that do not use CERs for the 
above reasons, might want to sell their rights to others. Opportunities to address these issues 
are examined in the next section.  
 
                                                          
33
 Transaction costs are not accounted for here. Furthermore, using direct purchase of CERs from 
project developers might increase the spread relative to the spread between EUA and CER futures 
contracts. 
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5.4 Allocating the rent  
Allowing EU ETS companies’ installations to use CERs is valuable. Figure 5.2 indicates that 
the entitlements to use CERs have a value equal to areas E1 and or the sum of E1 and E2, 
respectively. If these entitlements are tradable, the cost of using EUAs and CERs is the same, 
in the absence of transaction costs.  
Currently under the status quo, limits are not tradable i.e. each installation can use up to a 
certain volume of CERs equal to a share of freely allocated EUAs. After describing the status 
quo, three possibilities are presented to address rent allocation: 1) Changing from the 
current allocation base to the verified emissions base for allocating CDM entitlements, 2) the 
‘CER usage option’, and 3) the ‘pre-commitment option’. The last two options cater to 
economic efficiency and to potential enhanced mitigation through revenue recycling.  
5.4.1 Compliance strategies and installation-based limits rules  
Under installation-based limitations, there are two options: ‘allocation-based’ and 
‘compliance-based’ limits. Allocation-based limits (the status quo) stipulate that a certain 
percentage of allocation – the amount AEUA distributed freely through the regulator – may be 
covered through CERs. If the allowed CDM limit CERi, for instance, is 10% and allocation 
AEUA is 100 units, 10 units (CERi x AEUA = C1*) can be covered through CERs, independent of 
verified emissions (V). Thus, the absolute CER limit (C1*) increases in both the free 
allocation (AEUA) and the CDM percentage allowed (CERi). The allocation option is currently 
used for existing installations that have been granted an entitlement under their Member 
State National Allocation Plans or Article 11a, paragraph 8(1) of Directive 2009/29/EC 
(Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009).34 
The compliance option stipulates that a certain percentage of compliance needs – i.e. actual 
verified emissions (V) – may be covered through CERs. If the allowed CDM limit is 10% 
(CERi) and verified emissions are 80 units (V), 8 units (CERi x V = CV1*) can be covered 
through CERs, independent on how many EUAs (AEUA) were freely allocated. This rule is 
used for new entrants under Article 11a, paragraph 8, of the new EU ETS Directive. Thus, 
under the compliance option absolute CER limit (CV1*) increases in both verified emissions 
(V) and CERi. 
The allocation option, currently employed by the EU ETS gives rise to substantial arbitrage 
profits, which are due to the initial allocation of EUAs (AEUA) as shown in Table 5.3. Where 
                                                          
34 In this case the CDM limits, no matter how defined, are not tradable. This assumption is crucial as, 
in its absence, the efficiency gain is equal to the CER usage right and the pre-commitment options 
described above. 
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installations do not receive any EUA allocation (i.e. where AEUA = 0), they are excluded from 
profiting from the price spread, which is likely to worsen their competitive position. The 
compliance option treats each installation equally, independent of allocation, in terms of 
access to CDM credits. While there is a potential to increase verified emissions (V) due to the 
production of emission-intensive goods, it is unlikely that installations increase their verified 
emissions only to get more access to CERs as it comes at a significant cost (unless the price 
spread between PEUA and PCER is large). Arbitrage under the compliance option occurs if the 
sum of allocated EUAs (AEUA) and allowed CERs (V x CERi) is greater than verified emissions 
(V).35 Equation 2: 
AEUA/(1-CERi) > V          (2) 
If the regulator chooses CERi so as it to be equal to the limit under the allocation option, the 
installation can still increase its use of CERs by emitting more and abating less.36 
Under the allocation rule, entities have an incentive to lobby both for increased free 
allocation and for a higher percentage of CER use (Equation 1). The former effect is absent 
when the compliance option is chosen (Equation 2). Depending on the price spread between 
PL and PCER, the difference between the compliance and the allocation option can be 
substantial. Note that the analysis above is static and does not take into account price effects 
of selling and buying allowances for arbitrage.  
It has been shown how the allocation option, as a basis for calculating the CER limit, 
increases the distortions created by free allocation. However, while the change from the 
allocation option to the compliance option, to some extent, allows access to a more equal 
distribution of the right to use CERs, it does not account for transaction costs and counter-
party risk. These issues can only be addressed if others are able to absorb this risk, either 
other EU ETS installations or the government, which are discussed in the next section. 
5.4.2 CER usage rights 
Figure 5.2 suggests that installations use all of their allowed CER volume. As the shown in 
the discussion of section 5.3.1 (Table 5.3), however, not all installations have fully used their 
allowed CER volume. These installations should want to sell their CER usage rights. In turn, 
                                                          
35
 That is, when AEUA + V x CERi > Vó AEUA > V x (1-CERi) ó AEUA/(1-CERi) > V. 
36
The profit also arises in the absence of over-allocation. The condition for arbitrage profit is that the 
installation is allocated more allowances than the compliance needs, minus the allowed CER use. This 
could therefore also arise if free allocation is contingent on benchmarking, as is the case in the EU ETS 
(Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009: Article 10). 
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installations with a MAC curve starting above the prevailing EUA price and installations and 
traders who can swap EUAs for CERs, could buy the right to use CERs from other 
installations. Thus trading of the right to use CDM credits brings a trade benefit for both 
(Coase, 1960; Dales, 1968). 
The right to use CERs could be traded, with the rent going either to the emitter or to the 
relevant state, depending on how the right is allocated. The proposal is as follows: Each 
offset right carries the right to use one CER, equivalent to the abatement of one ton of CO2e. 
The ‘CER usage rights’ option allows each installation to use as many CERs as it wants, as 
long as it holds, and is able to surrender, an equivalent amount of CER usage rights. Thus, 
CER usage rights and the underlying CERs are complementary instruments. Due to the 
tradability of the entitlement to use CERs, the price of EUAs is equal to the price of CERs 
plus the price of the CER usage right. Thus, the cost of using the two instruments – EUAs 
and CERs – is equalized, assuming zero transaction costs. 
Thus, an installation needs to surrender a corresponding CER usage right, for each CER 
surrendered. Economically, this does not result in an efficiency loss, because the installation 
sells a corresponding amount of EUAs, providing liquidity to the market and making 
compliance easier for the other entities that do not use CERs.  
The right to use CERs could be allocated for free or auctioned. The regulator is faced with the 
same challenge as with the initial allocation of allowances in an ETS. Each right would carry 
an opportunity cost, a rent, irrespective how the right is allocated, on a spectrum between 
free allocation and auctioning of the rights. Thus, the allocation mechanism distributes 
wealth, i.e. the reduction of average abatement costs, among entities and the regulator. This 
is likely to encourage and strengthen rent-seeking behaviour by entities.37 
5.4.2.1 Free allocation of CER usage rights 
Free allocation of CER usage rights transfers rents to installations. If the CER usage rights 
are freely handed out to entities, the question arises as to how this is done. If the basis is 
historical emissions the risk of ‘perverse incentives’ arises (as it does in the case of allowance 
allocation in emissions trading) such that increased historical emissions yields access to 
more CER usage rights (K. Neuhoff, Martinez, & Sato, 2006). If the basis is sector 
benchmarks (e.g. the product-based benchmarks in Phase III of the EU ETS ), while there is 
a fairer distribution, compared to using historical emissions, the regulator makes an implicit 
assumption about the needs of the installation for compliance.  
                                                          
37
 Coase (1959 p. 27, fn. 54) admits that, in the presence of rent-seeking behaviour, the Coasian 
solution does not hold. Medema (1997) first pointed to this ‘missing’ footnote. 
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The idea behind allocation benchmarks for Phase III of the EU ETS, for example, is to 
allocate allowances at a level equal to the best 10% in the specific sector (See article 10 in 
Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009). Due to this ambitious level, 
benchmarks entities must buy some allowances in the market. Using the same basis for CER 
usage rights allocation as that for the allocation of allowances, entities are potentially 
allocated more allowances and CER usage rights than they need. Although all entities must 
acquire offsets in the market, holding an offset confers a benefit and a rent. So, although the 
CER usage rights are freely allocated, they carry an opportunity cost, which is (absent 
transaction costs) equal to the spread of the allowance and the CER price. This is the same as 
the price difference between PL and PCER in Figure 5.2. 
5.4.2.2 Auction CER usage rights  
If the regulator chooses to auction the CER usage rights, the amount of rights purchased by 
entities will depend on their expectation about the future need to use CERs to comply with 
their obligations. An installation with high marginal costs could buy as many CER usage 
rights as it expects CERs to procure, as long as the sum of the CER price and the CER usage 
right price is below the EUA price PL.
38 Thus, firms which already hold or plan to buy CERs 
in the CDM market have an incentive to also purchase and hold CER usage rights. 
Auctioning CER usage rights distributes the rent to the regulator, rather than to entities, as 
would occur under free allocation. If there is already an auctioning mechanism for 
allowances, a second, separate auction would create an additional layer of complexity. This 
could be a particularly important point in terms of transaction costs for smaller installations. 
Auctioning these rights reduces arbitrage opportunities for installations that received 
generous free allocation.  
Auctioning of CER rights will not change total abatement by installations, but it can change 
overall abatement by the EU depending on how the revenue is channelled through 
supporting mechanisms, such as national or EU funds targeting higher cost mitigation or 
infrastructure projects (which are more expensive than the EUA price and would thus not be 
conducted by EU ETS installations). 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Market power can be prevented if CER usage right auctions are held periodically, with access for all 
entities. If the market power effect is small, the CER usage rights option minimizes the amount of 
CERs that remain unused. 
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5.4.2.3 Pre-commitment option  
The third option involves the active participation of the regulator. Under this approach, the 
regulator issues additional allowances to the volume, equal to the allowed CER limit. The 
allowances can be sold through an auction or distributed freely among existing installations. 
Thus, there are no CERs in the secondary market. Entities can use as many allowances as 
they need, without the need for the regulator to check or enact an installation-based limit. 
The regulator then issues the additional allowances, for instance, through an auction. At the 
same time, it signs an agreement to buy the same volume of offsets in the international 
market. Private actors can then use EUAs for their compliance without the complexity of 
using and procuring CERs.  
By acting as a large CER buyer, the regulator minimizes transaction costs and can impose 
certain quality purchasing standards on the CDM market. The regulator can sign long-term 
CER purchasing contracts to mitigate its own risk. This serves as a credible signal to project 
developers in the CDM market, and enhances certainty in the CDM market as to which 
projects are acceptable to both the CDM Executive Board and the compliance market.  
According to European Commission (2008), the quality of offsets to be imported must be 
reviewed before the start of Phase III of the EU ETS. Harmonizing the rules for approved 
CERs is a complex task, as demonstrated by the difficulties of agreeing on harmonized 
criteria for the application of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) guidelines on CDM 
projects from large hydroelectric power plants (See amendments to Article 11b (6) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC amended in the ‘Linking Directive’, Council of the European Union & 
European Parliament, 2004).39 However, once the quality criteria are agreed upon, the EU 
regulator will be able to consistently influence the quality of CERs for one segment of the 
market.40  
The European Commission has banned the use of CDM credits from industrial gas projects 
for compliance in Phase III from 2013 to 2020 (European Commission, 2011). The ban is 
effective as of May 2013 and does not allow operators from that moment to use these credits 
for compliance. At the same time, this option might lead to tensions in UNFCCC fora if the 
EU unilaterally decides to define quality in the CDM, thus overstepping the decisions taken 
                                                          
39
  Different Member States applied different interpretations to Article 11b(6), European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU (2004), which resulted in regulatory competition. One Member 
State, the Netherlands, received most requests for approval of large hydro-projects. 
40  This requires that other Annex I compliance markets apply similar quality standards, in order 
not to start a ‘race to the bottom’ of approval criteria. 
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by the CDM Executive Board.41 It however also illustrates the bargaining power that the EU 
has gained by being the largest demand market for the CDM.  
5.4.3 Discussion 
The three options presented above can be assessed in terms of efficiency, practicability and 
feasibility. In some cases, the efficiency and practicability gains have to be paid for by the 
regulator. Installations have different abatement opportunities; thus, fixing a non-tradable 
CER amount that an installation can use is inefficient. Changing from the current allocation 
option to the compliance option decreases the distortive effects from EUA allocation and is 
thus an overall improvement, albeit the incentive to increase emissions to profit from 
increased CER use. However, this change potentially carries a transaction (negotiation) cost 
if the limits have to be negotiated again (Flåm, 2009). The CER usage rights and the pre-
commitment options address this challenge.  
Setting up a CER procurement or trading desk is costly and is often pursued only by large 
power installations that are used to trade electricity. The CER usage rights, and especially the 
pre-commitment option, benefit operators for whom the benefit from using CERs is itself 
eliminated by the cost of procurement and the delivery and counter-party risk.42 This is 
especially relevant for smaller installations. If the CER usage rights are auctioned through 
the same mechanism as EUAs, this mechanism does not necessarily increase costs relative to 
a situation where only EUAs are procured through an auction. Using the CER usage rights, 
however, installations need to procure CERs, which increases transaction costs.  
In the case of the procurement option, the regulator has to set up an institution for procuring 
CERs and negotiates the quality accepted at the EU level. Subsequent auctioning of EUAs 
can be done through the auctioning structures, which are to be implemented fully by 2013. 
The pre-commitment option is advantageous as only one instrument, EUAs, is used for 
compliance, thus reducing the complexity and transaction costs. This can potentially 
increase certainty for EU ETS participants as only the original ETS concepts are at work. 
The regulator carries the risk of large-scale speculative investments in CER and non-delivery 
of CERs.43 If the procurement interval is long enough, speculators are unlikely to lock-up 
funds for so long, decreasing the price risk. There is a drawback, not to be underestimated, as 
transactions become political, as in the example of Assigned Amount Unit ‘hot air’ sales 
                                                          
41
 See for instance the concern by Wang (2011). 
42
 The KfW CO2 barometer assesses the use of CERs for German ETS installations. Small installations 
have used their CER limit sparingly (KfW/ZEW, 2009). 
43
 The average time for a CDM project, from the submission for comments stage to the registration 
request, is more than eight months for most project types (Risoe, 2011). 
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(ENDSEurope, 2009). Moreover, the biggest upswing in the CDM market has been due to 
the increase in liquidity when many private CER buyers entered the market.  
The pre-commitment option is feasible under the revised EU ETS Directive 2009/29/EC, as 
the auctioning revenue can be used for the mitigation projects in developing countries 
(Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009). The Preamble to the 
Directive encourages the use of auctioning revenues to provide certainty for the CDM market 
in the Least Developed Countries (See Preamble 31, Council of the European Union & 
European Parliament, 2009). Although no direct mention is made of the use of auctioning 
for the acquisition of CERs, the Directive earmarks ‘at least 50% of the revenues generated 
from the auctioning of allowances’ for support of mitigation in developing countries (Council 
of the European Union & European Parliament, 2009: Article 10, paragraph 3). This could 
be taken to mean support of highly sustainable CDM projects and improving the efficiency of 
the EU ETS itself. 
The CER rights option gives the same positive signals to the CDM market as the pre-
commitment option. The EU ETS (2003/87/EC) and the Linking Directive (2004/101/EC) 
carry no provisions against implementing such a rights approach. The approach, however, 
would introduce a trading system within a trading system. The capacity needed for trading 
and deciding optimal compliance strategies increases under the CER rights option. This 
impacts the proposal’s feasibility.  
Thus, harmonising the CDM limit rules before the start of Phase III would reduce the 
complexity for EU installations and decrease the uncertainty in the CDM market. 
5.4.4 Limitations  
The analysis presented here is static and the empirical data covers only one year. 
Furthermore, it mainly covers the limits awarded to installations for Phase II of the EU ETS 
which is already running. Any change in the way CER usage rights are allocated would face 
substantial political difficulties. However, the analysis is helpful for future periods and 
upcoming emissions trading schemes that allow offsets.  
For instance, in absence of CDM limit harmonisation between new and existing installations, 
new entrants will be at a disadvantage due to the different calculation basis (allocated 
allowances vs. verified emissions) and the CDM limits set at a lower level than for existing 
installations.44 In addition, the Revised EU ETS Directive (2009/29/EC) makes further use 
                                                          
44
This issue is beyond the scope of this article. However in light of increased auctioning in Phase III, 
the discussion here reopens the debate on whether allocation or verified emissions is more efficient as 
a basis for the right to use CDM credits. 
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of offsets in Phase III (2013-2020) contingent upon international agreement.45 In detail, for 
the period after 2012, if no satisfactory international agreement increases the EU emissions 
reduction target to 30%, eligible credits from CDM projects registered and issued after 2012 
can come only from projects in Least Developed Countries (Council of the European Union & 
European Parliament, 2009). In addition, the European Parliament decision on the ban, 
starting from May 2013 of the use of CERs generated from industrial gas (i.e. HFC and 
adipic/nitric N2O) projects does affect a large part of the CDM supply (European 
Commission, 2011). These two project types make up 36% of expected credits by 2012 from 
registered projects.  
Allowing for inter-period flexibility (i.e. banking of CER limits) and the ability to sell CER 
usage rights if they are not needed leads to economic efficiency gains and makes planning 
easier for entities, as they do not have to plan offset use for each year ahead. The results of 
inflexibility are sub-optimal investment decisions, due to uncertainty (Lecocq, Hourcade, & 
Ha Duong, 1998).  
At the same time, increasing abatement flexibility decreases political flexibility. Other 
stakeholders might be concerned that CERs are used excessively in later periods, decreasing 
the incentive to innovate in the current period. The EU ETS has opted for inter-period 
flexibility, stating that the CER limit can be used in the period 2008-2020, while conversions 
from some CERs are only possible until the end of March 2015 (Council of the European 
Union & European Parliament, 2009: Article 11a). 
5.5 Conclusion 
Different options to distribute and administer the valuable CER limit have been discussed. 
The CER price spread between EUAs and CERs translates into a rent for installations in 
countries with a generous CDM limit. The rents created through this limit are in the order of 
€250 million for the year 2008. Three mechanisms for distributing access to the CER limits 
and the underlying compliance cost reduction were discussed: free allocation, auctioning, 
and pre-commitment. The current application of installation-specific limits within the EU is 
inefficient and gives rise to competitive distortions. This has implications for applying the 
limit within the EU. The EU can improve the current system by either shifting to auctioning 
CER usage certificates or pre-selling allowances in the amount equal to the CDM limit, and 
subsequently buying CERs. The main advantages of these approaches are achieving the 
lowest compliance costs across the EU and decreasing the rents and arbitrage opportunities 
awarded to participants in the EU ETS. These options have transaction cost limitations as 
                                                          
45
The creation of Joint Implementation credits will not be allowed post-2012 (European Parliament 
and the Council of the EU, 2009, Preamble 28).  
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they require that either the regulator participate actively in the market or limits be allocated 
(freely or by auction), for subsequent trading. A change in the baseline for allocating the 
limits from EUA allocation (status quo) to one of verified emissions leads to an efficiency 
improvement and mitigates the distortive effects of EUA allocation, while at the same time 
providing potential lower incentives to increase emissions to profit from increased CER use.  
The rents collected in a fund could be used to finance more costly emission reductions such 
as through grid expansion or renewables deployment. When the funds are used to increase 
investments in the CDM, the same challenges, such as regulatory capture are concerned as 
discussed in Chapter 3. If the funds are used to increase financing of emission reductions 
that are not used for offsetting purposes, global emissions can actually decrease. The German 
International Climate Initiative is such an approach where auction revenue from the sales of 
EUAs is used to finance emission reduction activities in developing countries which are not 
used for offsetting. The largest challenge in such program is to quantify the emission 
reductions and sustainable co-benefits achieved through the funding. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this chapter and is left for future research. 
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6. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
he Kyoto Protocol sets binding emission reduction targets for industrialised 
countries. These targets are to be achieved in the period 2008-2012. The Kyoto 
Protocol was established on the vision of a global emissions trading scheme, where 
targets are set top-down at the global level and distributed to emitters at the national level. 
The Kyoto Protocol does not define emission targets for developing countries, but still 
envisages that developing countries pursue mitigation action with the support of 
industrialised countries. One mechanism to facilitate this cooperation is the Clean 
Development Mechanism. It is the only market-based instrument that encourages emission 
reductions in developing countries to be pursued by industrialised countries. Industrialised 
countries – and their companies – benefit from lower compliance costs of achieving their 
Kyoto targets. Emission reductions generated by CDM projects can be used to lower the 
emission reduction effort for industrialised countries. The decrease of emissions in 
developing countries is offset by allowing industrialised countries to keep emissions above 
the Kyoto emission limit. Therefore emission reductions generated by a CDM project have to 
be additional to any reduction that would have happened anyway to avoid global emissions 
increasing. Furthermore, CDM projects should contribute to sustainable development in the 
countries hosting the projects and be cost-effective.  
In the absence of any emission reduction targets for developing countries, the CDM is an 
important instrument to address high emissions growth in developing countries. The CDM 
was intended as a transitory instrument until developing countries take on individual 
emission reduction targets. As developing countries are on a course of strong economic 
growth, this carries large investments in energy and industrial infrastructure with it. These 
investments are usually long-lived and thus there is a risk that carbon-intensive choices 
made today, can make it expensive in the future to replace or retrofit this infrastructure with 
less carbon and energy-intensive alternatives. However, in the absence of any financial 
support and in the presence of other barriers many of the low-carbon investments might not 
be pursued. The CDM aims at identifying these “additional” projects, i.e. which are not 
financially viable without support, and paying the incremental finance needed to make low-
carbon projects operational. 
This book analyses whether the CDM is effective in detecting and supporting these projects. 
In particular, the main research question of this book is whether the CDM achieves its 
objectives of cost-effectiveness, the promotion of sustainable development, and 
additionality? If the CDM is found to be ineffective in promoting its goals, the book analyses 
what can be done to align the instrument with its objectives? To answer these questions, the 
T 
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CDM is analysed from two perspectives. The first perspective is the supply-dimension which 
answers the question of how the CDM system identifies suitable projects and generates 
emission reductions in theory and practice. Suitable CDM projects should be additional, 
cost-effective, and sustainable. The second perspective is the compliance-dimension, which 
answers the question whether the CDM was effectively used by industrialised countries for 
compliance with the Kyoto targets. The application of the CDM in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme is used as a case-study.  
6.1 Findings 
In particular, the book is structured as follows around the following three chapters which 
address the research question: 
1) Chapter 3: How did the CDM perform in practice? Can potential inefficiencies be 
addressed by an alternative approach?  
2) Chapter 4: What incentives exist to set the benchmark right for the CDM 
additionality test – a case study of Indian and Chinese renewable projects  
3) Chapter 5: Did the EU implement the CDM efficiently? 
The analysis to answer these questions was guided by six hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I: The project developer maximise the profit from project 
registration by optimising the volume of CERs, the CER price, and the 
probabilities of approval by the DOE, the approval by the DNA, and by 
the EB. 
Hypothesis II: The DOE will maximise project business, while minimising 
the risk of losing its operating license. 
Hypothesis III: DNAs compete for project inflow and will thus engage in 
regulatory competition that leads to a “race to the bottom” of 
sustainability criteria, unless the DNA country holds a 
monopoly/oligopoly position in the low-cost abatement market. 
Hypothesis IV: Executive board members maximise the volume of 
additional project to be registered subject to their expertise and avoiding 
any costs imposed by a conflict of interest with their country of origin. 
Hypothesis V: Compliance buyers aim at minimising the target 
compliance costs. Doing so can be achieved through arbitrage of emission 
rights against CERs. 
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Hypothesis VI: Governments aim at minimising the costs imposed from 
emission reduction targets on society, by aiming for the lowest cost policy 
and maximising the revenue available for climate and non-climate issues 
so as to be able to compensate potentially adverse effects from the 
emissions policy. 
These hypotheses were used to assess whether the CDM achieved its goals of environmental 
integrity (i.e. additionality), sustainable development and cost-effectiveness. These goals 
were essential elements to ensure the cooperation of industrialised and developing countries. 
Industrialised countries were interested in achieving their target at lowest costs and 
developing countries were interested in pursuing economic growth in a sustainable manner 
funded with the support of industrialised countries. Environmental integrity is the back bone 
of the instrument: projects that would have happened anyway should not be financed, as this 
would increase global emissions 
The main findings of the book are as follows: 
This book finds that the CDM has not achieved its goals of environmental integrity, 
sustainable development and cost-effectiveness. Furthermore, the book shows cases, where 
the CDM conflicts with national climate policies in developing countries, for instance in 
China, the biggest CDM host country, and thus has an adverse effect on the global effort to 
reduce emissions. An alternative fund-approach, where developing countries are free to 
choose their long-term abatement strategy to be pursued by the funds received, could 
remedy some of the difficulties of the CDM, but creates potential trade-offs with cost-
effectiveness. The CDM has not been implemented efficiently at the compliance-stage within 
the EU ETS. The result is that large wind-fall rents have been conferred to participants of the 
EU ETS. In the following these findings are described in chronological order of the book’s 
main chapters excluding the introduction of the first chapter. 
Chapter 2 was a background chapter and characterised the procedures of the CDM, the 
effectiveness criteria applied to the CDM and the compliance market at the example of the 
EU ETS that were explored in more detail in Chapter 3, 4 and 5. The procedures of CDM 
project are conducted in seven steps. There are four main actors that were distinguished in 
the context of the CDM excluding the ultimate credit buyers in industrialised countries. 
Within these procedures the regulator and private auditing firms are responsible for 
ensuring additionality of projects and emission reductions, while the project developer is 
responsible for cost-effectiveness and the host country is responsible for sustainable 
development. To register a project, project developers need to demonstrate to the CDM 
regulator that the project is additional to any activity that would have happened anyway. The 
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regulator needs to collect information on the viability of the project without CDM support 
from the project developer, who is the better informed party. This information collection is 
done through the barrier or the investment analysis test (section 2.3 in Chapter 2). The 
information asymmetries between the regulator and project developers lead to potential 
moral hazard, which was examined in Chapter 3. The EU ETS and its quantitative and 
qualitative rules to use emission reductions generated through the CDM were briefly 
introduced to provide the background for Chapter 5.  
Chapter 3 showed the impact of information asymmetries between project developer and the 
CDM regulator in theory and that the resulting adverse selection and moral hazard 
challenges could often only be diminished in practice. The literature supported Hypothesis I 
and II and suggests that many registered CDM projects did not meet the criteria of 
additionality, sustainability and cost-effectiveness, as the regulator had fewer information 
and resources than market participants. Therefore the fund-approach, an alternative to the 
market based CDM was discussed. The clean development fund would collect penalty fees 
from industrialised countries, which emitted more than their emission limits and channel 
these fees to developing countries for emission reducing activities.  
Following the detection of non-additional registered projects, the CDM regulator had 
implemented stricter and clearer guidance over time and had sanctioned auditors, the latter 
which led auditing firms to increasingly decline validation of projects, thus suggesting that 
the guidance was effective (Hypothesis II and IV). Regarding sustainable development, the 
literature review has shown that CDM projects often focused on low-sustainability projects, 
as these were more profitable, than high-sustainability projects (Hypothesis III). In contrast 
to other countries, China was able to avoid regulatory competition and a “race to the bottom” 
of sustainability criteria. China imposed a tax on low-sustainable industrial gas projects 
without the concern of losing funds (Hypothesis III). However, the presence of the tax 
revenue limited its willingness to directly regulate industrial gas emissions through 
command and control regulation. Such regulation could have been pursued at a much lower 
cost but would have eroded the income from taxes. This interaction between the CDM and 
domestic policy in developing countries is particularly concerning as industrial gas projects 
make up the largest share of emission reduction credits expected from the CDM.  
Furthermore, the high revenue from the selling of project credits has been shown to create 
perverse incentives to increase production and thus increased global emissions from the 
industrial gas sector (Hypothesis I). Instead of fostering cooperation and evolution on 
domestic climate change policies, thus the CDM hindered these opportunities through the 
rent it created for involved countries. The chapter furthermore showed that an alternative 
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fund-approach would potentially resolve the regulatory competition issue (Hypothesis III). It 
would enable developing countries to align incentives provided by international funds with 
domestic policy. This is true if funds were conditioned on long-term observable sustainable 
development policy or not at all dependent on national policy so as to avoid strategic 
behaviour. Environmental integrity (additionality) and cost-effectiveness however could be 
potentially at risk due to insufficiency or diversion of funds.  
Chapter 4 examined the effectiveness of the benchmark test to prove additionality based on 
case studies in China and India. The analysis assessed whether benchmark rates have 
changed over time as a response to stricter guidance by the CDM regulator. The moral 
hazard problem predicted that project developers will choose high benchmark rates to 
render their projects unprofitable on a stand-alone basis (Hypothesis I). The analysis 
provided in this chapter came to mixed results. On one hand, consistent with rational choice 
theory, the analysis showed that the level of the benchmark chosen varied with the freedom 
to set benchmark rates. Project developers in India were free to set the benchmark rate and 
have used a variety of benchmark sources and levels. In comparison, China had used steady 
government rates. On the other hand, while benchmark rates have dropped in India 
following guidance from the CDM regulator, it cannot be concluded that the guidance by the 
CDM regulator was effective in reducing subjectivity, because these findings are based only 
on few data observations. The reduction in benchmark rates could also reflect learning and 
lower risk for the renewable technology involved over time so that lower profitability was 
required from these projects in general. To assess whether the benchmark test had become 
more objective over time, further analysis will have to analyse the simultaneous impact of 
risk factors and regulator guidance on benchmark rates. The findings in this chapter were 
consistent with previous research which has shown that project developers frequently chose 
internal company benchmark rates, which were generally higher and more difficult to assess 
in practice than sectoral rates.  
However, even in the presence of lower benchmark rates, for instance through a benchmark 
imposed by the government, as was the case in China, the question remained whether there 
is not a strategic choice by the government to game the benchmark test, i.e. to misrepresent 
the financial profitability or projects through the choice of other parameters in the 
benchmark test (Hypothesis III). While this was not been examined in this chapter, some 
previous empirical research conducted suggested that this is the case, when the CDM 
regulator rejected Chinese wind projects suspecting that these projects were “made” 
additional by the Chinese government through the decrease in the feed-in-tariff for wind. 
Understanding the strategic interaction between international support and domestic policy 
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is the basis for future policy design within and beyond the CDM. The findings of this chapter 
can serve as a starting point for such examination. 
Chapter 5 examined how the European Union has implemented the limits on the use of 
certified emission reduction credits from CDM projects for compliance in the EU ETS. As the 
right to use CER conferred a value to its holder, emitters in countries with a generous CDM 
limit benefited from higher arbitrage rents. These rents arose through the profitable sale of 
previously freely allocated EUA (European Union Allowance - the currency of the EU ETS) 
with CERs (Hypothesis V). The higher CDM limits were the result of more stringent 
reduction targets in some EU Member States relative to others. The chapter quantified the 
rents created through this limit for the year 2008. The chapter showed that the current 
application of installation-specific limits within the EU was inefficient and gave potential rise 
to competitive distortions.  
Three alternative mechanisms for distributing access to the CER limits and the underlying 
compliance cost reduction were discussed: free allocation, auctioning, and pre-commitment. 
This had implications for applying the limit within the EU. The EU can improve the current 
system by either shifting to auctioning CER usage certificates or pre-selling allowances in the 
amount equal to the CDM limit, and subsequently buying CERs (Hypothesis VI). The main 
advantages of these approaches were achieving the lowest compliance costs across the EU 
and decreasing the rents and arbitrage opportunities awarded to participants in the EU ETS. 
These options have transaction cost limitations as they require that either the regulator 
actively participates in the market or limits were allocated (freely or by auction), for 
subsequent trading. A change in the baseline for allocating the limits from the current status 
quo EUA allocation to one of verified emissions leads to an efficiency improvement and 
mitigated the distortive effects of EUA allocation, while at the same time providing potential 
lower incentives to increase emissions to profit from increased CER use.  
Summarising, the Clean Development Mechanism is a useful example of the opportunities 
and challenges of using market instrument to support mitigation action in developing 
countries. The offsetting mechanism succeeded in creating some attention and engaging new 
public and private actors, and also delivered initial low-carbon projects. But the analysis also 
demonstrated that the mechanism inherently carries the risk of global emission increases. 
Furthermore, even in the presence of perfect information, the incremental emission 
reductions by the CDM are not sufficient to achieve the deep emission reductions consistent 
with reducing global emissions by 80% by the year 2050. Thus, solving the challenges and 
up-scaling the CDM cannot address the problem of decreasing global emissions beyond the 
Kyoto Protocol targets. 
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6.2 Limitations  
The findings of this book are subject to several limitations which are outlined in the 
following: 
The analysis in chapter 3 on the cost-effectiveness and sustainable development of projects is 
based on earlier CDM case-studies. For instance, abatement costs for different project types 
are extrapolated from a smaller sample to all projects registered by the year 2011. Abatement 
costs could have decreased in the meantime due to learning or have increased due to the 
move along the marginal abatement cost curve. This, however, does not alter the conclusion 
that rents between abatement costs and market price, could be used to leverage mitigation, 
and that the presence of these rents can hinder domestic policy. Similarly, the ranking 
applied to sustainable development benefits from different project types assumes that 
sustainability benefits announced during project documentation reflect actual benefits 
observable after implementation of the project (Appendix 1 of Chapter 3). This need not hold 
true in practice. Project developers can easily exaggerate sustainable development benefits 
when there is no penalty after implementation for “optimism” as the literature has shown. 
However, it was assumed that all project types overestimate benefits in project 
documentation, such that this is expected not to change the actual ranking of the 
sustainability of projects.  
The benchmark analysis in chapter 4 focuses on the absolute benchmark rate without taking 
account of the underlying risk of the project. Only a few observations indicate that rates have 
declined following regulatory guidance. The findings of the chapter, thus call for further 
research to be able to draw any inference whether examined projects are additional or not, 
and whether the benchmark test incentivises strategic behaviour for host country 
governments.  
The main limitation of the analysis on the use of CDM in the EU ETS is that the policy 
recommendations cover the limits awarded to EU ETS installations for a period which is 
already running. Changing the rules for these limits as suggested in the analysis would face 
substantial political barriers. However, the analysis is hoped to contribute to the effective 
implementation of future periods and the eventual phase-out of offsets, as a rights approach 
allows rights to be withdrawn from the market if necessary.  
6.3 Outlook 
The CDM is based on a top-down approach in a global climate change regime, i.e. setting 
targets globally and distributing them to individual emitters. This approach is gradually 
replaced by a bottom-up approach, where national, bilateral and regional cooperation play 
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an increasingly stronger role (Buchner & Carraro, 2007). The CDM is an element of the top-
down approach. Even if the CDM could be improved by addressing its weaknesses analysed 
in this book, the incremental changes offered by the CDM are not sufficient to reduce global 
emissions by 80-95% by the year 2050. Originally it was envisioned that the CDM is a 
transitory mechanism. Developing countries were expected, given experience with the CDM, 
to move to binding targets, which would enable a global emissions trading scheme. The 
global emissions trading vision did not materialise in practice, partly because the CDM 
provides incentives for developing countries to resist such a change to renounce CDM 
revenue, and because both industrialised developing countries did not accept binding 
emission reduction targets compatible with a decarbonisation by 2050.  
New approaches need to be developed which go beyond offsetting and account for the 
massive efforts that are required to decarbonise the economy in the next forty years as well 
as address the shift in power structures between countries at the global level. The 
decarbonisation efforts include infrastructure investments in electricity grids to enable 
decentralised renewable energy deployment, renewable technologies, electricity storage 
facilities, and incentives for energy efficiency in industry and buildings. An institutional 
framework that encourages such investment by private actors will facilitate the process. This 
is true for both industrialised and developing countries. At the same time, national 
circumstances and challenges vary between countries. For instance, in Brazil and Indonesia 
forestry and agriculture sectors account for the largest portion of greenhouse emissions. 
These sectors are also an important source of food provision as well as for economic growth 
and are thus highly sensitive to change. The tasks thus vary from country to country due to 
the economic structure and deserve a closer look at the national circumstances rather than a 
one-size fits all global emissions trading scheme. 
Furthermore, the Kyoto split between industrialised and developing countries is blurring. 
Increasingly, developing countries such as China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa play 
an increasingly important role both politically and economically. A large middle-class is 
emerging in these countries, whose consumption patterns and wants are influenced by 
examples from industrialised nations. At the same time, industrialised countries struggle 
beyond the emissions challenge with a budgetary and financial crisis. Resolving these crises 
at the same time in industrialised countries will take considerable economic and political 
effort and slowly balances the power between industrialised and emerging (also called newly 
industrialised) economies.  
Thus, the challenges to develop a growth paradigm to achieve low-emissions growth vary to 
some degree with the national context. It is thus difficult to sketch a complete roadmap of 
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what approach to take. However, some of the following building blocks will facilitate the 
transformation to a decarbonised economy in all countries1: 
1) Evidence-based decision-making 
2) Understanding of financial flows and their structure 
3) Adaptive, iterative and collaborate learning 
4) Political accountability at the national level 
First and foremost, decisions taken on activities connected with decarbonisation are more 
stable and effective over time if they are based on evidence. Basing decisions on evidence is 
an over-arching theme that entails the aspects of finance, collaborative learning and 
accountability. Gathering evidence requires the availability of data and an analysis of this 
data to understand what did work in the past and what did not? The CDM data analysed in 
this book is a prime example. Due to the availability of data, the CDM regulator could change 
the framework and thereby improve performance of the system. This is even more important 
in the national context. An example is the German feed-in-tariff that provides an incentive to 
German households to install photovoltaic technology on the roof. Did this policy instrument 
work? The German government reports every four years to the German parliament on 
deployment rates, the cost evolution of the technology, and employment effects. Some of this 
data is collected on an annual basis (Hogan et al., 2012). This enables the German 
government to take decisions on this policy instrument on the basis of evidence and 
experience.  
Second, most governments are interested in the financial burden that such a transformation 
to a low-carbon economy requires. Mapping the financial flows of previous and current 
decisions enables to understand which actors invested how much, and how these flows 
finally enable the building of energy infrastructure or the increase in energy efficiency. The 
experience with the CDM has shown that in order to achieve CDM status, private actors need 
to document precisely their investment decision process, financial flows and the 
identification of risks. Public regulators can do a similar mapping at a nationwide scale. Also 
at the national level most investments have both a public and a private component. The 
share of each of these components is dependent on the institutional framework as private 
actors compare the risk of any undertaking with the return they can earn. Understanding 
these components and their structure allows governments to better tailor the institutional 
framework to optimise the ratio between public and private money invested in low-carbon 
infrastructure and technology. An example of this is the connection risk from offshore wind 
                                                          
1
 These building blocks are similarly important for good policy in general, but are especially 
conductive to long-term transformative changes. 
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parks. Who is liable in the case of a connection loss? Answering these questions can help 
governments to speed up investments in renewable technologies. Law and economics is well-
suited to help answer some of these questions. 
Third, adaptive, iterative and collaborate learning requires that countries and regions try 
different approaches in a trial and error fashion for some policies. This enables learning and 
improvement based on evidence. The findings in this book show that the rules governing the 
CDM have been constantly improving over time based on evidence. The identification of 
weaknesses was however a collaborative effort between academics, civil society, the CDM 
regulator, and sometimes national governments and CDM consultants. This requires the 
open sharing of information through open consultation processes, which allow public actors 
to tailor low-carbon policies better to the realities of private actors. With the participation of 
civil society better results can be achieved to balance the information provision by industry. 
Trial and error entails the risk of “betting too much on the wrong horse.” The Chinese 
government reduces this risk by trying out new policies in one province first before they are 
scaled up at the national level. Many regions around the world take a similar approach. Thus, 
sharing information of successful policies can be helpful for other countries to adapt the 
experience to their own situation. Law and economics research can help measure the 
performance of a particular policy, analyse the reasons, and make improvement suggestions. 
Furthermore, law and economics can help to translate the findings from a national country 
context to another. 
Fourth, accountability allows public actors to measure their performance in achieving their 
goals. While some policy-makers will naturally shy away from direct performance 
measurement, it is an important yard stick to improve policy. The CDM experience has 
shown that auditing firms that do not conform to the rules are sanctioned. Indeed in the 
private sector in general performance measurement is often immediate. This poses a 
challenge in the public sector as a low-carbon transformation requires long-term decisions 
and as mentioned some trial and error, inevitably leading to sub-optimal performance at 
first. Public actors should have the freedom to take decisions on the basis of well-founded 
evidence and data, and take responsibility for the outcomes. The accountability system 
should enable improvement over time rather than induce sanctions or punishment, as 
optimal results are rarely achieved at the first trial.  
These four criteria will play an important role in the national context as well as in bilateral 
interaction between countries. For instance, the Copenhagen Accord foresees a transfer from 
industrialised to developing countries of US$100 billion a year from the year 2020 onwards 
and “fast-start finance” of US$30 billion a year between 2010 and 2012. These funds are to 
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be spent so as to align long-term climate, economic and social goals in emerging economies. 
The Green Climate Fund is currently under discussion at the UNFCCC and can channel the 
aforementioned funds into low-carbon activities. Spending by the Green Climate Fund 
should be based on evidence, experience with financial flows and structure, enable cross-
country learning, and ensure accountability. One channel is the currently discussed concept 
of nationally appropriate mitigation actions. It is an umbrella term for potential projects 
being pursued unilaterally or with international support. These nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions are essentially plans by developing countries which are submitted for 
international support for instance directly to the Global Climate Fund. It is important to 
analyse what kind of cooperation between donor and implementing country governments is 
necessary and possible to design effective emission reduction activities (Upadhyaya, 2012). 
Such cooperation requires a better understanding of national circumstances in developing 
countries rather than a tick-box approach used in the CDM, as climate is a cross-cutting 
issue and countries’ concerns over food and energy security, as well as poverty reduction 
come first. Making the ground rules of managing the nationally appropriate mitigation 
action process clear is where the future of mutual responsibility of industrialised and 
emerging economies for a shift towards a low carbon path lies. The four criteria of evidence, 
finance, collaborative learning and accountability facilitate this process.  
The research findings of this book, based on law and economics analysis, contribute to the 
evolving knowledge that a large decarbonisation transformation needs to be based on long-
term goals beyond short-term cost advantages and beyond offsetting. Future climate policy 
research should focus on the optimal design and interaction between public and private 
funds to leverage decarbonisation projects where long-term climate, social and economic 
goals are maximised. Taking such a holistic approach requires potentially the collaboration 
of law and economics scholars with other disciplines. The research stemming from such 
collaboration will inevitably allow an effective and socially-acceptable transformation of our 
economies and societies. 
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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
limate change has been acknowledged as a threat to humanity. Most scholars agree 
that to avert dangerous climate change and to transform economies into low-carbon 
societies, deep global emission reductions are required by the year 2050. Under the 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the only 
market-based instrument that encourages industrialised countries to pursue emission 
reductions in developing countries. The CDM aims to pay the incremental finance necessary 
to operationalize emission reduction projects which are otherwise not financially viable. 
According to the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM should finance projects that are 
additional to those which would have happened anyway, contribute to sustainable 
development in the countries hosting the projects, and be cost-effective. To enable the 
identification of such projects, an institutional framework has been established by the Kyoto 
Protocol which lays out responsibilities for public and private actors. This thesis examines 
whether the CDM has achieved these objectives in practice and can thus be considered an 
effective tool to reduce emissions. 
To complete this investigation, the book applies a rational choice approach and analyses the 
CDM from two perspectives. The first perspective is the supply-dimension which answers the 
question of how, in practice, the CDM system identified additional, cost-effective, 
sustainable projects and, generated emission reductions. The main contribution of this book 
is the second perspective, the compliance-dimension, which answers the question of whether 
industrialised countries effectively used the CDM for compliance with their Kyoto targets. 
The application of the CDM in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is 
used as a case-study. Where the analysis identifies inefficiencies within the supply or the 
compliance dimension, potential improvements of the legal framework are proposed and 
discussed.  
The book finds that the CDM has not achieved its goals of additionality, sustainable 
development nor cost-effectiveness. In some cases the CDM incentivises governments such 
as the Chinese government, to forgo the implementation of national low-carbon policies in 
specific sectors so as to maintain financial support provided through the CDM. These 
adverse interactions reduce the global effort to reduce emissions. To overcome the pitfalls of 
the current CDM approach, a fund-approach, is discussed which would collect penalty fees 
from industrialised countries, which emitted more than their emission limits and channel 
these fees to developing countries for emission reducing activities. The fund-approach 
results in developing countries being free to determine their long-term abatement strategy 
and thus potentially strengthening national domestic climate and energy policy. While this 
could remedy some of the difficulties of the CDM such as the absence of sustainable 
C 
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development, it potentially creates trade-offs with project cost-effectiveness in the short-
term.  
The CDM has also not been implemented efficiently at the compliance-stage within the EU 
ETS. The right to use CDM has been allocated to participants of the EU ETS free of charge 
and has led to large wind-fall rent gains to these emitters. The book outlines different 
options to correct for this inefficiency and collect these rents to leverage for further 
mitigation in Europe or developing countries. In light of these findings, the book concludes 
by discussing emerging alternative approaches and future research required to support the 
restructuring of our economies to become low-carbon societies in the coming decades.  
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
limaatverandering wordt algemeen erkend als een bedreiging voor de mensheid. 
De meeste wetenschappers zijn het erover eens dat grote emissiereducties moeten 
zijn gerealiseerd  in het jaar 2050 en dat de economie koolstofarm moet zijn zodat 
een gevaarlijke klimaatverandering kan worden voorkomen. Het mechanisme voor schone 
ontwikkeling (Clean Development Mechanisme, CMD), ingevoerd door het Kyoto Protocol, is 
het enige marktinstrument waarmee geïndustrialiseerde landen worden aangemoedigd om 
in ontwikkelingslanden emissiereducties te bewerkstellingen. Het doel van de CMD is het 
financieren van de oplopende kosten die worden gemaakt voor uitstootbeperkende projecten 
die anders financieel niet haalbaar zouden zijn. Volgens de doelen van het Kyoto protocol 
moeten met CMD projecten worden gefinancierd die een aanvulling zijn op de projecten die 
toch al zouden zijn uitgevoerd en waarmee een bijdrage wordt geleverd aan duurzame 
ontwikkeling van rendabele projecten in de landen waar de projecten worden uitgevoerd. 
Het Kyoto protocol heeft een institutioneel kader in het leven geroepen voor dergelijke 
projecten waarin de verantwoordelijkheden van publieke en private partijen zijn neergelegd. 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt of deze doeleinden met CMD worden bereikt, met andere 
woorden of CMD een effectief middel is om de uitstoot te verminderen. 
Om dit onderzoek compleet te maken, wordt in dit boek een rationele keuzebenadering 
gevolgd en wordt CMD geanalyseerd vanuit twee perspectieven. Het eerste perspectief is de 
vraagdimensie die erop gericht is om te zien hoe met CMD aanvullende, rendabele en 
duurzame projecten kunnen worden gevonden die de emissie beperken. De belangrijkste 
bijdrage van dit boek is echter het tweede perspectief, de nakomingdimensie, waarmee de 
vraag wordt beantwoord of geïndustrialiseerde landen CMD daadwerkelijk hebben gebruikt 
om aan hun Kyoto doelen te voldoen. Als case study voor de CMD is gekozen voor het 
Europese emissiehandelssysteem (European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, EU ETS). 
Het doel van de analyse is het aangeven waar de vraagdimensie en de nakomingdimensie 
tekort schieten en hoe het juridische kader mogelijkerwijs kan worden verbeterd.  
De conclusie is dat met CMD de doelen van additionaliteit, duurzame ontwikkeling en 
rendabiliteit niet worden gehaald. In sommige gevallen, zoals in China, zorgt CMD ervoor 
dat de overheid geen landelijk beleid voert om emissies in bepaalde sectoren tegen te gaan 
teneinde de financiële voordelen van de CMD te behouden. Deze acties hebben een 
tegengesteld en nadelig effect op de wereldwijde pogingen om emissies tegen te gaan. Om de 
nadelen van de huidige CMD benadering tegen te gaan, wordt aangegeven hoe heffingen 
kunnen worden geïnd van geïndustrialiseerde landen die meer uitstoot hebben geproduceerd 
dan is toegestaan. Deze heffingen moeten ten goede komen aan de ontwikkelingslanden voor 
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maatregelen om de uitstoot te beperken. De fondsbenadering geeft ontwikkelingslanden de 
vrijheid om hun langetermijn strategie voor de vermindering van uitstoot te bepalen, 
waarmee het nationale klimaat- en energiebeleid kan worden versterkt. Met deze benadering 
kunnen sommige problemen van de CMD, zoals de afwezigheid van de duurzame 
ontwikkeling, worden opgelost en op korte termijn kan de rendabiliteit van de projecten 
mogelijkerwijs worden verbeterd.  
De CMD is evenmin op efficiënte wijze ingevoerd in de EU ETS. Het recht om CMD in te 
zetten is kosteloos voor deelnemers van de EU ETS en heeft geleid tot grote financiële 
meevallers voor de uitstootveroorzakers. In dit boek worden de verschillende opties 
besproken om deze inefficiëntie tegen te gaan, zodat deze opbrengsten ten goede kunnen 
komen aan het beperken van de uitstoot in Europa en ontwikkelingslanden. In het licht van 
deze conclusies wordt het boek afgesloten met een bespreking van de alternatieven en 
onderzoek dat verder nodig is om onze economieën de komende decennia om te vormen in 
een koolstofarme maatschappij.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
